Courts apply general principles of justiciability governing declaratory-judgment standing to determine whether a party has standing under section 14.44. See Rocco Altobelli, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Commerce, 524 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. App. 1994) (citing State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 25 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. 1946)); see also Arens v. Village of Rogers, 61 N.W.2d 508, 512-13 (1953)).

This court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of an administrative agency's rule in a pre-enforcement declaratory-judgment action. Minn. Stat. § 14.44 (2012); Rocco Altobelli, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Commerce, 524 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. App. 1994). If we conclude the challenged rule violates constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's statutory authority, or was adopted in violation of statutory rulemaking procedures, we will declare the rule invalid. Minn. Stat. § 14.45 (2012). Petitioners argue that the DNR violated statutory rulemaking procedures by adopting the wolf rules under expedited emergency rulemaking procedures, which do not require a notice-and-comment period.

Courts apply general principles of justiciability governing declaratory-judgment standing to determine whether a party has standing under section 14.44. SeeRocco Altobelli, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Commerce , 524 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. App. 1994) (citing State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland , 223 Minn. 89, 25 N.W.2d 474, 477 (1946) ); see alsoArens v. Village of Rogers , 240 Minn. 386, 61 N.W.2d 508, 512-13 (1953). Under these principles, "[p]etitioners must have a direct interest in the validity of that rule which is different in character from the interest of the citizenry in general."

Before addressing the merits of a petition under section 14.44, however, we must determine whether the petitioner has standing to challenge the rule. Rocco Altobelli Inc. v. Dep't of Commerce, 524 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. App. 1994). We may only consider the validity of the rule when "it appears that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner."

This court has treated this language in section 14.44 as a conferment of statutory standing and has applied general principles governing declaratory-judgment standing to determine the existence of standing in a rules action. See Rocco Altobelli, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Commerce, 524 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. App. 1994) (citing State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 25 N.W.2d 474 (Minn. 1946) and Arens v. Village of Rogers, 61 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 1953)). Under those principles, the mere possibility of injury or a mere interest in a problem is not sufficient to confer standing.

But a petitioner must have standing to challenge an administrative rule under Minn.Stat. § 14.44. Rocco Altobelli Inc. v. State, Dep't of Commerce, 524 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn.App. 1994). Standing exists only "when it appears that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner."

Generally, before addressing the merits of a declaratory-judgment action, this court must determine whether the petitioner has standing to challenge an agency's rule. Rocco Altobelli, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Com., 524 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn.App. 1994). Shortly after petitioners commenced this action, respondent moved to dismiss the action for lack of standing.

To have standing to bring an action under section 14.44, a petitioner must show that a rule or its “threatened application” will interfere with or threaten to interfere with legal rights of the petitioner. Rocco Altobelli, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Commerce, 524 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn.App.1994). A petitioner's interest must be different in character than the interest of the general citizenry.

The petitioner's “direct interest” in the validity of the challenged rule must be “different in character from the interest of the citizenry in general.” Rocco Altobelli, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Commerce, 524 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn.App.1994) (quotation omitted). An organization whose members claim such an interest may file suit “to redress injuries ... to its members.”

The principle underlying the right of equal protection is that people who are similarly situated will be treated in a similar manner by the law. Rocco Altobelli, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Commerce, 524 N.W.2d 30, 37 (Minn.App. 1994). The father argues that Minn. Stat. § 518.54, subd. 8, as applied, violates equal protection because a parent who carries the label "sole physical custodian" is accorded greater benefit by the law than a parent who does not have that label, even though the "noncustodial" parent might spend as much time caring for the children as the custodial parent does.