" '[W]here adoption of a particular legal standard dictates the outcome of a case based on undisputed facts, we may address that issue as a question of law.' " Kelly v. Nicholson, 463 F.3d 1349, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Halpern v. Principi, 384 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see Sellers v. Wilkie, 965 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Groves v. Peake, 524 F.3d 1306, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Secretary has not shown that the facts that are material under the correct standard are in dispute, and on those facts, the post-Act version of the fee statute applies.
Under ยง 285, "a favorable judgment on the merits is not necessary for a defendant to be deemed a prevailing party for purposes of statutory fee-shifting." Raniere v. Microsoft Corp., 887 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018); cf. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1646, 1651 (2016) (reaching the same holding as to a similarly worded provision of Title VII and noting that "Congress has included the term 'prevailing party' in various fee-shifting statutes, and it has been the [Supreme] Court's approach to interpret the term in a consistent manner"); see also Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 981-82 (Fed. Cir. 2018). While a "defendant of course, might prefer a judgment vindicating its position regarding the substantive merits of the plaintiff's allegations," the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he defendant has . . . fulfilled its primary objective whenever the plaintiff's challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the court's decision.