Opinion
Civil 3:13-CV-1603
06-03-2021
MARK ANTHONY ROBINSON Plaintiff, v. RICHARD SOUTHERS, et al. Defendants.
Mariani Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Introduction and Procedural History
This case comes before us for consideration of a second motion for summary judgment (Doc. 176) which challenges lingering aspects of a far-flung civil complaint filed by the plaintiff, Mark Anthony Robinson, a state inmate. As we discuss below, we had previously issued a series of Reports and Recommendations to address the numerous, disparate, and disjointed claims which Robinson had combined and conflated in this amended complaint. We took this systematic approach for two reasons: First, we wished to ensure that each of the many different legal claims lodged by Robinson against some 30 separate defendants received specific and individualized care and attention. Second, we found this approach appropriate since we believed that many of the discrete and divergent claims and defendants were not properly joined in a single lawsuit. Having found this to be the case, we recommended dismissal of many of Robinson's claims, while noting that those remaining claims required a more fulsome factual record on which to proceed with disposition. We have now been presented with a more fulsome record in a second motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we turn to a consideration of these remaining claims.
As we have stated before, the plaintiff, Mark Anthony Robinson, is a frequent litigant in this Court. In the past several years, he has filed numerous actions in this Court relating to a variety of grievances that he has had with correctional officers, administrators, officials, and medical providers working at prisons located within the Middle District of Pennsylvania, institutions where Robinson was previously housed. Often, Robinson's actions center on allegations that corrections employees and officials have subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical and mental health needs, or that they have retaliated against him after he has resorted to the Department of Corrections grievance process to seek redress for his complaints. Moreover, Robinson's claims are frequently prolix and all-encompassing, combining a host of seemingly discrete and wholly unrelated incidents which span many months into a single lawsuit, and pursuing disparate and discrete acts that are bound together only by Robinson's subjective sense that he has been aggrieved.
So it is in this case. Robinson initially brought suit against 30 named defendants, leveling claims arising out of numerous legally and factually distinct complaints Robinson had during a time when he was held at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. Robinson's claims, though expansive in their naming of defendants and theories of liability for a wide range of complaints, have been significantly narrowed by prior court rulings, and now consist of 3 discrete episodes which allegedly involved some 8 employees of the Department of Corrections (collectively, the “Corrections Defendants”).
The process of narrowing these claims began with a preliminary summary judgment motion filed by the Corrections Defendants in this case. We approached this motion with caution, noting that in prior cases filed by Robinson, the multiplicity of legal claims made by this inmate, and the administrative processing of those claims, often created a factual thicket which is not readily amenable to summary judgment resolution. Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 149 (3d Cir. 2016). Thus, recognizing that Robinson's tangled history of administrative exhaustion within the prison system suggested that a cautious approach should be followed with respect to determining whether this inmate had exhausted his administrative remedies, we recommended that such an inquiry should await consideration of a more fulsome motion for summary judgment by the Corrections Defendants addressing the merits of the various, diverse, and largely unrelated remaining claims lodged against them. (Doc. 101).
The district court adopted this recommendation, (Doc. 104), and the defendants subsequently filed another summary judgment motion. (Doc. 120). While this motion reprised the defendants' arguments concerning Robinson's alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, it also endeavored to separately address the merits of as many as fifteen separate legal claims brought by Robinson against some 19 correctional defendants. To provide an intelligible resolution of this welter of conflated claims, we filed 12 separate Reports and Recommendations addressing the merits of these 15 different and distinct claims which were inappropriately combined by Robinson in this single lawsuit. (Docs. 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 155, 156, 158, 161, 162, 163, 165).
These Reports and Recommendations were likewise adopted by the District Court with the exception that Robinson's complaint was not dismissed in its entirety on Rule 20 grounds. (Doc. 174). In its memorandum opinion, the District Court denied the Corrections Defendants' motion for summary judgment without prejudice, provided that any additional motions be tailored to address the following remaining issues: “1) whether Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies before filing suit with regard to Plaintiff's three remaining claims; 2) whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment spit mask claim; and 3) whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the merits [of] Plaintiff's claim that his due process rights were violated by Defendant Reisinger's failure to recuse herself from a disciplinary hearing.” Robinson v. Southers, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219321, *12 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2019). Following this guidance, the Corrections Defendants have filed the instant motion for summary judgment, the focus of which is on the three lingering legal issues in Robinson's complaint left by the District Court's December 20, 2019 order. (Doc. 176). For the reasons set forth below, we recommend that these lingering claims be dismissed.
Specifically, these remaining claims include: (1) Robinson's Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Leedom, Saez, and Pryal relating to the plaintiff's suicide attempt on February 12, 2012; (2) Robinson's Eighth Amendment claim for being forced to wear a spit hood when leaving his cell between October 19, 2011 and March 28, 2012; and (3) Robinson's Fourteenth Amendment due process violation against Defendant Reisinger for failure to recuse herself from a December 2011 misconduct hearing.
