Robinson v. Stuck

7 Citing cases

  1. Wade v. Whalen

    232 Ga. App. 765 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 21 times

    Sykes v. Springer, 220 Ga. App. 388, 390 (2) ( 469 S.E.2d 472) (1996); cf. Ga. Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Kilgore, 265 Ga. 836, 837 ( 462 S.E.2d 713) (1995) ("In determining whether diligence was exercised, the focus is upon the plaintiff's efforts after becoming aware that the process server failed to perfect service in accordance with the time limit provided in OCGA § 9-11-4 (c)").Patterson v. Johnson, 226 Ga. App. 396, 398 ( 486 S.E.2d 660) (1997); Robinson v. Stuck, 194 Ga. App. 311, 312 (1) ( 390 S.E.2d 603) (1990); Roberts v. Bienert, 183 Ga. App. 751, 752 (1) ( 360 S.E.2d 25) (1987). On August 11 Wade sent the summons and complaint to the sheriff to serve Dr. Whalen at a residence in Cobb County, Georgia.

  2. Van Omen v. Lopresti

    357 Ga. App. 9 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that "the standard of ‘greatest possible diligence’ in the context of assessing a plaintiff's attempts at service applies only when the statute of limitation has expired and the defendant has raised a service defense in court"

    Numerous cases support Van Omen's position that the greatest-possible-diligence standard applies only from the time a defendant files a pleading raising a service issue. See, e.g., Lipscomb v. Davis , 335 Ga. App. 880, 880, 783 S.E.2d 398 (2016) ; Milani v. Pablo , 316 Ga. App. 287, 288 (1), 728 S.E.2d 883 (2012) ; Milton v. Goins , 309 Ga. App. 865, 865-866 (2), 711 S.E.2d 415 (2011), overruled in part on other grounds in Giles , 330 Ga. App. at 317-321 & n. 2 (2), 765 S.E.2d 413 ; Carver v. Tift County Hosp. Auth. , 268 Ga. App. 153, 155, 601 S.E.2d 475 (2004), overruled in part on other grounds in Giles , 330 Ga. App. at 317-321 & n. 2 (2), 765 S.E.2d 413 ; Ingraham v. Marr , 246 Ga. App. 445, 447, 540 S.E.2d 652 (2000) ; Patterson v. Johnson , 226 Ga. App. 396, 398, 486 S.E.2d 660 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds in Giles , 330 Ga. App. at 317-321 & n. 2 (2), 765 S.E.2d 413 ; Robinson v. Stuck , 194 Ga. App. 311, 312 (1), 390 S.E.2d 603 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds in Giles , 330 Ga. App. at 317-321 & n. 2 (2), 765 S.E.2d 413. A less numerous line of cases supports Lopresti's position that the greatest-possible-diligence standard applies from the time a plaintiff becomes aware of a problem with service such as from a sheriff's return of service non est.

  3. Giles v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.

    765 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)

    992), overruled in part on other grounds, Farrie, supra; Collier v. Marsh, 203 Ga.App. 322, 323(2), 416 S.E.2d 849 (1992); Starr v. Wimbush, 201 Ga.App. 280, 281(2), 410 S.E.2d 776 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds, Ragan, supra; Bennett v. Matt Gay Chevrolet Oldsmobile, 200 Ga.App. 348, 349(1), 408 S.E.2d 111 (1991); Capra v. Rogers, 200 Ga.App. 131, 134(3), 407 S.E.2d 101 (1991); Williams v. Colonial Ins. Co., supra; Dunson v. Golden, 199 Ga.App. 513, 405 S.E.2d 332 (1991); Day v. Burnett, 199 Ga.App. 494, 495(1), 405 S.E.2d 316 (1991); Smith v. Winn, 198 Ga.App. 459(1), 402 S.E.2d 79 (1991); Ennis v. Bradshaw, 197 Ga.App. 744, 745, 399 S.E.2d 493 (1990); Pickens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 Ga.App. 550, 551, 398 S.E.2d 792 (1990); Green v. Young, 197 Ga.App. 101, 397 S.E.2d 509 (1990); Anderson v. Hughes, 196 Ga.App. 186, 187(1), 395 S.E.2d 623 (1990); Shears v. Harris, 196 Ga.App. 61, 395 S.E.2d 300 (1990); Land v. Casteel, 195 Ga.App. 455, 456, 393 S.E.2d 710 (1990); Robinson v. Stuck, 194 Ga.App. 311, 312(1), 390 S.E.2d 603 (1990); Davis v. Johnson, 193 Ga.App. 19, 21(1), 386 S.E.2d 900 (1989); Day v. Burnett, 189 Ga.App. 905, 906, 377 S.E.2d 734 (1989); Garrett v. Godby, 189 Ga.App. 183, 185(3), 375 S.E.2d 103 (1988); Ellerbee v. Interstate Contract Carrier Corp., 183 Ga.App. 828, 830(2)(b), 360 S.E.2d 280 (1987); Brumbalow v. Fritz, 183 Ga.App. 231, 232(2), 358 S.E.2d 872 (1987); Brim v. Pruitt, 178 Ga.App. 321, 323, 342 S.E.2d 690 (1986) (physical precedent only); Siler v. Johns, 173 Ga.App. 692, 327 S.E.2d 810 (1985) (physical precedent only); Brumit v. Mull, 165 Ga.App. 663, 665(3), 302 S.E.2d 408 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Brent v. Hin, 254 Ga.App. 77, 561 S.E.2d 212 (2002); Scoggins, supra, 156 Ga.App. at 410, 274 S.E.2d 775 (1980).In Parker v. Shreve, 244 Ga.App. 350, 535 S.E.2d 332 (2000) (physical precedent only), the rule was restated in yet another way.

