Petitioner's guilty plea is, therefore, valid. Furthermore, contrary to petitioner's argument, the record does not support his claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel (see Matter of Robinson v. Travis, 295 A.D.2d 719). Turning to petitioner's various challenges to the Board's determination, we are unpersuaded that the violation finding was insufficient because respondent failed to formally introduce a certificate of conviction. Notably, at no point did petitioner dispute the existence of the Florida conviction and, in any event, his guilty plea, standing alone, is "sufficient to provide a rational basis for the finding of guilt as to the charged violation" (Matter of McCloud v. New York State Div. of Parole, 277 A.D.2d 627, 628, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 702;see Matter of Carney v. New York State Div. of Parole, 244 A.D.2d 746, 746). Furthermore, we find that the statement provided to him explaining the evidence relied upon and the reasons his parole was revoked was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process (see People ex rel. Hacker v. New York State Div. of Parole, 228 A.D.2d 849, 850, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 809).
Petitioner has not sustained the assertion that he failed to receive meaningful legal representation, a claim that requires more than a showing of disagreement with defense counsel's strategy or tactics (see People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705, 708-709). As set forth in the record, the ALJ was aware that defense counsel and the parole revocation specialist had agreed to a 24-month hold period; however, he advised the parties prior to petitioner's plea of guilty to the parole violation that he had arrived at an independent determination, finding that a hold period of 32 months would be more appropriate in view of the serious nature of the conduct involved in petitioner's parole violations and his conviction of an additional crime while he was released on parole (see Matter of Robinson v. Travis, 295 A.D.2d 719). In any event, the ultimate determination of the length of petitioner's hold period lay within the power of the Board. Hence, an agreement with the ALJ regarding the length of the hold period would not have guaranteed its adoption by the Board.
Id at 835-836 (citation omitted). In Robinson v. Travis, 295 AD2d 719, on the other hand, the facts are well-spelled out and in stark contrast to the facts and circumstances in the case at bar. The Robinson petitioner was serving an indeterminate sentence of 20 years to life imposed upon his conviction of the crime of Murder 2°.