II. Statement of Facts
Since Robinson's remaining claims present three distinct factual scenarios, we categorize them accordingly below. The Corrections Defendants have completed further, more detailed briefing with respect to these three remaining claims, so we summarize these additional, undisputed facts below.
Robinson's Suicide Attempt
With respect to Robinson's Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, the parties' competing statements of facts still present an irreconcilable conflict on an essential element of this claim-the question of whether the defendants had a subjective appreciation of the danger which Robinson presented to himself on February 12, 2012. As to this pivotal issue, the parties' positions remain in stark contrast to one another. For his part, Robinson insists that he explicitly warned all three defendants that he was suicidal. In contrast, the defendants flatly deny having ever been informed by Robinson that he was in a suicidal frame of mind on February 12, 2012. (Doc. 178, Exhibit T ¶¶ 29-31). Beyond these factual disputes regarding the events giving rise to Robinson's claim, there is a second legal issue raised by the defendants, upon which we had previously elected to defer action. Specifically, the defendants also contend that Robinson has never grieved any claims relating to this February 12, 2012 incident, and therefore is barred from pursuing this claim due to his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
In support of this proposition, the Corrections Defendants provide us with a breakdown of how the grievance system operates in the SMU at SCI-Camp Hill. According to this institution's formal policies, which all inmates have access to, grievances must be filed within 15 working days of the events which would give rise to a grievance filing with “working days” being defined as typical work-week days which exclude weekends and state holidays. (Doc. 178, Exhibits B-1, B-2). We are also presented with a spreadsheet of every grievance filed by Robinson during his stay in the SMU at SCI-Camp Hill. (See Doc. 178, Exhibit C). In total, it appears that Robinson filed 43 grievances, only one of which was filed during the month of February 2012. (Id.) This particular grievance was received on February 1, 2012, prior to his February 12, 2012 suicide attempt, and appears to present some issue with Robinson's property. (Id.) Conspicuously absent from this spreadsheet list is any grievance filed on or within 15 working days of February 12, 2012-the date of the events which would give rise to a grievance. Thus, it appears that Robinson had until March 5, 2012 to file a grievance pertaining to the events on February 12, 2012, accounting for weekends and the President's Day holiday that year. No. grievances appear on Robinson's grievance spreadsheet within this time frame. In fact, Robinson did not file any grievances until March 13, 2012 at which time he appears to grieve some issue with office staff at SCI-Camp Hill, an event completely unrelated to Robinson's suicide attempt earlier that month. (Id.)
While we note that Robinson was on grievance restriction for some portion of this time period in which he could have appropriately filed a grievance for the February 12, 2012 events, it appears as though this restriction was lifted on February 22, 2012, giving Robinson 9 days to file this grievance, if he so desired. (Doc. 178, Exhibit J). In addition, we note that this grievance restriction was in place from November 22, 2011 through February 22, 2012, but that Robinson had nevertheless continued to file five grievances during this time. (Id., Exhibit C). Thus, it appears that Robinson had no compunction with continuing to file grievances during the time period when he was prohibited from doing so.
In addition to this grievance spreadsheet, the Corrections Defendants also propound the actual grievances filed by Robinson which demonstrate both his general knowledge of how the prison grievance system functions, and his ability to properly exhaust administrative remedies. (See Doc. 178, Exhibits E, F, I, N). In fact, Robinson appealed 21 of his 43 grievances to final review, though only 10 of these were appealed properly despite administrative efforts to correct Robinson's deficient appeals. (See id., at Exhibits D, D-1, E, F, G, H, I, J). Collectively, these items demonstrate that at a minimum, Robinson was familiar with filing grievances, had no qualms doing so, and was indeed on notice of how the grievance system functioned at SCI-Camp Hill.
With these facts established, we now turn to the facts underlying Robinson's Eighth Amendment claim for alleged excessive use of a spit hood precaution.
Spit Mask Usage
Robinson received certain restrictions between October 2011 and March 2012, including the imposition of a spit mask precaution when Robinson left his cell, triggered by his October 19, 2011 threat to throw feces at two correctional officers.(Doc. 178, Exhibits U, U-1, V, W). Robinson was disciplined for this threatening behavior, and under the SMU Inmate Handbook, Robinson was subject to certain security restrictions since that handbook provided that inmates who threatened, assaulted, or acted out aggressively towards others could be placed on security precautions which would remain in place until the Review Committee is convinced that the threat is over. (Id., Exhibit L). Pursuant to this policy, as a result of Robinson's threatening behavior, prison officials determined that Robinson should wear a spit mask when he was removed from his cell. (Id., Exhibits U, V, W). Officers felt that this security precaution was appropriate due to their prior experience with inmates, including Robinson, who have thrown or threatened to throw bodily fluid or human waste. (Id., Exhibit W). In addition, these officers noted that when inmates' ability to throw other fluids or waste is limited, as when they are handcuffed for transport outside of their cells, they have a tendency to spit. (Id.) Staff continued to use a spit mask when Robinson was being taken out his cell for five months until March 28, 2012, when they removed the spit hood security precaution after Robinson expressed a desire to follow SMU rules and exhibited appropriate behavior for the month leading up to his March 28, 2012 monthly PRC review. (Id., Exhibit S, U, U-1).
