(Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 3). In particular, Hill cites Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 462 (2001), arguing that on summary judgment Wal-Mart's submission of Hill's deposition alone is insufficient to shift the burden of production to Hill. But Robinson is inapplicable to the case at bar.
On review of a motion for summary judgment, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the adverse party. Robinson v. Lamb's WilsonvilleThriftway, 332 Or. 453, 461, 31 P.3d 421 (2001). This case was pending in the trial court when a 1999 amendment to ORCP 47 C became effective; therefore, the amended version of ORCP 47 C applies.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ORCP 47 C; Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or 453, 455, 31 P3d 421 (2001). There is no genuine issue as to a material fact when "no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary judgment."
As plaintiff applied the brakes, her car likewise spun out of control, crossing two lanes of traffic before hitting the median dividing the north-bound and south-bound lanes. See Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or 453, 455, 31 P3d 421 (2001). Angela Willis was driving behind both plaintiff and White when she observed both of them lose control of their cars.
On review of the grant of summary judgment, we consider the facts, and all of the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party. Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 455, 31 P.3d 421 (2001); Mount Joseph Cattle Co., Inc. v. Makin Farms, Inc., 180 Or. App. 27, 29, 42 P.3d 331 (2002). We will affirm only if the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that plaintiff, the moving party, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
On review of a summary judgment, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 455, 31 P.3d 421 (2001). We will affirm only if the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Once the parameters of what is, and is not, at issue in summary judgment are identified, we will affirm the trial court's judgment if we agree that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and * * * the moving party [was] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." ORCP 47 C; see also Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway , 332 Or. 453, 455, 31 P.3d 421 (2001) (describing that standard on review). No issue of material fact exists if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—here, plaintiffs—"no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary judgment."
ORCP 47 C. That standard is met when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable juror could return a verdict for that party. Id.; Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 455, 31 P.3d 421 (2001). The nonmoving party—in this case, plaintiff—has the burden of producing evidence on any issue raised in the motion as to which it would have the burden of persuasion at trial.
In Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland, 335 Or. 105, 110, 59 P.3d 521 (2002), this court held that “ ‘the ORCP apply only in trial courts.’ ” (quoting McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze Dry, Inc., 327 Or. 84, 89, 957 P.2d 1200, adh'd to on recons., 327 Or. 185, 957 P.2d 1200 (1998)); see also Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 459, 31 P.3d 421 (2001) (stating that the rules of civil procedure “are rules to be applied to actions in trial courts ”) (emphasis in original). Although rules of civil procedure have indeed been incorporated into this court's procedural framework, we have done so only after expressly making those provisions part of the Oregon Rules of Appellate Procedure. See, e.g., ORAP 1.40 (expressly adopting the provisions of ORCP 17); ORAP 8.05 (doing the same for ORCP 34).
McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze Dry, Inc., 327 Or. 84, 89, 957 P.2d 1200, adh'd to on recons, 327 Or. 185, 957 P.2d 1207 (1998). Accord Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 459, 31 P.3d 421 (2001) (stating that ORCP "are rules to be applied to actions in trial courts" (emphasis in original)). The foregoing suggests that the word "judgment" in ORCP 71 B was intended to include circuit court judgments, not appellate judgments.