Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway

54 Citing cases

  1. Hill v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

    Case No. 3:16-cv-00450-AC (D. Or. Jun. 5, 2017)

    (Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 3). In particular, Hill cites Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 462 (2001), arguing that on summary judgment Wal-Mart's submission of Hill's deposition alone is insufficient to shift the burden of production to Hill. But Robinson is inapplicable to the case at bar.

  2. Schaff v. Ray's Land & Sea Food Co.

    334 Or. 94 (Or. 2002)   Cited 42 times
    Holding that a dealer was an independent contractor, not an employee, notwithstanding that their relationship was terminable at will

    On review of a motion for summary judgment, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the adverse party. Robinson v. Lamb's WilsonvilleThriftway, 332 Or. 453, 461, 31 P.3d 421 (2001). This case was pending in the trial court when a 1999 amendment to ORCP 47 C became effective; therefore, the amended version of ORCP 47 C applies.

  3. Medina v. State

    278 Or. App. 579 (Or. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that "prediscipline notice," a "last chance agreement," an "investigatory meeting," and "placement of plaintiff on administrative leave" were materially adverse where those actions were predicates to termination

    Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ORCP 47 C; Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or 453, 455, 31 P3d 421 (2001). There is no genuine issue as to a material fact when "no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary judgment."

  4. Bingenheimer v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.

    196 Or. App. 316 (Or. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 4 times
    Deciding that, without any evidence as to the relative probability that a vehicle would leak oil with or without negligence, “a jury is without a legally sufficient basis for inferring, based on res ipsa loquitur, that negligence of driver of vehicle caused the plaintiff's injuries”

    As plaintiff applied the brakes, her car likewise spun out of control, crossing two lanes of traffic before hitting the median dividing the north-bound and south-bound lanes. See Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or 453, 455, 31 P3d 421 (2001). Angela Willis was driving behind both plaintiff and White when she observed both of them lose control of their cars.

  5. Sande v. City of Portland

    185 Or. App. 262 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 11 times
    Reversing allowance of summary judgment for defendant city based on "discretionary immunity," where the defendant denied that the alleged actionable conduct had ever occurred: "The problem with the city's response * * * is that it supports at best a conclusion that [the officer] could have made a judgment call that would have been entitled to discretionary immunity, not that she did make that judgment call."

    On review of the grant of summary judgment, we consider the facts, and all of the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party. Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 455, 31 P.3d 421 (2001); Mount Joseph Cattle Co., Inc. v. Makin Farms, Inc., 180 Or. App. 27, 29, 42 P.3d 331 (2002). We will affirm only if the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that plaintiff, the moving party, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

  6. Mount Joseph Cattle Co. v. Makin Farms

    180 Or. App. 27 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 7 times

    On review of a summary judgment, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 455, 31 P.3d 421 (2001). We will affirm only if the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

  7. Adelsperger v. Elkside Dev.

    371 Or. 61 (Or. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    Once the parameters of what is, and is not, at issue in summary judgment are identified, we will affirm the trial court's judgment if we agree that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and * * * the moving party [was] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." ORCP 47 C; see also Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway , 332 Or. 453, 455, 31 P.3d 421 (2001) (describing that standard on review). No issue of material fact exists if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—here, plaintiffs—"no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary judgment."

  8. Hagler v. Coastal Farm Holdings, Inc.

    354 Or. 132 (Or. 2013)   Cited 28 times
    In Hagler v. Coastal Farm Holdings, 354 Or. 132, 144 (2013), the Oregon Supreme Court held that a merchant may be held liable if circumstances suggest that, in the exercise of due care, the merchant should have recognized a particular display posed a risk, Hagler, 354 Or. at 144.

    ORCP 47 C. That standard is met when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable juror could return a verdict for that party. Id.; Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 455, 31 P.3d 421 (2001). The nonmoving party—in this case, plaintiff—has the burden of producing evidence on any issue raised in the motion as to which it would have the burden of persuasion at trial.

  9. Lasley v. Combined Transp. Inc.

    351 Or. 1 (Or. 2011)   Cited 50 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that evidence of joint tortfeasor's intoxication was not relevant to whether defendant's negligence was a cause of decedent's death but was relevant to the apportionment of fault

    In Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland, 335 Or. 105, 110, 59 P.3d 521 (2002), this court held that “ ‘the ORCP apply only in trial courts.’ ” (quoting McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze Dry, Inc., 327 Or. 84, 89, 957 P.2d 1200, adh'd to on recons., 327 Or. 185, 957 P.2d 1200 (1998)); see also Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 459, 31 P.3d 421 (2001) (stating that the rules of civil procedure “are rules to be applied to actions in trial courts ”) (emphasis in original). Although rules of civil procedure have indeed been incorporated into this court's procedural framework, we have done so only after expressly making those provisions part of the Oregon Rules of Appellate Procedure. See, e.g., ORAP 1.40 (expressly adopting the provisions of ORCP 17); ORAP 8.05 (doing the same for ORCP 34).

  10. Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland

    59 P.3d 521 (Or. 2002)   Cited 3 times

    McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze Dry, Inc., 327 Or. 84, 89, 957 P.2d 1200, adh'd to on recons, 327 Or. 185, 957 P.2d 1207 (1998). Accord Robinson v. Lamb's Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or. 453, 459, 31 P.3d 421 (2001) (stating that ORCP "are rules to be applied to actions in trial courts" (emphasis in original)). The foregoing suggests that the word "judgment" in ORCP 71 B was intended to include circuit court judgments, not appellate judgments.