Robinson had in fact thrown feces on another inmate before his arrival at SCI-Camp Hill, wiped feces all over himself and his cell, and had thrown urine on officers. (Doc. 178, Exhibits W, W-3, W-4).
Having established these facts, we now turn to the facts underlying Robinson's claim against Defendant Reisinger for alleged due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hearing Examiner Reisinger
While Robinson was confined at SCI-Camp Hill, he was issued a total of fourteen misconducts. (Doc. 178, Exhibit O). Defendant Reisinger, a Disciplinary Hearing Officer, was the hearing official who addressed many of these disciplinary citations. On December 21, 2011, Defendant Reisinger presided over one such disciplinary hearing involving Robinson and Lieutenant Gardner regarding misconduct number B336936. (Id., Exhibit N-1). This particular misconduct citation charged Robinson with using abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language to an employee, refusing to obey an order, and threatening an employee or their family with bodily harm the day before. (Id.) In the course of the disciplinary hearing relating to this citation, Robinson listed his sole witness as the video evidence, but did not otherwise deny the allegations, choosing instead to seek Reisinger's recusal on the grounds that Lieutenant Gardner and Defendant Reisinger were in a romantic relationship. Robinson's claims appears to be entirely speculative. Further, for his part, Lieutenant Gardner denied ever engaging in such a relationship with Reisinger. (Doc. 178, Exhibit U).
On the merits of Robinson's misconduct hearing, Reisinger's report indicated that she watched the video footage from the December 20, 2011 incident, and outlined that the video depicted Robinson engaging in verbally abusive conduct. Given this video evidence, Reisinger found by a preponderance of evidence that Robinson committed these prohibited acts and sanctioned Robinson to 150 days of disciplinary custody time. (Id., Exhibit N-1). Thereafter, Robinson appealed the results of this misconduct hearing, continuing to raise his belief that Reisinger was impermissibly biased due to her alleged romantic relationship with Lieutenant Gardner, though subsequent levels within the appeals process through the final review stage agreed with Defendant Reisinger's assessment of the immutable video evidence depicting Robinson's misconduct, and affirmed her decision. (Id.) Thus, Robinson's appeal on this misconduct was dismissed, but he properly exhausted his administrative appeals on this claim.
When we initially addressed this claim in our Report and Recommendation to the District Court, we were presented with sparse facts surrounding this claim from both parties. Therefore, we requested that the Corrections Defendants further brief whether there is any factual basis for this claim; whether a viable due process claim exists here in light of the substantial evidence which supported Defendant Reisinger's finding that Robinson committed this infraction; whether the penalty imposed here was insufficient to trigger substantive due process protections; and whether Defendant Reisinger is also entitled to qualified immunity on this specific and narrow claim.
Having received this specific and detailed briefing, and on the added factual basis of the three distinct claims discussed above, we turn to consideration of the merits of these three lingering claims.
III. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment - Standard of Review
The defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., No. 07-0493, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31615, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id., at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial, ” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial.” Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark N.J. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence, or assess credibility, when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. Summary Judgment Should be Granted on the Plaintiff's Remaining Claims.
After thorough review of Robinson's remaining claims, we recommend that these lingering claims be dismissed in their entirety.
1. Robinson's Remaining Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claim Should be Dismissed.
In order for Robinson's to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, he must satisfy certain procedural thresholds. For example, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“PLRA”), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” See also Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The [PLRA] requires that prisoners seeking relief in federal court must first exhaust the administrative remedies available at the prison level.”).
The PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to a wide-range of inmate complaints, including damages complaints like those made here grounded in alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000). A prisoner is not required to allege that administrative remedies have been exhausted. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2002). Rather, failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, id., and as such must be pled and proven by the defendants. Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2002). Furthermore, although this exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional bar to litigation, the requirement is strictly enforced by the federal courts. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.”). The rigorous enforcement is mandated by the recognition that § 1997e's exhaustion requirement promotes important public policies. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
Courts have recognized myriad policy considerations in favor of exhaustion requirements. They include (1) avoiding premature interruption of the administrative process and giving the agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors; (2) conserving scarce judicial resources, since the complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process and the courts may never have to intervene; and (3) improving the efficacy of the administrative process. Each of these policies, which Congress seems to have had in mind in enacting the PLRA, is advanced by the across-the-board, mandatory exhaustion requirement in § 1997e(a).
. . . [A] comprehensive exhaustion requirement better serves the policy of granting an agency the “opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court.” Moreover, “even if the complaining prisoner seeks only money damages, the prisoner may be successful in having the [prison] halt the infringing practice” or fashion some other remedy, such as returning personal property, reforming personal property policies, firing an abusive prison guard, or creating a better screening process for hiring such guards. And when a prisoner obtains some measure of affirmative relief, he may elect not to pursue his claim for damages. In either case, local actors are given the chance to address local problems, and at the
very least, the time frame for the prisoner's damages is frozen or the isolated acts of abuse are prevented from recurring.
