Robinson v. Norato

13 Citing cases

  1. Walker v. Jones

    33 Ala. App. 348 (Ala. Crim. App. 1948)   Cited 17 times

    In suits involving O.P.A. regulations in sale of automobiles above ceiling price, the purchaser is not entitled to recover treble damages, but only actual damages, and is not entitled to recover a penalty. Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 43 A.2d 467, 162 A.L.R. 362. Davis Bealle, of Tuscaloosa, for appellee.

  2. Walker v. Gilman

    171 P.2d 797 (Wash. 1946)   Cited 3 times

    [5] It, therefore, makes no difference whether the lawful maximum legal rental in this case was fixed by the order of June 15, 1943, or by the original regulation, since the amount is forty-five dollars in either case. The plaintiff was charged thirty dollars per month in excess of that amount for seven consecutive months, and is, therefore, legally entitled to recover his damages in this action, unless (1) we follow the supreme court of Rhode Island in holding, as it did in Robinson v. Norato, 43 A.2d (R.I.) 467, that it would not enforce § 205(e) of the Federal emergency price control act, or (2) refuse, for some adequate reason, to follow the decisions of the supreme court of the United States. In the interest of brevity, we set out the theory of the Rhode Island court decision in Robinson v. Norato, supra, by quoting from the [Atlantic Reporter] headnotes to the case:

  3. Haywood v. Drown

    556 U.S. 729 (2009)   Cited 345 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once a State creates a court of general jurisdiction, as all three of our States have, the State must hear and adjudicate § 1983 claims

    330 U.S., at 394, and n. 13, 67 S.Ct. 810. The Rhode Island court nevertheless declined to exercise that jurisdiction under its decision in Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 258, 43 A.2d 467, 468 (1945), which had relied on a “universally acknowledged” doctrine “of private international law” as a basis for refusing to adjudicate federal “penal” claims. Because the Rhode Island Supreme Court had invoked this common-law doctrine despite the existence of state-law statutory jurisdiction over the federal claims, this Court correctly ruled that the state court's “policy against enforcement ... of statutes of other states and the United States which it deems penal, [could not] be accepted as a ‘valid excuse.’ ” 330 U.S., at 392–393, 67 S.Ct. 810.

  4. Testa v. Katt

    330 U.S. 386 (1947)   Cited 338 times
    Holding that state courts with jurisdiction to hear federal issues "are not free to refuse enforcement" of litigants' rights under federal law

    It held that an action for violation of § 205(e) could not be maintained in the courts of that State. The State Supreme Court rested its holding on its earlier decision in Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 43 A.2d 467 (1945) in which it had reasoned that: A state need not enforce the penal laws of a government which is foreign in the international sense; § 205(e) is treated by Rhode Island as penal in that sense; the United States is "foreign" to the State in the "private international" as distinguished from the "public international" sense; hence Rhode Island courts, though their jurisdiction is adequate to enforce similar Rhode Island "penal" statutes, need not enforce § 205(e). Whether state courts may decline to enforce federal laws on these grounds is a question of great importance.

  5. Salonen v. Farley

    82 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Ky. 1949)   Cited 5 times
    In Salonen, Judge Swinford concluded that KRS 372.040 "creates a right of action in a private person and provides for a recovery of treble amount of recovery lost to the defendant in a gambling transaction."

    The defendants have correctly stated the well established principle of law that the Government of the United States is foreign as to the States of the Union within the rule of private international law that the penal statutes of one sovereignty will not be enforced by another. Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 43 A.2d 467, 162 A.L.R. 362; State of Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265,8 S.Ct. 1370,32 L.Ed. 239. It is universally recognized that foreign jurisdictions will not enforce penal statutes of another state. Galveston, H. S. A. R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 32 S.Ct. 205, 56 L.Ed. 516; The Antelope, 10 Wheat 66, 23 U.S. 66, 6 L.Ed. 268, wherein Chief Justice Marshall made the short statement that, "The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another."

