Summary
In Robinson, we observed that Storms, 579 S.W.2d at 452-53, and Scott, 959 S.W.2d at 721, "recognize [that] the doctrine of equitable estoppel is a fact specific doctrine to be decided on a case-by-case basis."
Summary of this case from Boerschig v. Rio Grande Elec. Coop.Opinion
No. 04-15-00272-CV
03-30-2016
Kyu Im ROBINSON, Appellant v. William P. RIDDICK, Individually and as Trustee of the Cynthia Riddick Marmolejo 76 Trust, the William McDonald Riddick 76 Trust, the Warren Pretlow 76 Trust, and the Patricia Swann Riddick 76 Trust, Appellees
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2013-CI-07766
Honorable Renée Yanta, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice AFFIRMED
This is an appeal from the trial court's judgment granting appellee William P. Riddick, Individually and as Trustee of the Cynthia Riddick Marmolejo 76 Trust, the William McDonald Riddick 76 Trust, the Warren Pretlow 76 Trust, and the Patricia Swann Riddick 76 Trust (collectively "Riddick"), a permanent easement to a roadway located on property owned by appellant Kyu Im Robinson. On appeal, Robinson argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's findings of an easement by estoppel or an easement by prescription. Robinson also contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Riddick. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a dispute over the use of an alleyway, which the parties refer to as a roadway, located on the southwest lot line of Robinson's property and adjacent to the northeast boundary line of Riddick's property. It is undisputed the roadway is located on Robinson's property, but is currently being used by adjacent property owners, including tenants, service people, and others who need to access the Regency House Apartments ("the Apartments") located on Riddick's property. Although there was never an express or written easement regarding the roadway, the roadway has been used continually by adjacent property owners to access the Apartments since they were built in 1959.
The roadway was originally constructed sometime during the mid-1950s across the southwest portion of a triangular-shaped lot known as Block 13 in the Bel Meade Addition in San Antonio. At that time, Steves Brothers, Inc. and Ed Steves & Sons (collectively, "the Steves Brothers") owned Block 13, which was designated and restricted for use as apartment housing and business purposes. Shortly after the roadway's construction, the Steves Brothers divided Block 13 into two lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2. Lot 2 consisted of the base portion of the original triangular-shaped lot and contained the entire roadway. By August 1959, Lot 2 was replatted as two lots, Lot 3 and Lot 4, and the roadway was located on Lot 4 running along its southwest boundary line.
On October 9, 1959, B. Lee Lifshutz purchased Lot 3 with the intention of building the Apartments on it. According to the architectural and engineering drawings of the Apartments, the roadway provided the only means of access to several features of the Apartments, such as a set of stairs, hot water boilers, electrical infrastructure, and twenty-five covered parking spaces for tenants of the Apartments. When the Apartments were completed, the Steves Brothers, who still owned Lot 4, allowed Lifshutz and tenants of the Apartments to use the roadway; however, as mentioned above, neither an express nor written easement was ever filed regarding use of the roadway. The only easement recorded is an electrical easement from Albert Steves III, a successor in interest to the Steves Brothers, to City Public Service. The electrical easement tracks the boundary line of the roadway. In 1977, William P. Riddick and Thomas R. Riddick purchased the Apartments, and interests in the property were eventually transferred to several trusts. The property is now owned by Riddick.
Lot 4 was eventually replatted in 1968 as Lot 6 and Lot 7. In an effort to keep the roadway intact, the entire roadway was made a part of the legal description of Lot 7. By 1981, William H. Atwell and Atwell Properties, Ltd. (collectively "Atwell") owned Lot 7 and operated a shopping center on it, and eventually Atwell sold the property and shopping center to Bok Yi. In 1991, Robinson leased spaced in the shopping center and ultimately purchased the shopping center in 1997. Throughout this time period, tenants of the Apartments and customers of the shopping center used the roadway. Riddick maintained the roadway and built a concrete slab on it to hold dumpsters for the Apartments' trash collection.
In 2007, Robinson sent a letter to Riddick, claiming Riddick was trespassing by using the roadway without permission. In the letter, Robinson asked Riddick to contact him to negotiate use of the roadway. Riddick did not respond or stop using the roadway. Several months later, Robinson sent Riddick a second letter, advising Riddick that he would initiate legal action to prevent any unlawful use of the roadway. On May 7, 2015, Robinson filed a lawsuit against Riddick, seeking temporary and permanent injunctions to prevent Riddick from using the roadway. Robinson also sought a declaratory judgment, asking the court to declare that Riddick has no interest in the roadway. In addition, Robinson asserted a claim for trespass to try title.
