Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9280.
February 15, 2006.
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, William H. Fuld, Judge. Trial Court No. 3AN-04-12665 CR.
Henry E. Graper, III, Gorton, Logue Graper, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Rachel Plumlee, Assistant Municipal Prosecutor, and Frederick H. Boness, Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Russell Robinson was convicted following a bench trial of resisting or interfering with a police officer. He argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We reject that claim and affirm his conviction.
Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 8.30.010.A.6.
Facts and proceedings
On December 31, 2004, at about 9:00 p.m., the Anchorage police were dispatched to the Tesoro 2-Go Mart, a gas station and convenience store located at the intersection of Dowling Road and Old Seward Highway, on an anonymous report that a suspicious person driving an older blue pickup truck with a wooden camper on the back had been talking about robbing the store. The caller reported that the person said something about terrorists, and about wanting to make sure that the women and children were out of there. The officers soon located the distinctive vehicle. The vehicle appeared to have no rear license plate (as it turned out, the vehicle had a rear license plate, but it was not immediately visible because the bumper was rotated so that the plate was pointing downward).
As the vehicle pulled away from the Tesoro station, Officer Howard Shore activated his emergency lights and pulled it over. Officer Shore approached the driver, Robinson, and asked him for identification. Robinson immediately demanded to know why he had been stopped. Officer Shore told Robinson he had been stopped because he was missing his rear license plate. Robinson yelled that the police had no right to stop him, and refused to produce his driver's license. Robinson then indicated that he wanted to park, and Officer Shore told him not to move the vehicle. The vehicle then lurched forward and Officer Shore shouted at Robinson to stop. Robinson complied. Officer Shore told Robinson to produce his driver's license; Robinson verbally refused to do so, and he put his hand inside his coat near his left armpit. Concerned that Robinson might be reaching for a gun, Officer Shore pulled out his service pistol and told Robinson not to move. Robinson ignored Officer Shore's order and pulled his hand out of his coat, extracting his wallet. Robinson continued to yell that the police had no right to stop him.
Officer Shore told Robinson to get out of the vehicle, but Robinson would not. Officer Shore opened the car door, but Robinson grabbed it and tried to slam it shut. The door did not latch, and Officer Shore pulled it open again and grabbed Robinson by the coat and started to pull him out of the vehicle. Robinson continued to shout, now stating that the police were aggravating his medical conditions. However, he appeared limber and strong, and the police did not observe any obvious physical problems.
Once he was out of the vehicle, Robinson was told to put his hands on the vehicle so he could be searched for weapons. Robinson repeatedly took his hands off the truck and pulled away from the vehicle. The police then told Robinson they were going to handcuff him, but he refused to cooperate, repeating that the police had no right to arrest him. Two officers attempted to place Robinson's hands behind his back, but he physically resisted. It took four police officers to handcuff him. Robinson continued to yell and tried to jerk himself out of the hands of police. Officer Shore told Robinson that he was being charged with resisting an officer; Robinson initially refused to get into the back of the patrol car.
Based on this conduct, Robinson was charged under the Anchorage Municipal Code with resisting or interfering with a public officer. At a bench trial before District Court Judge William H. Fuld, three officers testified to the above facts, asserting that Robinson had repeatedly resisted police orders and that at least four officers had been required to subdue him for a weapons search. The Municipality also played portions of a police audio tape and video.
Robinson then testified. He said that he had been "totally polite, respectful, [and] calm," and that before he had an opportunity to comply with any police orders, Officer Shore jerked open the door of his truck and "the whole squad of them just basically started beating the heck out of me." He said at that point he began to yell because of pain from his physical ailments.
Judge Fuld rejected Robinson's version of events and found beyond a reasonable doubt that he had recklessly interfered with the officers.
Was there sufficient evidence to support Robinson's conviction?
On appeal, Robinson argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for resisting or interfering with a police officer.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence following trial without a jury, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judge's verdict. The question, then, is whether there is "substantial evidence" to support the verdict; that is, whether there is adequate relevant evidence "to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that there was no reasonable doubt as to [the defendant's] guilt."
Beck v. State, 408 P.2d 996, 997 (Alaska 1965); Ross v. State, 586 P.2d 616, 618 (Alaska 1978); see also Helmer v. State, 608 P.2d 38, 39 (Alaska 1980).
Beck, 408 P.2d at 997; Ross, 586 P.2d at 618.
Robinson's conviction required proof that he intentionally, recklessly, or knowingly disobeyed the lawful orders of a public officer. Robinson concedes that three police officers testified at trial that he was "not compliant with multiple commands." But he asserts that this evidence was contradicted by his own testimony and by the Municipality's exhibits. He argues that this conflicting evidence showed that he was given no opportunity to comply with police orders.