An across-the-board exhaustion requirement also promotes judicial efficiency. . . . . Moreover, even if only a small percentage of cases settle, the federal courts are saved the time normally spent hearing such actions and multiple appeals thereto.
In cases in which inmate-plaintiffs exhaust their remedies in the administrative process and continue to pursue their claims in federal court, there is still much to be gained. The administrative process can serve to create a record for subsequent proceedings, it can be used to help focus and clarify poorly pled or confusing claims, and it forces the prison to justify or explain its internal procedures. All of these functions help courts navigate the sea of prisoner litigation in a manner that affords a fair hearing to all claims.Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75-76 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
Because of the important policies fostered by this exhaustion requirement, it has been held that there is no futility exception to the rule. Id. Instead, courts have typically required complete administrative exhaustion by inmate plaintiffs who seek to pursue claims in federal court. Moreover, courts have also imposed a procedural default component onto this exhaustion requirement, holding that inmates must fully satisfy the administrative requirements of the inmate grievance process before proceeding in federal court. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004). In this regard, the PLRA requires “ ‘proper exhaustion,' meaning that the prisoner must comply with all the administrative requirements and not merely wait until there are no administrative remedies ‘available.' ” Williams, 482 F.3d at 639 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed. 2D 368 (2006)). Applying this procedural default standard to § 1997e's exhaustion requirement, courts have concluded that inmates who fail to fully complete the prison grievance process are barred from subsequently litigating their claims in federal court, Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000), and the failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies will result in the procedural default of a prisoner's claim, Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230-32.
Against this legal backdrop, we turn to Robinson's Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. The defendants contend that Robinson has never grieved any claims relating to this February 12, 2012 incident, and therefore is barred from pursuing this claim due to his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. In contrast, Robinson asserts that he “specifically alerted prison officials to the failure to protect[, ]” but does not describe the manner in which he alerted staff. (Doc. 187). Moreover, he does not deny that he failed to follow well-established and well-known administrative guidelines for exhaustion of this claim. Robinson appears to believe that by appealing the misconduct he received as a result of the February 12, 2012 incident and by expressing his dissatisfaction with the outcome thereof during a PRC hearing, he had properly exhausted his administrative remedies. We disagree with Robinson's assessment.
SCI-Camp Hill maintains both an inmate grievance policy, DC-ADM 804, and an inmate misconduct policy, DC-ADM 801, which all inmates have access to. These policies lay out the necessary procedures that an inmate must follow in order to successfully exhaust his or her appeals within the institution. These policies represent separate procedures and tracks for appeals, however. As the Third Circuit has recognized, “the inmate grievance process and the inmate discipline process are two separate tracks, the mixing of which is specifically forbidden: ‘A grievance directly related to a specific inmate misconduct charge . . . will not be addressed through the Inmate Grievance System and must be addressed through Department policy DC-ADM 801, “Inmate Discipline.”' ” Howard v. Chatcavage, 570 Fed. App'x 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2014). Thus, an inmate may not take up a grievance through the appeals track for a misconduct citation.
SCI-Camp Hill's grievance policy dictates that any grievances must be filed within 15 working days of the events which give rise to a grievance filing with “working days” being defined as typical work-week days which exclude weekends and state holidays. (Doc. 178, Exhibits B-1, B-2). Therefore, Robinson had 15 working days from February 12, 2012, the date of the events giving rise to his failure to protect grievance, to file a grievance. Accounting for weekends and the President's Day holiday that year, Robinson had until March 5, 2012 to file his grievance.
While we note that Robinson was on grievance restriction for some portion of this time period in which he could have appropriately filed a grievance for the February 12, 2012 events, it appears as though this restriction was lifted on February 22, 2012, giving Robinson 9 days to file this grievance if he so desired. (Doc. 178, Exhibit J). In addition, we note that this grievance restriction was in place from November 22, 2011 through February 22, 2012, but that Robinson had nevertheless continued to file five grievances during this time. (Id., Exhibit C). Thus, it appears that Robinson had no compunction with continuing to file grievances during the time period when he was prohibited from doing so, bringing into sharper relief the fact that Robinson failed to file any grievances remotely close to the date these events giving rise to his claim took place.
According to the spreadsheet of every grievance filed by Robinson during his stay in the SMU at SCI-Camp Hill, it appears that Robinson filed a total of 43 grievances, only one of which was filed during the month of February 2012. This particular grievance was received on February 1, 2012, prior to his February 12 suicide attempt, and appears to present some issue with Robinson's property. Conspicuously absent from this spreadsheet list is any grievance filed between February 12, 2012 and March 5, 2012-the relevant time frame for Robinson to file a grievance. In fact, Robinson did not file any grievances until March 13, 2012 at which time he appears to grieve some issue with office staff at SCI-Camp Hill, an event completely unrelated to Robinson's suicide attempt earlier that month.