In response, Riddick counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that Riddick had an implied easement based on prior use, an implied easement by estoppel, or in the alternative, an easement by prescription. Following a bench trial, the trial court denied all of Robinson's claims and granted Riddick a permanent easement by estoppel or in the alternative, an easement by prescription. The trial court also awarded Riddick attorney's fees. In support of its judgment, the trial court prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
In two issues, Robinson challenges the trial court's judgment. In her first issue, Robinson contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's judgment granting Riddick a permanent easement by estoppel, or alternatively, an easement by prescription, to the roadway located on her property. In her second issue, Robinson contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to Riddick.
Easement by Estoppel — Sufficiency
In her first issue, Robinson complains about the trial court's finding of easement by estoppel, arguing the evidence is legally insufficient to support this finding. She further contends that should we conclude the finding is legally sufficient, then the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding of easement by prescription — an alternate ground for judgment in favor of Riddick.
Standard of Review
When a party appeals a judgment rendered after a bench trial, the trial court's findings of fact have the same weight as a jury's verdict and are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994); Smith v. Reid, No. 04-13-00550-CV, 2015 WL 3895465, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 24, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Latch v. Gratty, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. 2003). We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence used to support the trial court's findings by the same standards we would apply to review a jury's findings. Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at 297; Smith, 2015 WL 3895465, at *4; see Latch, 107 S.W.3d 545. When conducting a legal sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005); Horner v. Heather, 397 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, no pet.); Marin Real Estate Partners, L.P. v. Vogt, 373 S.W.3d 57, 83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); McClung v. Ayers, 352 S.W.3d 723, 727 (Tex. App—Texarkana 2011, no pet.). We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable fact finder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827; Horner, 397 S.W.3d at 325; Vogt, 373 S.W.3d at 83; McClung, 352 S.W.3d at 727.
When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which it did not have the burden of proof, it must demonstrate there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. Horner, 397 S.W.3d at 325 (citing Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983)); McClung, 352 S.W.3d at 727 (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)); Ingham v. O'Block, 351 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (same). We will sustain a legal-sufficiency or "no evidence" challenge if the record shows one of the following: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) rules of law or evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810; Vogt, 373 S.W.3d at 83; McClung, 352 S.W.3d at 727.
Applicable Law
An easement is a nonpossessory interest that authorizes its holder to use the property of another for a particular purpose. Killiam Ranch Props., Ltd. v. Webb Cty., 376 S.W.3d 146, 155 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (citing Marcus Cable Assoc., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 700 (Tex. 2002)). Typically, the grant of an easement must be in writing. Kolb v. Scarborough, No. 01-14-00671-CV, 2015 WL 1408780, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] March 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); Horner, 397 S.W.3d at 325; McClung, 352 S.W.3d at 727. However, the doctrine of easement by estoppel is an exception to the writing requirement. Kolb, 2015 WL 1408780, at *6; Horner, 397 S.W.3d at 325; McClung, 352 S.W.3d at 727.
Under the doctrine of easement by estoppel, the owner of the alleged servient estate (here, Robinson, the owner of the roadway) may be estopped from denying the existence of an easement if he made representations that were acted upon by the owner of the alleged dominant estate (here, Riddick, the owner of the Apartments). Kolb, 2015 WL 1408780, at *6; Horner, 397 S.W.3d at 325 (citing Ingham, 352 S.W.3d at 100); Holden v. Weidenfeller, 929 S.W.3d 124, 131 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied). To create an easement by estoppel, three elements must exist: (1) the owner of the servient estate communicated, either by word or action, a representation to the promisee; (2) the promisee believed the communication; and (3) the promisee relied on the communication. Kolb, 2015 WL 1408780, at *6; Horner, 397 S.W.3d at 325; Ingham, 352 S.W.3d at 100; Holden, 929 S.W.3d at 131.
Once created, an easement by estoppel is binding upon the owner of the servient estate and his successors in interest if they had notice - actual or constructive - of the easement claimed. Kolb, 2015 WL 1408780, at *6; McClung, 352 S.W.3d at 727; Holden, 929 S.W.3d at 131. It is also binding if the owner of the dominant estate and his successors in interest continue to rely upon the existence of the easement. Kolb, 2015 WL 1408780, at *6; McClung, 352 S.W.3d at 727; Holden, 929 S.W.3d at 131. As an equitable doctrine, its application depends on the unique facts of each case. Kolb, 2015 WL 1408780, at *6; McClung, 352 S.W.3d at 727; Holden, 929 S.W.3d at 131.