AMC 8.30.010.A.6.
The only exhibit Robinson designated as part of the record on appeal is the police audio tape. That tape indicates that the police told Robinson eleven times to get out of his truck. Robinson was also asked several times to put his hands behind his back. The audio tape conveys the sounds of a struggle as the police handcuff Robinson, and records Robinson yelling loudly about his injuries. Robinson is then repeatedly asked to get in the patrol vehicle.
This tape, and the testimony of the three police officers, provided sufficient relevant evidence for Judge Fuld to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Robinson recklessly disobeyed the lawful orders of police. Judge Fuld could properly rely on this evidence, and disregard Robinson's conflicting testimony, in ruling that he had committed the offense of resisting or interfering with the police. Conclusion
Ross, 586 P.2d at 618.
See Rhodes v. State, 717 P.2d 422, 425 (Alaska App. 1986).
Robinson's conviction is AFFIRMED.
Robinson was charged with resisting or interfering with a police officer. He waived his right to a jury trial and consented to be tried by the court. At the conclusion of the trial, District Court Judge William H. Fuld found Robinson guilty.
Robinson argues in this appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the judge's verdict. Robinson concedes that the Municipality of Anchorage presented some evidence to support the charge; but Robinson argues that, if the evidence presented at his trial is taken as a whole, the "substantial weight of the evidence" does not support the verdict.
This argument is based on a misunderstanding of the standard of review that applies to judge-tried cases.
Normally, when an appellate court reviews a trial court's findings of fact, the appellate court applies the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Under this standard of review, an appellate court must normally defer to the trial judge's findings of fact. Nevertheless, the appellate court retains the right to depart from a trial judge's finding if, despite the existence of some evidence to support that finding, the appellate court is "[left] with a definite and firm conviction[, based] on the entire record[,] that a mistake has been made". Geczy v. LaChappelle, 636 P.2d 604, 606 n. 6 (Alaska 1981); Mathis v. Meyeres, 574 P.2d 447, 449 (Alaska 1978).
The rule is different, however, when the decision being reviewed is a judge's verdict in a judge-tried case. In this circumstance, the "clearly erroneous" standard of review does not apply. Rather, the Alaska Supreme Court has declared that the governing standard of review is the "substantial evidence" standard. Helmer v. State, 608 P.2d 38, 39 (Alaska 1980); McKinney v. State, 566 P.2d 653, 662 (Alaska 1977).
In this appeal, Robinson has interpreted the "substantial evidence" test as meaning that the judge's verdict must be supported by the "substantial weight of the evidence" — thus allowing a defendant to seek reversal of the verdict if the weight of the evidence is against the trial judge's conclusion. This position is mistaken.
As the supreme court explained in Helmer and McKinney, the "substantial evidence" standard of review requires an appellate court to affirm a trial judge's verdict in a criminal case if the verdict "is supported by [sufficient] relevant evidence . . . to support a conclusion by a reasonable [person] that there was no reasonable doubt as to [the defendant's] guilt". And when the appellate court decides whether the evidence is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the defendant's guilt, "[a]ll inferences are to be resolved in the light most favorable to [the judge's verdict]".
Helmer, 608 P.2d at 39, quoting McKinney, 566 P.2d at 662.
McKinney, 566 P.2d at 662.
This is a more deferential standard of review than the "clearly erroneous" test. As explained above, the "clearly erroneous" standard of review authorizes an appellate court to set aside a trial judge's finding of fact even when there is evidence to support the finding, if the appellate court is firmly convinced that the trial judge made a mistake. But under the "substantial evidence" standard of review, an appellate court must abide by the trial judge's verdict if there is evidence to support it, even when the weight of the evidence is to the contrary.
In effect, the "substantial evidence" standard of review is equivalent to the standard of review that an appellate court employs when assessing whether a jury's verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. The test for reviewing a jury's finding of guilt is whether, "[v]iewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support a [conclusion by] fair-minded jurors [that] the defendant [is] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt". Wells v. State, 102 P.3d 972, 974 (Alaska App. 2004), citing Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981).
These two tests are meant to be equivalent. The point of the "substantial evidence" standard of review is to put verdicts in judge-tried cases on the same footing as verdicts in jury-tried cases, so that both types of verdicts are equally insulated from appellate court second-guessing. In other words, an appellate court's limited authority to overturn a verdict in a criminal case is the same, regardless of whether the defendant exercises their right to a jury trial or waives that right and consents to a bench trial.