  6. Rein v. Koons Ford, Inc.

    318 Md. 130 (Md. 1989)   Cited 14 times
    Construing a Virginia consumer protection statute

    Whether a statute is penal in the conflict of laws sense is decided by the law of the forum. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. at 683, 13 S.Ct. at 233, 36 L.Ed. at 1133; Miller v. Municipal Court of City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal.2d 818, 837, 142 P.2d 297, 308 (1943); Southern Package Corp. v. Walton, 196 Miss. 786, 801, 18 So.2d 458, 461, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 762, 65 S.Ct. 93, 89 L.Ed. 609 (1944); Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 264, 43 A.2d 467, 471 (1945); Paper Prods. Co. v. Doggrell, 195 Tenn. 581, 586, 261 S.W.2d 127, 129 (1953); Hinton v. Bond Discount Co., 214 Ark. 718, 724, 218 S.W.2d 75, 78 (1949); 36 Am. Jur. 2d, Forfeitures Penalties § 12. Thus the Supreme Court in Huntington stated:

  7. Bourguet v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad

    65 N.M. 200 (N.M. 1958)   Cited 3 times

    After quoting Article VI the court discusses a number of its previous holdings, stating: "The Rhode Island court in its Robinson decision [Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 43 A.2d 467, 162 A.L.R. 362] on which it relies cites cases of this Court which have held that states are not required by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution to enforce judgments of the courts of other states based on claims arising out of penal statutes. But those holdings have no relevance here, for this case raises no full faith and credit question.

  8. McGrath v. Tobin

    81 R.I. 415 (R.I. 1954)   Cited 4 times
    In McGrath Ex'r. v. Tobin, 1954, 81 R.I. 415, 103 A.2d 795, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that said Massachusetts death by wrongful act statute was penal in nature and unenforceable in the courts of Rhode Island.

    O'Reilly v. New York New England R.R., 16 R.I. 388. We recently reaffirmed the underlying principle of those cases in Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256. Since then the United States supreme court has decided that under the supremacy clause of the federal constitution we must enforce a federal statute even though we deem it penal. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386. But as far as we are aware that court has never held that the full faith and credit clause requires one state to enforce the penal statutes of a sister state.

  9. Basham v. Smith

    149 Tex. 279 (Tex. 1950)   Cited 16 times
    In Basham v. Smith, 149 Tex. 279, 233 S.W.2d 297 (1950) the survival question arose when the defendant died prior to trial in an action under the Federal Rent Control Act.

    The right of a state forum to determine by its own law questions under federal statutes, such as whether the statute imposes a penalty or not, has been asserted by some state courts, but we believe upon a mistaken idea of the application of Conflict of Laws principles to the relationship between the Federal and State governments. See Bowles v. Barde Steel Co., 177 Or. 421, 164 P.2d 692, 162 A.L.R. 328; Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 43 A.2d 467, 162 A.L.R. 362; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 1948 Supp. § 2. If the statute in question had contained express provision for survival, the state courts would seem clearly bound to give it effect, just as they would also be bound to look to the federal decisions for guidance in the matter of its meaning. It is no great step thence to say that in the absence of any federal provision on the point, we should, so far as we can, determine the matter of survival by reference to federal decisions. There is, indeed, a federal statute which provides that: 'A civil action for damages commenced by or on behalf of the United States or in which it is interested shall not abate on the death of a defendant but shall survive and be enforceable against his estate as well as against surviving defendants.' 28 U.S.C.A. § 2404.

  10. Newman v. Fuller Co.

    72 R.I. 113 (R.I. 1946)   Cited 2 times

    Defendants contend that that act is a penal statute in an international sense and is, therefore, not enforceable in the courts of this state. In support of that contention they rely upon the recent case of Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256. The plaintiff contends, on the other hand, that that case is not in point for the reason that the Federal Emergency Price Control Act, therein held to be penal and unenforceable, is clearly distinguishable from the Fair Labor Standards Act.