The EAJA applicant bears the burden of proving he or she is a prevailing party. Robinson v. O’Rourke , 891 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018).EAJA provides in relevant part:
The EAJA applicant "carries the burden of proving he is a prevailing party." Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
CRST highlighted "the asymmetry in the parties’ litigation objectives, which affects the showing that each party must make to achieve prevailing-party status" and held that a defendant "prevails ‘whenever the plaintiff's challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the court's decision.’ " Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting CRST, 136 S. Ct. at 1651 ); see also B.E. Tech., L.L.C. v. Facebook, Inc., 940 F.3d 675, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 618, 208 L.Ed.2d 227 (2020) ("Facebook obtained the outcome it sought via the mootness dismissal; it rebuffed B.E.’s attempt to alter the parties’ legal relationship in an infringement suit .... CRST explains that a defendant, like Facebook, can prevail by ‘rebuffing’ plaintiff's claim, irrespective of the reason for the court's decision."). Of course, in order to confer prevailing party status, the rejection of the plaintiff's attempt to alter the parties’ legal relationship "must be marked by ‘judicial imprimatur.’ " CRST, 136 S. Ct. at 1646 (citation omitted).
Under § 285, "a favorable judgment on the merits is not necessary for a defendant to be deemed a prevailing party for purposes of statutory fee-shifting." Raniere v. Microsoft Corp., 887 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018); cf. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1646, 1651 (2016) (holding the same as to a similarly worded provision of Title VII and noting that "Congress has included the term 'prevailing party' in various fee-shifting statutes, and it has been the Court's approach to interpret the term in a consistent manner"); see also Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 981-82 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Although a "defendant, of course, might prefer a judgment vindicating its position regarding the substantive merits of the plaintiff's allegations," the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he defendant has . . . fulfilled its primary objective whenever the plaintiff's challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the court's decision.
Under § 285, "a favorable judgment on the merits is not necessary for a defendant to be deemed a prevailing party for purposes of statutory fee-shifting." Raniere v. Microsoft Corp., 887 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018); cf. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1646, 1651 (2016) (reaching the same holding as to a similarly worded provision of Title VII and noting that "Congress has included the term 'prevailing party' in various fee-shifting statutes, and it has been the [Supreme] Court's approach to interpret the term in a consistent manner"); see also Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 981-82 (Fed. Cir. 2018). While a "defendant of course, might prefer a judgment vindicating its position regarding the substantive merits of the plaintiff's allegations," the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he defendant has . . . fulfilled its primary objective whenever the plaintiff's challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the court's decision.