(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocha v. FedEx Corporation, 2020 IL App (1st) 190041, ¶ 60. Here, the court stated the motion to dismiss "w[ould] be granted," not that the motion was granted.
In addition, a complaint must contain well-pled facts and not merely conclusions of fact or law. Rocha v. FedEx Corp., 2020 IL App (1st) 190041, ¶ 66. ¶ 15 Under section 2-612(a) of the Civil Code, when a pleading is insufficient in substance or form, the circuit court may order a fuller or more particular statement or, if the issues are not sufficiently defined, it may order other pleadings be prepared.
"[A] complaint should contain well-pled facts and not simply mere conclusions of either fact or law." Rocha v. FedEx Corp., 2020 IL App (1st) 190041, ¶ 66, 164 N.E.3d 640 (citing Barham v. Knickrehm, 277 Ill.App.3d 1034, 1037, 661 N.E.2d 1166, 1168-69 (1996)). ¶ 22 "There is little question that a trial court has the authority, on its own motion, to strike a complaint that is insufficient in substance ***."
To establish a breach of contract under Illinois law, a plaintiff must prove (1) a valid and enforceable contract exists; (2) he substantially performed; (3) the defendant committed a breach; and (4) resulting damages. Rocha v. FedEx Corp., 164 N.E.3d 640, 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). There is no dispute that these elements are met, and the only question is the amount of resulting damages.
735 ILCS § 5/13-215. A plaintiff relying on fraudulent concealment must show that the defendant engaged in "affirmative acts or representations" designed to prevent the plaintiff from discovering the cause of action or induce her into delaying filing her claim. Rocha v. FedEx Corp., 2020 IL App (1st) 190041, ¶ 86 (quoting J.S. Reimer, Inc. v. Vill. of Orland Hills, 2013 IL App (1st) 120106, ¶ 51). The plaintiff must have detrimentally relied on those deceptions.
¶ 21 To prevail on their claim of breach of contract, plaintiffs must prove (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract, (2) that they substantially performed the contract, (3) that defendant breached the contract, and (4) that damages resulted. See Rocha v. FedEx Corp., 2020 IL App (1st) 190041, ¶ 95. Whether a breach of contract occurred is a question of fact and the judgment of the trier of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence. Horton Industrial, Inc. v. Village of Moweaqua
Although the trial court continued to grant additional motions for extensions, the appellate court held that after the December 19, 2008, deadline passed with no ruling granting an additional extension, the trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the case, and the plaintiff's eventual notice of appeal was untimely. Id. at 855; see In re Estate of Andre T., 2018 IL App (1st) 172613, ¶¶ 35-36 (this court found the mother's motion to dismiss the trial court's appointment of guardians to be untimely when filed more than 30 days after the appointment order had been entered); Rocha v. FedEx Corp., 2020 IL App (1st) 190041, ¶ 55 (observing that "[i]n jury cases, a posttrial motion must be filed within 30 days after the entry of judgment or within any other timeframe as allowed by the circuit court, so long as the court allows such an extension within the initial 30-day window or any extension period"); Habitat Co., LLC v. Peeples, 2018 IL App (1st) 171420, ¶ 15 (recognizing the "general rule is that a trial court loses jurisdiction over a case and has no authority to vacate or modify a final judgment once 30 days have elapsed, unless a timely postjudgment motion has been filed").
¶ 35 "The denial of a motion to dismiss an appeal is not final and '[t]he panel that hears the appeal has an independent duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction and to dismiss the appeal if it does not.'" Rocha v. FedEx Corp., 2020 IL App (1st) 190041, ¶ 54 (quoting In re Estate of Gagliardo, 391 Ill.App.3d 343, 348-49 (2009)). Therefore, despite the prior order denying the motion to dismiss, we reconsider whether this appeal is moot, pursuant to our inherent authority to reconsider our prior rulings.
¶ 36 "The denial of a motion to dismiss an appeal is not final and '[t]he panel that hears the appeal has an independent duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction and to dismiss the appeal if it does not. '" Rocha v. FedEx Corporation, 2020 IL App (1st) 190041, ¶ 54 (quoting In re Estate of Gagliardo, 391 Ill.App.3d 343, 348-49 (2009)). Therefore, despite the prior order denying the motion to dismiss, we reconsider whether this appeal is moot, pursuant to our inherent authority to reconsider our prior rulings.
Had the court believed that Graham's supplemental petition for attorney fees and costs was unwarranted based upon the dictates of Graham I or because it had not granted him leave to do so, it could have struck Graham's supplemental petition sua sponte rather than provided the parties a briefing schedule and allowed the supplemental petition to be fully briefed. See Rocha v. FedEx Corp., 2020 IL App (1st) 190041, ¶ 70 (finding the circuit court properly struck a party's pleading sua sponte). We therefore find no issue with Graham filing a supplemental petition for attorney fees and costs.