Robinson v. State

16 Citing cases

  1. Palmer v. State

    271 Ga. 234 (Ga. 1999)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that evidence that the defendant was in possession of the murder weapon when stopped for a traffic violation several years before the homicide-related crimes “was not a similar transaction, but simply relevant evidence that [the defendant] possessed the murder weapon”

    Therefore, Palmer's plea of misnomer was untimely. See id.; Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 368-369(1) ( 498 S.E.2d 579) (1998). Moreover, Palmer is clearly the person named in the indictment.

  2. Blackwell v. State

    512 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 1999)   Cited 8 times

    Applying the "reasonable attorney performance" test to trial counsel's tactical decision to have appellant recant his confessions before the jury rather than in a pre-trial hearing, we conclude that trial counsel's actions were reasonable and, even if unreasonable, appellant suffered no harm since his assertions concerning his pre-confession demeanor and the officers' purported behavior were aired before the jury which did not find appellant's version of events to be credible. See Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368(6) ( 498 S.E.2d 579) (1998). Turning to the issue of witness impeachment, our review of the record shows that when trial counsel cross-examined one of the police detectives, the witness admitted that his testimony differed in a crucial aspect from the written report he had made of his interview with appellant.

  3. McKie v. State

    812 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 3 times

    Id. at 130-131, 558 S.E.2d 459 ; see also Kovacs v. State , 227 Ga. App. 870, 872 (2), 490 S.E.2d 539 (1997) (when a defendant admitted at trial and in closing argument that "he knew he had a suspended license," the evidence was sufficient to find him guilty of driving with a suspended license); Michael v. State , 335 Ga. App. 579, 584 (1), n. 7, 782 S.E.2d 479 (2016) (in light of evidence including an admission during closing argument that defendant was guilty of hit-and-run and tampering with evidence, defendant's sufficiency challenge to the tampering conviction failed). Although Division 1 of Bonilla was physical precedent only at the time of its issuance, it was cited for the proposition that a party can make an "admission in judicio in closing argument" in Robinson v. State , 231 Ga. App. 368, 368 (1), 498 S.E.2d 579 (1998). Here, the evidence establishing that McKie was a convicted felon included not only his guilty plea to a charge of first-degree forgery, a felony, but also his admissions in closing argument that he had been convicted on just this charge.

  4. Boone v. State

    667 S.E.2d 880 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 10 times

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 370 (3) ( 498 SE2d 579) (1998). 9.

  5. Brown v. State

    667 S.E.2d 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 9 times
    Reversing denial of motion to suppress cocaine housed in a cigar box and seized during a Terry pat-down where officer testified that he felt the corner of a hard object and pulled it from the defendant's pocket based on his belief that “ ‘anything can house a weapon’ ”

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368 (1) ( 498 SE2d 579) (1998). (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

  6. Dunn v. State

    665 S.E.2d 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 14 times
    Concluding that “[t]he expert's testimony was proper ... because the supervisor came to her own independent conclusion” as to the identity of the substance contained in defendant's blood based upon her review of the test results

    We have long held that an expert need not "testify to the validity of every step that went into the formulation of his results as a foundation for their admissibility." Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 370 (3) ( 498 SE2d 579) (1998), quoting Orr v. Indiana, 472 NE2d 627, 633-634 (2) (Ind.App. 1984). Also, an expert may base his opinion on data collected by others.

  7. Livingston v. State

    267 Ga. App. 875 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 3 times

    Livingston testified at trial and stated for the record that his name was Jonathan Brandon Livingston. There was ample evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant at trial was the same person charged in the indictment. Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368-369 ( 498 SE2d 579) (1998). The State produced additional evidence that Livingston was a passenger in a car stopped by police for a traffic violation on Interstate 75. The officer who made the stop testified that the driver gave him consent to search the car and that he found a bag under the passenger-side front seat containing suspected cocaine and other suspected contraband.

  8. Byrd v. State

    583 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 7 times
    In Byrd v. State, 261 Ga. App. 483 (583 SE2d 170) (2003), we held that the trial court did not err in allowing a GBI chemist's supervisor to testify that a tested substance was cocaine, based on his review of the lab technician's file and the output generated by two different tests.

    Walker v. State, 228 Ga. App. 509, 511(2) ( 493 S.E.2d 193) (1997). See also Pitts v. State, (A02A2122) _ Ga. App. _ (1)(b) (S.E.2d) (2003); Bellamy v. State, 243 Ga. App. 575, 580(3) ( 530 S.E.2d 243) (2000); Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 370(3) ( 498 S.E.2d 579) (1998). Compare Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1020 ( 107 S.Ct. 1903, 95 L.Ed.2d 509) (1987) (upholding admission of drug composition testimony by supervising toxicologist who based his opinion on results of tests, including chromatography and spectophotometry, performed by subordinates).

  9. Pitts v. State

    260 Ga. App. 553 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 22 times
    Affirming conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute based upon evidence that 28 grams of marijuana divided into five individual packages was found with a large, distribution amount of another illegal drug

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 370(3) ( 498 S.E.2d 579) (1998). In addition, fulfillment of the GBI Crime Lab's standard operating procedures is not a condition precedent for evidentiary admission.

  10. Cooper v. State

    575 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 11 times

    The testimony of the officers who seized the evidence regarding the manner in which it was safeguarded and kept in the evidence safe until it was transported to the crime laboratory, coupled with the testimony of the crime laboratory expert who analyzed the evidence and delivered it to the district attorney's office, was sufficient to establish the requisite chain of custody.Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 369(2) ( 498 S.E.2d 579) (1998). Further, Cooper has pointed to no evidence of tampering.