Robinson v. Houston-Galveston Area Council

2 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Stubblefield

    942 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 2019)   Cited 7 times

    To start, Stubblefield signed three agreements to act "in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations," and such law at least suggests that H-GAC is part of the state government. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code, TEX. STAT. tit. 12, § 391.003 (1987); Byrdson Servs. v. S. E. Texas Reg’l Planning Comm’n , 516 S.W.3d 483, 484 (Tex. 2016) ; Robinson v. Houston-Galveston Area Council , 566 F. Supp. 370, 371 (S.D. Tex. 1983) ; BCCA Appeal Grp. v. EPA , 355 F.3d 817, 842 n.35 (5th Cir. 2003). Further, those same three signed agreements note the oversight of the State of Texas, and the last such agreement, as well as various records of payments made to H-GAC, includes the abbreviation "TDOT."

  2. Franks v. Magnolia Hosp

    888 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Miss. 1995)   Cited 11 times

    Furthermore, as suggested in Perry v. Sindermann and its progeny, the plaintiff bears responsibility for requesting a due process hearing. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570, 581 (1972) (proof of property interest would obligate employer to "grant a hearing at his (plaintiff/employee's) request"); Dwyer, 793 F.2d at 457 (when pre-termination hearing is required, it need be provided only if requested); See also Robinson v. Houston-Galveston Area Council, 566 F. Supp. 370, 379 (S.D.Tex. 1983) (due to finding of court that plaintiffs had property interest, employer is obligated to grant healing at their request); Kaiser v. Dixon, 127 Ill. App.3d 251, 82 Ill.Dec. 275, 468 N.E.2d 822, 834 (1984) (individual with protected interest in employment is entitled to hearing at his request). Certainly the plaintiff should not be permitted to sit on her hands and then complain to the court that she was not given an express opportunity to question her discharge.