Application
According to Robinson, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding of an easement by estoppel because there is no evidence of a representation or reliance. To support her argument, Robinson claims there is no evidence her predecessors in interest, i.e., the Steves Brothers, et al., did anything that constituted a representation, and their silence or acquiescence was not a representation. Robinson further argues that even assuming a representation was made, there is no evidence Lifshutz or his successors in interest, i.e., Riddick, relied on the representation; thus, there is no evidence that an easement by estoppel was created. Robinson also argues that even if an easement by estoppel was created, there is no evidence she had actual or constructive notice of any purported easement. According to Robinson, Riddick's use of the roadway was premised on Riddick's incorrect assumption that the roadway was a public road.
Riddick, on the other hand, argues the evidence is legally sufficient because there is evidence that Robinson's predecessors in interest, i.e., the Steves Brothers, et al., made representations to Lifshutz and his successors in interest, i.e., Riddick, that an easement existed. According to Riddick, these representations occurred when neither the Steves Brothers nor their successors in interest objected to Lifshutz's use of the roadway, thereby acquiescing to use of the roadway. Riddick also contends there is evidence Liftshutz and his successors in interest relied on these representations when building and maintaining the Apartments.
Here, the trial court found the Steves Brothers, by not halting or precluding use of the roadway, represented to Lifshutz that he and tenants of the Apartments had an easement to use the roadway. In support of this finding, the record reflects the roadway was used without objection by adjoining property owners, including owners of the Apartments, since approximately 1959 when Lifshutz built the Apartments. The trial court heard testimony from Lifshutz's son, Dr. Carter L. Lifshutz, who testified that as early as 1960, cars and delivery trucks used the roadway to access the Apartments and tenants of the Apartments used the roadway to access the covered parking spaces. According to Dr. Lifshutz, he was never told he was not allowed to use the roadway. Moreover, there was evidence the Steves Brothers never blocked access to the roadway.
The trial court also found Atwell and Yi, successors in interest to the Steves Brothers, represented to Riddick, by their continued acquiescence, that he and tenants of the Apartments had a right to use the roadway. Atwell, who acquired the roadway around 1981, testified the roadway was utilized by both tenants of the Apartments and customers of the shopping center between 1981 and 1992. Atwell testified he believed the Apartments had a right to use the roadway. The next owner of the roadway, Yi, also testified he believed the owner and tenants of the Apartments had a right to use the roadway as a way to access the Apartments. Yi testified that throughout his ten years of ownership, he never restricted the Apartments' access to the roadway.
Robinson, however, argues evidence of acquiescence from the Steves Brothers or their successors in interest is not a representation. Robinson cites several cases for the proposition that an easement by estoppel may not be predicated upon mere silence or passive acquiescence, and the law does not impose a duty on the owner of a servient estate to speak up and prevent reliance. See e.g., Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 452-53 (Tex. 1979); Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 721 (Tex. App—Austin 1998, pet. denied); Smith, 2015 WL 3895465, at *7. However, each of these cases recognize the doctrine of equitable estoppel is a fact specific doctrine to be decided on a case-by-case basis. See Storms, 579 S.W.2d at 452-53; Scott, 959 S.W.2d at 721; Smith, 2015 WL 3895465, at *7. Numerous courts have recognized that in cases of easement by estoppel, permissive and acquiescing behavior by the owner of a servient estate can constitute actual representations. See, e.g., Ross v. Womack, No. 13-08-002-CV, 2008 WL 4822208, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Nov. 6, 2008) (mem. op.) (stating that evidence of use of roadway for over 70 years without objection is evidence of representation); Holden, 929 S.W.3d at 132 (holding that trial court could reasonably infer owners of servient estate led owners of dominant estate to believe they had easement by estoppel based on no complaint of use for seven years); Wallace v. McKinzie, 869 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex. App—Amarillo 1993, writ denied) (holding that no objection to use of roadway by owner for over 70 years constituted representation).
Here, the evidence shows that since approximately 1959, the owners and tenants of the Apartments have used the roadway and the original owners and their successors in interest of the roadway never objected to such use until Robinson sent Riddick a letter in 2007. Moreover, the evidence shows Robinson's predecessors in interest believed the Apartments had a right to use the roadway. Accordingly, after considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold this evidence constitutes legally sufficient evidence that the Steves Brothers and their successors in interest — by their actions — represented to Lifshutz and his successors in interest that owners and tenants of the Apartments were entitled to use the roadway. See, e.g., Ross, 2008 WL 4822208, at *5; Holden, 929 S.W.3d at 132; Wallace, 869 S.W.2d at 596.
Robinson also contends the evidence is legally insufficient because there is no evidence Lifshutz or his successors in interest, including Riddick, relied on the easement. The trial court found Lifshutz believed and relied on the Steves Brothers' non-verbal representation by designing and constructing the Apartments with features that were accessible only by use of the roadway. In support of this finding, the trial court reviewed architectural and engineering drawings of the Apartments, which reflected the roadway provided the only means of access to several features of the Apartments, including twenty-five covered parking spaces. The record also reflects those parking spaces were a necessary feature of the Apartments because without them, the Apartments would not comply with applicable city codes. We agree with the trial court that this evidence shows the design of the Apartments envisioned and necessitated the use of the roadway.