Thus, the uncontested record demonstrates that Robinson was thoroughly familiar with the procedures for filing grievances, had no qualms doing so, and was on notice of how the grievance system functioned at SCI-Camp Hill. Indeed, he had successfully appealed ten grievances to final review. Further, when Robinson attempted to improperly appeal grievances, the staff members at SCI-Camp Hill expressly instructed him on the proper way to do so and provided him with additional opportunities to refile his grievance appeals. It appears that Robinson declined this opportunity on numerous occasions. Thus, quite simply, Robinson's failure to ever file any grievance related to the events on February 12, 2012 is undisputed and is fatal to his failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment. Further, given that “the inmate grievance process and the inmate discipline process are two separate tracks, the mixing of which is specifically forbidden, ” Howard v. Chatcavage, 570 Fed. App'x 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2014), Robinson cannot rely upon complaints raised during his misconduct proceedings to satisfy this exhaustion requirement. We accordingly recommend that this claim be dismissed.
2. Robinson's Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim Should be Dismissed.
Robinson now appears to cast his spit mask claim as an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, stating that he was forced to wear the mask in violation of his constitutional rights. This shifting characterization of this claim illustrates one of the challenges of reviewing the claim advanced by this inmate-plaintiff, since those claims often seem to change in the course of litigation. However, accepting Robinson's current characterization of this claim Eighth Amendment excessive force claims like those advanced here by Robinson are governed by certain strict overarching legal standards which call upon courts to consider both the restraints imposed upon an inmate and whether prison officials have acted with a culpable state of mind. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed:
The Eighth Amendment protects against infliction of “cruel and unusual punishment.” However, “not every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). “It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.” Id.
Resolution of an Eighth Amendment claim therefore “mandate[s] an inquiry into a prison official's state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). Two considerations define that inquiry. We must first determine if the deprivation was sufficiently serious to fall within the Eighth Amendment's zone of protections. Id. at 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321. If not, our inquiry is at an end. However, if the deprivation is sufficiently serious, we must determine if the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. In other words, we must determine if they were motivated by a desire to inflict unnecessary and wanton pain. “What is necessary to establish an ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . .' varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2000).
In addition, where, as here, an inmate alleges an Eighth Amendment claim based on an excessive use of force, he or she must show some subjective intent on the part of officers to cause injury. In an excessive force case, where “prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is that set out in Whitley [v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)]: whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly observed:
[T]he Eighth Amendment serves as the primary source of substantive protection in cases where an inmate challenges a prison official's use of force as excessive and unjustified. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). In an excessive force claim, the central question is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). Summary judgment in favor of a defendant is not appropriate if “it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 1078; see also Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that wantonness exists when a prison guard intends to harm an inmate).Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000).
In addition, there are several factors that a court must examine in determining whether a correctional officer has used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, including: “(1) ‘the need for the application of force'; (2) ‘the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used'; (3) ‘the extent of injury inflicted'; (4) ‘the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them'; and (5) ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.' ” Id., at 106.
Given the ambiguities surrounding Robinson's shifting descriptions of his Eighth Amendment claims we note that like an excessive force claim an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim also requires proof of both extreme conduct and a subjective intent to harm. As we have observed in the past for Robinson:
“When an Eighth Amendment claim arises in the context of a challenge to conditions of confinement, we must determine if prison officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference' to the inmate's health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).” Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 345 (3d Cir. 2000). In this setting, it is also clear that: “The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments inconsistent with “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” ” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958)). Conditions of prison confinement violate the Eighth Amendment only if they “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272 (3d Cir. 2003).Robinson v. Southers, No. 3:13-CV-1603, 2018 WL 10229449, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2018), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, No. 3:13-CV-01603, 2019 WL 7163435 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2019). Therefore, the characterization of the claim by Robinson does not materially alter the manner in which we assess the legal sufficiency of this claim.
Guided by these overarching principles, we turn to a consideration of Robinson's Eighth Amendment spit mask claim. As an initial matter, we note that the cornerstone of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim is some allegation of injury or personal harm. See Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 344 (“only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment”); Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (“the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied . . . maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”). Indeed, one such factor in our analysis is “the extent of injury inflicted.” Brooks, 204 F.3d at 106.
In this case, we are quite simply missing this fundamental piece of Robinson's claim. Specifically, Robinson has not alleged any injury as a result of the Corrections Defendants' actions from October 2011 through March 2012 in his complaint or pleadings before this court. Indeed, in his brief in opposition to the Corrections Defendants' second motion for summary judgment, Robinson asserts that we should allow him to present “the testimony of a professional psychologist and psychiatrist to determine what, if any effects and how the effects of the constant, racist, retaliatory wearing of a spit mask impacted the plaintiff's mental health.” (Doc. 187, at 6) (emphasis added). Thus, Robinson appears to concede that he has suffered no injury that he is aware of and instead would have us allow him to venture onto a speculative attempt to uncover some evidence that he was injured in some way by wearing this precautionary spit mask during his confinement. After seven years of litigation Robinson may not defeat this summary judgment motion based upon some rank speculation. This element of injury was part of Robinson's initial burden of proof when he made the decision to bring a lawsuit in federal court. Indeed, determining what, if any effects stemmed from the imposition of the spit mask should have been uncovered during discovery and set forth in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, rather than a plea for further discovery at trial. Thus, in this case we are presented with a scenario where “there is no evidence that plaintiff suffered any injury as a result of the use of a spit mask. Therefore, there is no genuine Eighth Amendment violation”. Kelley v. Herrera, No. 216CV01894JAMCKDP, 2018 WL 3476442, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 216CV1894JAMCKDP, 2018 WL 9651052 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2018), aff'd, 785 Fed.Appx. 502 (9th Cir. 2019). While we believe that this lack of injury may cause Robinson's claim to be dismissed on its own, we find other more fundamental issues which justify awarding summary judgment on this claim.
Turning to the other factors in our analysis, we find that (1) there was a need for the application of force, i.e., the spit mask precaution; (2) the Corrections Defendants met this need with the least amount of force necessary to quell the safety threat; (3) Robinson suffered no injury as a result of this force; (4) the threat to the safety of staff was reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them; and (5) officers continually reminded Robinson that if his behavior improved, the spit mask precaution would be lifted. We make these findings based on the following:
First, that Robinson had made numerous threats to throw feces and human waste at correctional officers. (See Doc. 178, Exhibits U, V, W). Pursuant to SCI-Camp Hill policy, as a result of Robinson's threatening behavior, prison officials determined that Robinson should wear a spit mask when he was removed from his cell. Officers felt that this security precaution was appropriate due to their prior experience with inmates that have thrown or threatened to throw bodily fluid or human waste. Specifically, these officers noted that when inmates' ability to throw other fluids or waste is limited, as when they are handcuffed for transport outside of their cells, they have a tendency to spit. Indeed, SCI-Camp Hill policy dictates that all SMU inmates be handcuffed before they leave their cells. In addition, officers found that it is not uncommon for inmates to follow through with their threats. (See id., Exhibit W).
Second, the Corrections Defendants were aware of Robinson's correctional history in which he had in fact thrown feces on another inmate before arriving at SCI-Camp Hill, had wiped feces all over himself and his cell, and had thrown urine on officers. Thus, these officers were on notice of the threat that Robinson posed, given his correctional history at other institutions and within SCI-Camp Hill itself. Given this prior notice, when presented with threats from Robinson of throwing human waste or bodily fluids on corrections staff, officers took these threats seriously, and responded by taking the minimally-invasive precautionary measure of placing a spit hood on Robinson when removing him from his cell for transport within the facility.
Third, the use of this precaution continued for as long as Robinson's behavior continued to be threatening toward staff. In this case, correctional officers continued to use a spit mask when Robinson was removed from his cell for some five months until March 28, 2012, when they removed the spit hood security precaution after Robinson expressed a desire to follow SMU rules and exhibited appropriate behavior for the month leading up to his March 28, 2012 monthly PRC review. Robinson was notified on multiple occasions throughout this period that the spit hood precaution would be removed sooner if he modified his behavior so that he no longer posed a threat to corrections staff. (See id., at Exhibits V-1; V-2; V-3).
Further, there is no evidence outside of Robinson's speculative claims that this spit hood precaution was imposed for any reason other than a legitimate penological purpose. Specifically, Robinson's bald assertion that the Corrections Defendants' use of the spit mask was motivated by racial or retaliatory animus is wholly unsupported by the record. As described above, we find that this precaution was imposed in response to threats and threatening behavior by Robinson and was lifted as soon as this behavior ceased. Quite simply, Robinson has failed to provide any facts which would support this claim.
Finally, we note that, given the array of discretionary and fact-bound considerations which went into the decision to apply, and later remove, the spit mask when Robinson was outside his cell and in close contact with prison staff that he had previously threatened to harm, it cannot be said that Robinson's right to be free from wearing a spit mask in this setting was clearly established in 2011 and 2012. This fact is also fatal to Robinson's claims since it is well-settled that government officials like the defendants who are performing “discretionary functions, ” are insulated from suit if their conduct did not violate a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009). Recognizing the substantial element of discretion involved in any decision to apply a spit mask to a prisoner as an officer safety measure, courts have conferred qualified immunity upon officers who are charged with allegedly violating a detainee's rights through the use of a spit mask. See Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 2004)(qualified immunity Fourth Amendment spit mask claim). This principle applies with particular force in a case such as this, where there simply is no allegation by Robinson that he suffered any physical injury as a result of being required to wear a spit mask for a period of time when in close contact with prison staff he had previously threatened to harm. See Kelley v. Herrera, No. 216CV01894JAMCKDP, 2018 WL 3476442, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 216CV1894JAMCKDP, 2018 WL 9651052 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2018), aff'd, 785 Fed.Appx. 502 (9th Cir. 2019). See also Allen v. Rivera, 626 Fed.Appx. 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2015)(affirming jury verdict denying Eighth Amendment spit mask claim).Therefore, finding no Eighth Amendment violation in this setting, and further concluding that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we accordingly recommend that this claim be dismissed.
