Opinion
7 Div. 826.
December 11, 1969. Rehearing Denied January 22, 1970.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, St. Clair County, in Equity, Ashville Division, F. O. Whitten, J.
Embry Robinson, Pell City, Fred Blanton, Birmingham, for appellants.
Where parent, who conveys all property to child, is aged and feeble, only slight evidence of undue influence is necessary to rescind deed; especially if parent is mentally weak or consideration is grossly inadequate. Pitts v. Hawkins, 264 Ala. 428, 87 So.2d 835; Compare and distinguish: Dillard v. Hovater, 254 Ala. 616, 49 So.2d 151; Skinner v. Todd, et al., 3 A.B.R. 356, 1 Div. 512 (decided 11/14/68). The determination of the question as to who was the dominant party in a parent-child relationship depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case and no general rule can be laid down. Keeble v. Underwood, 193 Ala. 582, 69 So. 473. Where a material part of the consideration for a conveyance is the agreement of grantee to support grantor for life, then grantor may set such conveyance aside during his lifetime. Code of Alabama, 1940, Title 20, § 15; Whatley v. Nelson, 267 Ala. 10, 99 So.2d 208.
Gerald C. Swann, Ashville, for appellees.
A decree in a suit in equity, where the evidence is heard ore tenus by the trial judge, will not be set aside where the trial court's decision has foundation in the evidence. Lietz v. Pfuehler, et al., 3 ABR 328 (Decided Nov. 7, 1968); Inland Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hightower, 276 Ala. 291, 161 So.2d 493; Riley v. Wilkinson, 247 Ala. 231, 23 So.2d 582.
Bill in equity, filed in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Ashville Division, to vacate and set aside a deed from Edward C. Robinson and his wife, Sarah Elizabeth Robinson, to their son, R. L. Robinson, and his wife Lillian Robinson. The bill alleges the respondents procured the execution and delivery of the deed, conveying forty acres of land, through undue influence and threats. The trial court denied relief and taxed appellants with the court costs. This, appeal follows therefrom.
The evidence, taken orally before the court, is narrated in appellants' brief. The argued assignments of error contend, in different phraseology, that the trial court erred in denying relief.
We not only have considered and carefully read the narrated evidence, but we have also read the transcript of the testimony. We find therefrom that there were many conflicts which were addressed for resolution to the trial court. The court resolved them in favor of appellees.
We adhere to the cardinal rule of this Court, which here applies, that the finding of a judge or chancellor on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed unless clearly and palpably wrong. Barton v. Lumpkin, 277 Ala. 394, 171 So.2d 101; 2A Ala. Digest, Appeal and Error, 1009(3). We cannot say that the court was clearly and palpably wrong.
The decree of the trial court is affirmed.
The foregoing opinion was prepared by B. W. Simmons, Supernumerary Circuit Judge, and was adopted by the Court as its opinion.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON, MERRILL, HARWOOD and MADDOX, JJ., concur.