Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 20-CV-03084-TJS
10-07-2020
MICHAEL ROBINSON, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Respondents
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before me is Petitioner Michael Robinson's Petition for Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. Mr. Robinson is currently awaiting trial in state court on charges relating to an assault. Cr. Docket No. CP-15-CR-0001678-2019, Court of Common Pleas of Chester County. (hereafter "Dkt.") His trial was recently scheduled for October 13, 2020. Dkt. 1. Mr. Robinson was granted bail on June 11, 2020. Id. at 11. Mr. Robinson contends here that he has been denied his right to speedy trial and has been deprived of other constitutional rights without due process. Doc. 1, pp. 3-6. Because Mr. Robinson has failed to exhaust his state court remedies, I respectfully recommend that his petition be dismissed without prejudice with leave to refile once he has been tried in the state court and has exhausted his state court remedies.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Robinson was formally arraigned on the charges in his state criminal proceeding on May 16, 2019, Dkt. 1, having been formally charged in an information filed May 14, 2019. Dkt. 4. A motion for continuance was granted shortly after arraignment, although the docket does not indicate whether the Commonwealth or the defense requested it. See Id. p. 4. The defense moved for competency examination on November 20, 2019. Id. at 6. One week later, a second motion for continuance was granted. Id. Mr. Robinson moved for new appointed counsel on November 27, 2019 and filed his first writ of habeas corpus on December 5, 2019. Id. at 7. Another continuance was granted on February 7, 2020. Id. at 8. A Grazier hearing was requested on March 25, 2020. Id. at 9. Various correspondence from Mr. Robinson and a motion for nominal bail were docketed over the next several months. On June 11, 2020, Mr. Robinson posted bail, and another continuance was entered by the court on July 13, 2020. Id. at 11-12. A final continuance was granted on September 1, 2020. Id. at 12.
This matter was referred to me on August 11, 2020, for review. On September 10, 2020, I entered an order directing the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to file a motion to dismiss on or before September 24, 2020, if they believed such a motion was appropriate, and if they believed a motion to dismiss was not appropriate, to file by the same date a response explaining why dismissal without prejudice is inappropriate in this case. On September 21, 2020, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss. Mr. Robinson was given until October 5, 2020 to file a response. No response has been filed.
DISCUSSION
Federal courts have limited power to consider the merits of a constitutional defense to a state criminal charge in a petition for writ of habeas corpus prior to a final judgment of conviction. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). Considerations of federalism require restraint in exercising this power except in the most extraordinary circumstances. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489-91 (1973); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417-20 (1963). "While Federal courts have the power and may discharge the accused in advance of trial, if he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the Federal Constitution or laws, . . . the practice of exercising such power before the question has been raised or determined in the state court is one which ought not be encouraged.. . ." Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 (3d Cir. 1975) (quoting Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 194 (1892)); see Duran v. Thomas, 393 Fed. App'x. 3, 4, 2010 WL 3374095, at *2 (3d Cir. 2010) (not precedential) (affirming dismissal of a premature petition under Moore). Whether the petition arises under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2241, exhaustion is still required; "although there is a distinction in the statutory language of §§ 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned." Moore, 515 F.2d at 442.
In Moore, the petitioner had been facing charges without trial from 1967 to 1974. Id. at 439. He had insisted on a speedy trial on multiple occasions while incarcerated, first on a separate conviction in another state, and then while on pretrial detention on the new charges. Id. at 440-41. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held that his case was not "extraordinary," and that he was required to exhaust his state court remedies before litigating his constitutional claim in federal court. Id. Moore, like Mr. Robinson, sought not to enforce the state's duty to provide him with a trial, but rather sought to abort a trial in the state courts, thus depriving the state court of the opportunity to adjudicate not only the claimant's guilt or innocence, but also his constitutional claims. "We believe that the present case is precisely the situation anticipated by the Supreme Court's caveat that federal courts should not permit the claimed denial of a speedy trial, presented in a pre-trial application for habeas, to result in the 'derailment of a pending state proceeding.'" Id. at 446, quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 508.
There is nothing extraordinary here about Mr. Robinson's case in state court, or his claims in this court, that would excuse exhaustion. Examination of the state court docket reveals that there have been several requests for continuance granted, and that the defense has sought both a competency examination and additional discovery, both of which may have warranted additional time for preparation. Additionally, since at least mid-March, 2020, all courts have been hampered in their ability to hold hearings and trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic emergency, which has required the shut-down of virtually all indoor gatherings of people. There is nothing unusual, much less extraordinary, about the nature of this case that would warrant excusing exhaustion of Petitioner's claims in state court, under Moore. Mr. Robinson will be free to raise any speedy trial violation claims he may believe he has before the trial court, and, if he is tried and convicted, will have the full range of appeal proceedings available to him in state court.
Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that the petition be denied without prejudice to refile once Mr. Robinson has exhausted his state court remedies.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Richard A . Lloret
HON. RICHARD A. LLORET
U.S. Magistrate Judge