Opinion
C. A. 6:24-cv-01749-HMH-KFM
06-20-2024
Joshua Lynn Robinson, Plaintiff, v. Michael Kimbler, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. McDONALD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on April 8, 2024 (doc. 1). By orders filed April 30, 2024, and May 17, 2024, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (docs. 7; 16). The plaintiff complied with the court's orders, and the case is now in proper form for judicial screening. However, for the reasons that follow, it is recommended that this matter be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”), filed this action seeking damages from the defendant (doc. 1). Of note, the plaintiff's allegations, in part, appear to involve pending charges for two counts of domestic violence, first degree in the Greenville County General Sessions Court. See Greenville County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2021A2320500775, 2021A2320500776) (last visited June 20, 2024). The charges were indicted by a grand jury in December 2022. Id.
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights (doc. 1 at 4). He contends that he has video proof that the defendant falsified a “CDV risk assess[ment]” with the plaintiff's wife (id. at 4, 5, 6). The plaintiff contends that after the defendant falsified the documents, he ended up with two felony warrants put out for his arrest, which resulted in three months' incarceration before he was released on bond (id. at 5). The plaintiff does not allege specific injuries (id. at 7). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendant. Nevertheless, as outlined below, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
The plaintiff's complaint is barred by claim preclusion (res judicata)
In the instant matter, the plaintiff seeks to re-litigate claims that have already been adjudicated and decided adversely to him by this Court. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion-or res judicata-a final judgment on the merits of an action bars the parties from re-litigating the issues that were or could have been raised in the prior action. See Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004). In order for res judicata to apply, there must have been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) the identity of the cause of action in both suits; and (3) the same parties or their privies in the two suits. Id. at 354-55 (citing Nash Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 1981)); see Orca Yachts L.L.C. v. Mollicam, Inc., 287 F.3d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that claim preclusion applies when there has been a valid and final judgment-even if the matter was not actually litigated (quoting In re Varat Enters., Inc., 81 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996)). In evaluating whether the same cause of action is brought in both suits, the court ascertains whether the claim in the new litigation “arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved by the prior judgment.” Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1313 (4th Cir. 1986)). Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant, Mr. Kimbler (one of the defendants from his prior case), violated his rights by falsifying a report that was used to arrest him (see doc. 1). However, the plaintiff previously brought a claim against this defendant for falsifying a report to arrest him (as in this action), and the claim against Mr. Kimbler was dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Robinson v. Greer Police Dep't, et al., C/A No. 6:24-cv-00146-HMH, at doc. 28 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2024). Dismissals “for failure to state a claim are typically considered a final judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata . . . [unless] the prior action was expressly dismissed without prejudice.” Hegedus v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, C/A No. 5:17-cv-00053, 2018 WL 1465268, at *8 (W.D. Va. Feb. 1,2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 1461747 (W.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2018) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata in the present matter.
Failure to State a Claim
As noted above, the instant matter is subject to dismissal based upon res judicata. The plaintiff's complaint is also subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. As an initial matter, because the plaintiff seeks money damages, and not injunctive federal court interference with his pending criminal charges, it appears that Younger abstention does not apply to this action. See Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881,903 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that a federal court may not award injunctive relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
Fourth Amendment Claim
To the extent the plaintiff seeks damages from the defendant based upon an alleged falsified report that was used to arrest him (see doc. 1), the plaintiff alleges a claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment (even though he also references the Fourteenth Amendment). The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure . . . is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.” Skinnerv. Ry. Lab. Execs.'Assn, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). Further, § 1983 actions premised on malicious prosecution, false arrest, and/or false imprisonment are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
However, “an indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see Provet v. State of S.C., C/A No. 6:07-cv-01094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (section 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded because of indictment). This Court, as noted above, has taken judicial notice of the plaintiff's pending charges in the Greenville County General Sessions Court, including grand jury indictments on both of his pending charges. See Greenville County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2021A2320500775, 2021A2320500776) (last visited June 20, 2024). These indictments act as a bar to the plaintiff's claims that the defendant falsified a report to have him arrested. As such, the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim is subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).