3. Robinson's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim Should be Dismissed.
In initially addressing this Due Process claim against Defendant Reisinger, acting out of an abundance of caution, we recommended the denial of summary judgment on the limited issue of whether Defendant Reisinger denied Robinson access to an impartial tribunal during his December 2011 misconduct hearing. Specifically, we asked the parties for further briefing on whether there is any factual basis for Robinson's claim that Defendants Reisinger and Lieutenant Gardner were engaged in a romantic relationship; whether a viable due process claim exists here in light of the substantial evidence which supported Reisinger's finding that Robinson committed this infraction; whether the penalty imposed here was insufficient to trigger substantive due process protections; and whether the defendant is otherwise entitled to qualified immunity on this specific and narrow claim. (Doc. 151). After review on this more fulsome record, we find that there has been no due process violation, that Defendant Reisinger is otherwise entitled to qualified immunity, and that this final lingering claim should be dismissed.
As we have explained before,
In analyzing any procedural due process claim in this custodial setting, “the first step is to determine whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)). Once we determine that a property or liberty interest asserted is protected by the Due Process Clause, the question then becomes what process is due to protect it. Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). Protected liberty or property interests generally arise either from the Due Process Clause or from some specific state-created statutory entitlement. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972). However, in the case of prison inmates,
[i]n Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court announced a new standard for determining whether prison conditions deprive a prisoner of a liberty interest that is protected by procedural due process guarantees. Although the Court acknowledged that liberty interests could arise from means other than the Due Process Clause itself, the Court concluded that state-created liberty interests could arise only when a prison's action imposed an ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.' . . . In finding that the prisoner's thirty-day confinement in disciplinary custody did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest, the Court considered the following two factors: 1) the amount of time the prisoner was placed into disciplinary segregation; and 2) whether the conditions of his confinement in disciplinary segregation were significantly more restrictive than those imposed upon other inmates in solitary confinement.
Shoats, 213 F.3d at 143-44 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
Applying these legal benchmarks, it has been held that disciplinary proceedings which result in sanctions of disciplinary segregation for six months or more do not impose atypical and significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life in similar situations, and, therefore, do not give rise to due process claims. Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (7 months disciplinary confinement). See, e.g., Dunbar v. Barone, 2012 WL 2775024 (3d Cir. July 10, 2012) (held, inmate placed in disciplinary custody for 540 days (about eighteen months)).Adderly v. CPL Wilson, No. 3:13-CV-1945, 2015 WL 10935705, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2015), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Adderly v. Wilson, No. 3:13-CV-1945, 2016 WL 3006926 (M.D. Pa. May 25, 2016), aff'd, 668 Fed.Appx. 423 (3d Cir. 2016).
Judged against these settled benchmarks, Robinson's remaining due process claim fails from the start because the period of his period of disciplinary confinement which resulted from this December 2011 hearing-150 days, or some 7 months-is insufficient to trigger constitutional consideration as an atypical and significant hardship in an institutional setting. This is especially true considering that Robinson continued to receive monthly PRC reviews while in disciplinary custody as every other inmate did. There are other roadblocks to the success of this claim, however.
Due process also requires that a prison disciplinary tribunal be sufficiently impartial. Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 305-07 (3d Cir. 1974). The requirement of an impartial tribunal “prohibits only those officials who have a direct personal or otherwise substantial involvement, such as major participation in a judgmental or decision-making role, in the circumstances underlying the charge from sitting on the disciplinary committee.” Id., at 306. In the past, inmates have often invited courts to find violations of this due process right based upon general assertions of staff bias. Yet, such requests, while frequently made, have rarely been embraced by the courts. Instead, the courts have held that a “generalized critique” of staff impartiality is insufficient to demonstrate the degree of bias necessary to prove a due process violation. Lasko v. Holt, 334 Fed.Appx. 474 (3d Cir. 2009). Furthermore, in the absence of a showing that the hearing officer was “personally or substantially involved in the circumstances underlying [the investigation of the] charge, ” Greer v. Hogston, 288 Fed.Appx. 797, 799 (3d Cir. 2008), courts generally decline to sustain due process challenges to disciplinary decisions on claims of staff bias. See Redding v. Holt, 252 Fed.Appx. 488 (3d Cir. 2007).
There is no dispute that Defendant Reisinger was neither personally nor substantially involved in the circumstances underlying the investigation of the charges Robinson faced. Indeed, she had no part in the December 20, 2011 incident giving rise to the issuance of Robinson's misconduct. However, in our Report and Recommendation to the district court in which we recommended allowing this specific and narrow claim to proceed, we recognized that one other court had suggested that Robinson's allegation regarding Reisinger's romantic relationship with Lieutenant Gardner, if true, might state a colorable due process claim. See Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002). Now presented with a more fulsome record, we find this Seventh Circuit case distinguishable from our own. In Eads, the plaintiff-inmate faced a tribunal in which a member thereof was allegedly the “live-in boyfriend” of one of the key witnesses at the hearing, a female guard. Id. The court reasoned that “[i]t would not be a giant step to deem the right [to a fair tribunal] denied if the witness [at the hearing was] the spouse or ‘significant other' of a member of the tribunal. And so we shall assume that if the relationship were as intimate as alleged here and if the witness were crucial to the prosecution, the proceeding would indeed violate due process.” Id. (emphasis added). The Circuit, however, did not reach the merits of this issue since the plaintiff-inmate had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. In the progeny of Eads, courts within the Seventh Circuit have noted that in order for a tribunal to be deemed impartial on grounds of some intimate or romantic relationship with a witness, such witness should be crucial to the prosecution of the case, given the relaxed due process standards present in the prison disciplinary hearing context. See, e.g., Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. App'x 39, *43 (7th Cir. 2009).