The record also reflects evidence that Lifshutz and his successors in interest not only built the Apartments relying on use of the roadway, but continued to rely on use of the roadway by maintaining the roadway. See Ross, 2008 WL 4822208, at *5 (pointing out improvements made on roadway evidences reliance); Holden, 929 S.W.3d at 132 (recognizing maintenance of a roadway indicated reliance on use). When Riddick took over the Apartments, he testified he invested significant amounts of maintenance costs in improving the roadway, including asphalt repair work, repaving work, and the installation of a concrete slab for dumpsters to the Apartments. There was also testimony from prior owners of the roadway, such as Atwell, that they did not maintain the roadway. Accordingly, we conclude it was reasonable for the trial court to infer from this evidence that Lifshutz and his successors in interest relied on use of the roadway. See Ross, 2008 WL 4822208, at *5; Holden, 929 S.W.3d at 132.
Although Robinson contends an easement by estoppel cannot be binding against her as a subsequent purchaser because she did not have actual or constructive notice of a purported easement, we disagree. In support of the trial court's finding that Robinson knew the roadway was the only way to access certain features of the Apartments, the trial court heard testimony from Robinson that she was aware tenants of the Apartments used the roadway and Riddick maintained the roadway before she purchased the shopping center. See Holden, 929 S.W.3d at 132 (holding evidence that appellant observed appellee utilizing roadway prior to purchasing property is evidence of knowledge). Robinson, however, points to her testimony that the previous owner, Yi, did not expressly tell her the roadway was used by the owner and tenants of the Apartments. Yet, even if Robinson was not expressly told this information, her acknowledgement of such use prior to her purchase is notice. See id. Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold this evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Robinson knew the roadway was the only means of access to certain features of the Apartments. See id. Accordingly, the easement created by the Steves Brothers is binding against her because she was on notice of the easement. See Kolb, 2015 WL 1408780, at *6; McClung, 352 S.W.3d at 723.
Based on the foregoing, we hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's judgment granting Riddick an easement by estoppel to the roadway. Because we hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's judgment of an easement by estoppel, we need not consider Robinson's alternate argument regarding easement by prescription.
Attorney's Fees
In her second issue, Robinson contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to Riddick because Riddick is not entitled to recover such fees under the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act as a matter of law. According to Robinson, the recovery of attorney's fees in easement cases "is limited to instances involving the construction of a written agreement[,]" and in this case the trial court was not asked to construe a written agreement.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's award of attorney's fees in a declaratory judgment action for an abuse of discretion. See Amaro v. Wilson Cty., 398 S.W.3d 780, 789 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.). We will not reverse a trial court's award of attorney's fees absent a clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Id.
Applicable Law
In a proceeding under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("the UDJA"), section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes the trial court, in its discretion, to award reasonable and necessary attorney's fees it deems equitable and just. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.001 (West 2008). "The UDJA allows a party to seek a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings." Roberson v. City of Austin, 157 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.004). We construe the UDJA liberally as it is remedial in nature. See Walker v. Lampman, No. 10-06-00096-CV, 2007 WL 2276195, at *8 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.) (mem. op). "Its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.002(b)).
Application
Here, Robinson's contention that the recovery of attorney's fees in easement cases is limited to cases involving the construction of a written agreement is misplaced. None of the cases Robinson cites as authority hold that an award of attorney's fees under the UDJA is limited to claims that involve the construction of a written agreement, nor do we find any. See, e.g. Smith, 2015 WL 3895465, at *10; Herring v. Bocquet, 933 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 972 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1998); Roberson v. City of Austin, 157 S.W.3d at 133. Rather, each of those cases merely involved situations where the court was asked to construe a written agreement.
Robinson's argument ignores the liberal construction of the UDJA and its purpose because Texas courts have recognized that a party may invoke the UDJA to determine his/her rights of ingress and egress and more specifically to clarify his/her rights with respect to easements. See Walker, 2007 WL 227619, at *8; see also Linder v. Hill, 691 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex. 1985); Steel v. Wheeler, 993 S.W.2d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, pet. denied). In this case, the parties sought a declaration of their rights with respect to use of the roadway, and they introduced photographs, deeds, and other documents into evidence. Under a liberal construction of section 37.004 and its remedial purpose, we hold the parties' requests for declaratory relief falls within the scope of section 37.004. See Walker, 2007 WL 227619, at *8 (holding trial court did not err in awarding attorney's fees under the UDJA when construction of document was not at issue). Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we overrule Robinson's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice