The EAJA applicant bears the burden of proving he or she is a prevailing party. Robinson v. O’Rourke , 891 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018).EAJA provides in relevant part:
" '[W]here adoption of a particular legal standard dictates the outcome of a case based on undisputed facts, we may address that issue as a question of law.' " Kelly v. Nicholson, 463 F.3d 1349, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Halpern v. Principi, 384 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see Sellers v. Wilkie, 965 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Groves v. Peake, 524 F.3d 1306, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Secretary has not shown that the facts that are material under the correct standard are in dispute, and on those facts, the post-Act version of the fee statute applies.
The EAJA applicant "carries the burden of proving he is a prevailing party." Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
CRST highlighted "the asymmetry in the parties’ litigation objectives, which affects the showing that each party must make to achieve prevailing-party status" and held that a defendant "prevails ‘whenever the plaintiff's challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the court's decision.’ " Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting CRST, 136 S. Ct. at 1651 ); see also B.E. Tech., L.L.C. v. Facebook, Inc., 940 F.3d 675, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 618, 208 L.Ed.2d 227 (2020) ("Facebook obtained the outcome it sought via the mootness dismissal; it rebuffed B.E.’s attempt to alter the parties’ legal relationship in an infringement suit .... CRST explains that a defendant, like Facebook, can prevail by ‘rebuffing’ plaintiff's claim, irrespective of the reason for the court's decision."). Of course, in order to confer prevailing party status, the rejection of the plaintiff's attempt to alter the parties’ legal relationship "must be marked by ‘judicial imprimatur.’ " CRST, 136 S. Ct. at 1646 (citation omitted).
For that reason, it is appropriate for this court to hold that Mr. Sellers is not entitled to an earlier effective date based on his 1996 formal claim. See Robinson v. O'Rourke , 891 F.3d 976, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ("[W]here adoption of a particular legal standard dictates the outcome of a case based on undisputed facts, we may address that issue as a question of law.") (quoting Kelly v. Nicholson , 463 F.3d 1349, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ); Reeves v. Shinseki , 682 F.3d 988, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ; Comer v. Peake , 552 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ; Groves v. Peake , 524 F.3d 1306, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversing the Veterans Court and remanding for entry of judgment where application of correct law dictates outcome of a veteran's claim). CONCLUSION
Under § 285, "a favorable judgment on the merits is not necessary for a defendant to be deemed a prevailing party for purposes of statutory fee-shifting." Raniere v. Microsoft Corp., 887 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018); cf. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1646, 1651 (2016) (holding the same as to a similarly worded provision of Title VII and noting that "Congress has included the term 'prevailing party' in various fee-shifting statutes, and it has been the Court's approach to interpret the term in a consistent manner"); see also Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 981-82 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Although a "defendant, of course, might prefer a judgment vindicating its position regarding the substantive merits of the plaintiff's allegations," the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he defendant has . . . fulfilled its primary objective whenever the plaintiff's challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the court's decision.
Under § 285, "a favorable judgment on the merits is not necessary for a defendant to be deemed a prevailing party for purposes of statutory fee-shifting." Raniere v. Microsoft Corp., 887 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018); cf. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1646, 1651 (2016) (reaching the same holding as to a similarly worded provision of Title VII and noting that "Congress has included the term 'prevailing party' in various fee-shifting statutes, and it has been the [Supreme] Court's approach to interpret the term in a consistent manner"); see also Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 981-82 (Fed. Cir. 2018). While a "defendant of course, might prefer a judgment vindicating its position regarding the substantive merits of the plaintiff's allegations," the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he defendant has . . . fulfilled its primary objective whenever the plaintiff's challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the court's decision.