We also set forth our doubts as to the credulity of this claim, given the nature of Robinson's far-fetched assertions and the fact that both parties to this alleged romantic relationship vehemently denied its existence.
In this case, we are presented with a similar allegation as in Eads, though in a different procedural posture and with different facts. Here, while Robinson raised this allegation at the first possible instance, i.e., before Reisinger at the December 2011 misconduct hearing, and carried this allegation through the administrative appeals process, Lieutenant Gardner was by no means a crucial witness at this hearing. In fact, it appears that even Robinson did not believe that Lieutenant Gardner was a crucial witness since his sole listed witness for this hearing was the video evidence. That video evidence was an immutable, unimpeachable witness, which could not be colored by bonds of affection. Therefore, Defendant Reisinger was merely charged by Robinson with watching the video of the events and determining whether Robinson was guilty of the misconduct from what was portrayed in the video. She was not asked to weigh Lieutenant Gardner's credibility and did not do so in rendering her decision. Rather, Reisinger's report indicated that she watched the video footage from this December 20, 2011 incident and outlined that the video depicted Robinson engaging in verbally abusive conduct. Given this video evidence, Reisinger found by a preponderance of evidence that Robinson committed these prohibited acts and sanctioned Robinson to 150 days of disciplinary custody time.
In any event, we find that Defendant Reisinger is entitled to qualified immunity from this claim for damages arising out of this disciplinary hearing. In order to establish a civil rights claim, Robinson must show the deprivation of a right secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States. Satisfying these elements alone, however, does not guarantee that a plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from these public officials. Government officials performing “discretionary functions, ” are insulated from suit if their conduct did not violate a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009). This doctrine, known as qualified immunity, provides officials performing discretionary functions not only defense to liability, but also “immunity from suit.” Crouse v. S. Lebanon Twp., 668 F.Supp.2d 664, 671 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (Conner, J.) (citations omitted). Qualified immunity
balances two important interests - the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.”Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
Determinations regarding qualified immunity, and its application in a given case, require a court to undertake two distinct inquiries. First, the court must evaluate whether the defendant violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001), abrogated in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223; Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2007); Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 190 (3d Cir. 2006). If the defendant did not actually commit a constitutional violation, then the court must find in the defendant's favor. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If the defendant is found to have committed a constitutional violation, the court must undertake a second, related inquiry to assess whether the constitutional right in question was “clearly established” at the time the defendant acted. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. The Supreme Court has instructed that a right is clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity if a reasonable state actor under the circumstances would understand that his conduct violates that right. Williams, 455 F.3d at 191 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202).
The court is no longer required to conduct these two inquiries sequentially, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, and it may forego difficult constitutional issues and award qualified immunity to a defendant if it is apparent that the defendant did not violate rights that were clearly established at the time the defendant acted. Id. Where a court elects to address the alleged constitutional violations, however, the court's analysis of the merits for purposes of summary judgment merges with analysis of the deprivation of federal rights for purposes of qualified immunity. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2000); Crouse, 668 F.Supp.2d at 671; see also Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[C]rucial to the resolution of [the] assertion of qualified immunity is a careful examination of the record . . . to establish . . . a detailed factual description of the actions of each individual defendant (viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff).”). Because qualified immunity entails a consideration of whether the law was clearly established at the time of a defendant's conduct, this defense, which focuses on the state of the law, presents a question of law for the court, and one which can often be resolved on summary judgment. See Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2010).
In light of our findings above that Defendant Reisinger did not violate Robinson's due process rights, we likewise find that she is entitled to qualified immunity on these charges. Even if this were not the case, however, we still find that Reisinger would be entitled to qualified immunity. Neither party has cited any authority, and we have not independently uncovered any, addressing whether an inmate receives an impartial tribunal where a hearing examiner is alleged to be in a romantic relationship with the officer responsible for the misconduct charge, that officer appears at the misconduct hearing, but the sole witness presented is a video recording depicting the events giving rise to the misconduct as they transpired, and the hearing examiner bases his or her decision solely on the video evidence presented. Absent any authority on this score, it can hardly be said that Defendant Reisinger should have known that her conduct violated Robinson's due process rights. Indeed, we believe it did not. Therefore, we recommend that this final, lingering claim be dismissed.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons it is RECOMMENDED that the defendants' second motion for summary judgment (Doc. 176) be GRANTED.
The parties are hereby placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations, or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.