Therefore, Palmer's plea of misnomer was untimely. See id.; Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 368-369(1) ( 498 S.E.2d 579) (1998). Moreover, Palmer is clearly the person named in the indictment.
Applying the "reasonable attorney performance" test to trial counsel's tactical decision to have appellant recant his confessions before the jury rather than in a pre-trial hearing, we conclude that trial counsel's actions were reasonable and, even if unreasonable, appellant suffered no harm since his assertions concerning his pre-confession demeanor and the officers' purported behavior were aired before the jury which did not find appellant's version of events to be credible. See Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368(6) ( 498 S.E.2d 579) (1998). Turning to the issue of witness impeachment, our review of the record shows that when trial counsel cross-examined one of the police detectives, the witness admitted that his testimony differed in a crucial aspect from the written report he had made of his interview with appellant.
Id. at 130-131, 558 S.E.2d 459 ; see also Kovacs v. State , 227 Ga. App. 870, 872 (2), 490 S.E.2d 539 (1997) (when a defendant admitted at trial and in closing argument that "he knew he had a suspended license," the evidence was sufficient to find him guilty of driving with a suspended license); Michael v. State , 335 Ga. App. 579, 584 (1), n. 7, 782 S.E.2d 479 (2016) (in light of evidence including an admission during closing argument that defendant was guilty of hit-and-run and tampering with evidence, defendant's sufficiency challenge to the tampering conviction failed). Although Division 1 of Bonilla was physical precedent only at the time of its issuance, it was cited for the proposition that a party can make an "admission in judicio in closing argument" in Robinson v. State , 231 Ga. App. 368, 368 (1), 498 S.E.2d 579 (1998). Here, the evidence establishing that McKie was a convicted felon included not only his guilty plea to a charge of first-degree forgery, a felony, but also his admissions in closing argument that he had been convicted on just this charge.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 370 (3) ( 498 SE2d 579) (1998). 9.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368 (1) ( 498 SE2d 579) (1998). (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
We have long held that an expert need not "testify to the validity of every step that went into the formulation of his results as a foundation for their admissibility." Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 370 (3) ( 498 SE2d 579) (1998), quoting Orr v. Indiana, 472 NE2d 627, 633-634 (2) (Ind.App. 1984). Also, an expert may base his opinion on data collected by others.
Livingston testified at trial and stated for the record that his name was Jonathan Brandon Livingston. There was ample evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant at trial was the same person charged in the indictment. Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368-369 ( 498 SE2d 579) (1998). The State produced additional evidence that Livingston was a passenger in a car stopped by police for a traffic violation on Interstate 75. The officer who made the stop testified that the driver gave him consent to search the car and that he found a bag under the passenger-side front seat containing suspected cocaine and other suspected contraband.
Walker v. State, 228 Ga. App. 509, 511(2) ( 493 S.E.2d 193) (1997). See also Pitts v. State, (A02A2122) _ Ga. App. _ (1)(b) (S.E.2d) (2003); Bellamy v. State, 243 Ga. App. 575, 580(3) ( 530 S.E.2d 243) (2000); Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 370(3) ( 498 S.E.2d 579) (1998). Compare Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1020 ( 107 S.Ct. 1903, 95 L.Ed.2d 509) (1987) (upholding admission of drug composition testimony by supervising toxicologist who based his opinion on results of tests, including chromatography and spectophotometry, performed by subordinates).
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 370(3) ( 498 S.E.2d 579) (1998). In addition, fulfillment of the GBI Crime Lab's standard operating procedures is not a condition precedent for evidentiary admission.
The testimony of the officers who seized the evidence regarding the manner in which it was safeguarded and kept in the evidence safe until it was transported to the crime laboratory, coupled with the testimony of the crime laboratory expert who analyzed the evidence and delivered it to the district attorney's office, was sufficient to establish the requisite chain of custody.Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 369(2) ( 498 S.E.2d 579) (1998). Further, Cooper has pointed to no evidence of tampering.