  4. Giles v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.

    765 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)

    led in part on other grounds, Farrie, supra; Collier v. Marsh, 203 Ga.App. 322, 323(2), 416 S.E.2d 849 (1992) ; Starr v. Wimbush, 201 Ga.App. 280, 281(2), 410 S.E.2d 776 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds, Ragan, supra; Bennett v. Matt Gay Chevrolet Oldsmobile, 200 Ga.App. 348, 349(1), 408 S.E.2d 111 (1991) ; Capra v. Rogers, 200 Ga.App. 131, 134(3), 407 S.E.2d 101 (1991) ; Williams v. Colonial Ins. Co., supra; Dunson v. Golden, 199 Ga.App. 513, 405 S.E.2d 332 (1991) ; Day v. Burnett, 199 Ga.App. 494, 495(1), 405 S.E.2d 316 (1991) ; Smith v. Winn, 198 Ga.App. 459(1), 402 S.E.2d 79 (1991) ; Ennis v. Bradshaw, 197 Ga.App. 744, 745, 399 S.E.2d 493 (1990) ; Pickens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 Ga.App. 550, 551, 398 S.E.2d 792 (1990) ; Green v. Young, 197 Ga.App. 101, 397 S.E.2d 509 (1990) ; Anderson v. Hughes, 196 Ga.App. 186, 187(1), 395 S.E.2d 623 (1990) ; Shears v. Harris, 196 Ga.App. 61, 395 S.E.2d 300 (1990) ; Land v. Casteel, 195 Ga.App. 455, 456, 393 S.E.2d 710 (1990) ; Robinson v. Stuck, 194 Ga.App. 311, 312(1), 390 S.E.2d 603 (1990) ; Davis v. Johnson, 193 Ga.App. 19, 21(1), 386 S.E.2d 900 (1989) ; Day v. Burnett, 189 Ga.App. 905, 906, 377 S.E.2d 734 (1989) ; Garrett v. Godby, 189 Ga.App. 183, 185(3), 375 S.E.2d 103 (1988) ; Ellerbee v. Interstate Contract Carrier Corp., 183 Ga.App. 828, 830(2)(b), 360 S.E.2d 280 (1987) ; Brumbalow v. Fritz, 183 Ga.App. 231, 232(2), 358 S.E.2d 872 (1987) ; Brim v. Pruitt, 178 Ga.App. 321, 323, 342 S.E.2d 690 (1986) (physical precedent only); Siler v. Johns, 173 Ga.App. 692, 327 S.E.2d 810 (1985) (physical precedent only); Brumit v. Mull, 165 Ga.App. 663, 665(3), 302 S.E.2d 408 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Brent v. Hin, 254 Ga.App. 77, 561 S.E.2d 212 (2002) ; Scoggins, supra, 156 Ga.App. at 410, 274 S.E.2d 775 (1980).five-day grace period could begin running on the same day the complaint is filed when the clerk provides the summons and complaint to the person making service on the same day, the date of filing is not always the start date for the fi

  5. Flemister v. Hopko

    230 Ga. App. 93 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 8 times

    We find no abuse of discretion in the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Hopko. Bennett v. Nelson, 202 Ga. App. 346 ( 414 S.E.2d 291); Robinson v. Stuck, 194 Ga. App. 311, 312 (1) ( 390 S.E.2d 603). See also Abelt v. Nelson, 204 Ga. App. 501 ( 419 S.E.2d 749).

  6. McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

    177 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 1999)   Cited 7 times
    Listing the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits as ascribing to the doctrine, but choosing to follow the First, Third, and Tenth, which had taken the opposite position.

    Whether plaintiff diligently attempted to perfect service is a question for the trial court which must decide "whether the plaintiff showed that he acted in a reasonable and diligent manner in attempting to ensure that a proper service was made as quickly as possible." Robinson v. Stuck, 194 Ga. App. 311, 390 S.E.2d 603, 604 (1990). The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiff's delay in perfecting service was unreasonable.

  7. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Brunswick, Georgia April 4, 1991

    158 F.R.D. 693 (N.D. Ga. 1994)   Cited 6 times
    Finding suit time barred when plaintiffs waited fifteen days after filing of suit and eight days after expiration of the statute of limitations, opted for mail service rather than personal service, and finally perfected service over seven months from the filing date

    Further, if plaintiffs are unable to make this showing, then the statute of limitations is not tolled and they are barred from bringing suit. Robinson v. Stuck, 194 Ga.App. 311, 390 S.E.2d 603 (1990), cert. denied (March 1, 1990). Where, as here, the plaintiffs waited fifteen days after the suit was filed and eight days after the statute had expired to obtain a summons, forewent personal service in favor of service by mail, and where service was not personally served on the defendant until over seven months had passed from the filing date, the plaintiffs have clearly failed to meet their burden. Therefore, the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is hereby GRANTED.