Opinion
3:23-cv-89
09-04-2024
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Before this Court is the Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”) from Magistrate Judge Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong recommending that this Court deny Petitioner's renewed motion for default judgment or other appropriate judgment (Doc. No. 21). (Doc. No. 40.)
The R&R was issued on August 2, 2024. (Doc. No. 40.) On August 16, 2024, Petitioner filed a motion to preserve or set aside objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 42.) For the following reasons, Petitioner's objections are OVERRULED and the R&R is ADOPTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Martin Robinson (“Robinson” or “Petitioner”) filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for writ of habeas corpus on January 17, 2023. (Doc. No. 1.) The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong on February 15, 2023, and the Magistrate Judge's Initial Order states, “Respondent shall file an answer (‘Return of Writ') to the petition within forty-five (45) days from the date of this order.” (Doc. No. 5 at 24.)
For ease and consistency, record citations are to the electronically stamped CM/ECF document and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.
On March 13, 2023, the Court granted Respondent's motion for extension of time until May 31, 2023 to answer. (Doc. No. 8.) On May 30, 2023, the Court granted Respondent's second motion for extension of time until July 31, 2023 to answer. (Doc. No. 10.) On July 27, 2023, Respondent filed a motion for a more definite statement because the petition did not set forth the grounds for relief. (Doc. No. 13.)
On August 14, 2023, Petitioner filed a motion for default judgment. (Doc. No. 15). On September 12, 2023, the Court granted Respondent's motion for a more definite statement, ordered Petitioner to file an amended habeas petition, and denied the motion for a default judgment in light of the ruling. On October 19, 2023, Petitioner filed a response to the Court's September 12, 2023 Order. (Doc. No. 16.)
On February 6, 2024, Petitioner filed his renewed motion for default judgment or other appropriate judgment, claiming he is entitled to a default judgment under Rules 55, 56, or 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because “[t]he state of Ohio has failed to defend this matter.” (Doc. No. 21.) On February 21, 2024, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute because Petitioner failed to file an amended petition. (Doc. No. 22.) The Court denied Respondent's motion on May 7, 2024, and ordered Petitioner to file a complete amended petition. (Doc. No. 29.)
Petitioner filed an amended habeas petition on May 31, 2024. (Doc. No. 32.) On June 28, 2024, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the petition is beyond the one-year statute of limitation, it is a mixed petition of exhausted and unexhausted claims, and it is procedurally defaulted in its entirety. (Doc. No. 36.) Petitioner has several other motions pending before the Court. (See Doc. Nos. 30, 34, 37, 39.)
A. The R&R
The August 2, 2024 R&R recommends this Court find that Petitioner's renewed motion for default judgment (Doc. No. 21) fails under Rule 55(a) because default judgments are not available in habeas corpus proceedings. (Doc. No. 40 at 2939.) The R&R further notes that, “even if default was permissible in a habeas corpus action, default would not be appropriate here because Respondent has not failed to defend this case; in fact, Respondent's 86-page motion to dismiss is currently pending before the Court.” (Id. (citing Doc. No. 36).) The R&R also recommends this Court find that Petitioner's motion fails under Rules 56 and 57. (Id. at 294041.)
B. Petitioner's Objections to the R&R
On August 16, 2024, Petitioner timely filed a motion to preserve or set aside objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 42.) Petitioner only partially objected to the recommendation regarding Rule 55. (Id.) Petitioner argues, “If judgments are not allowed in habeas then the rules need to be clear, which they are not.” (Id.) He also takes issue with the cite to Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1970), which he claims is in his “favor” because it was “vacated and remanded for not holding an evidentiary hearing.” (Id.) Finally, Petitioner argues that the R&R “tried to make it appear as the motion to dismiss was timely and before the default judgment, which the motion to dismiss was not.” (Id.)
II. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The Court must conduct a de novo review of the portions of a report and recommendation to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b)(3). The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, a magistrate judge's findings and recommendations. Id. However, general objections are “tantamount to no objection at all” and do not receive de novo review. Middleton v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., No. 19-1943, 2020 WL 5000070, *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 26, 2020); see also Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that general objections duplicating the time and effort of the district court and magistrate judge waste judicial resources). To receive de novo review of portions of a report and recommendation, the stated objection must “address specific concerns” to “focus attention on those issues . . . that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.” Howard, 932 F.2d at 509 (quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985)). “[A]n objection preserves an issue when it explains and cites specific portions of the report which counsel deems problematic.” Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and alterations omitted).
B. Discussion
Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Clerk of Court to enter a default only “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). However, the Sixth Circuit has long recognized that “[d]efault judgments in habeas corpus proceedings . . . [and] the failure of the Office of the Attorney General of Ohio to file a timely return does not afford a basis for instanter relief.” Arnoff v. Black, No. 1:22-cv-00375, 2022 WL 2834663, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July 20, 2022) (citing Allen, 424 F.2d at 137 (holding that default judgment has “no application in habeas corpus cases”), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970)); King v. Kelly, No. 1:13 CV 2270, 2014 WL 3053183, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July 7, 2014) (“The Sixth Circuit has made clear that default judgments are not available in habeas corpus proceedings.”); see also Mahaday v. Cason, 222 F.Supp.2d 918, 921-22 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (collecting cases).
First, Petitioner objects that the rules are not clear if default judgments are not allowed in habeas proceedings. (Doc. No. 42.) This objection does not “address specific concerns” with the R&R and does not warrant de novo review. See Howard, 932 F.2d at 509; Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b)(3). Next, Petitioner's claim that the cite to Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1970) supports his motion because the case was vacated and remanded is mistaken. (Doc. No. 42.) In addition to other Sixth Circuit case law, the R&R cites to Allen in a parenthetical for the proposition that a default judgment under Rule 55(a) has “no application in habeas corpus cases.” (See Doc. No. 40 at 2939; 424 F.2d at 138.) The fact that the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the underlying district court's opinion in Allen does not impact the Sixth Circuit's holding regarding the inapplicability of default judgments in habeas cases. 424 F.2d at 138.
Additionally, Petitioner objects to the R&R's alternative basis for recommending that Petitioner's motion fails under Rule 55(a). (Doc. No. 42.) The R&R states, “even if default was permissible . . . default would not be appropriate here because Respondent has not failed to defend this case” where Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition. (Doc. No. 40 at 2939.) Petitioner specifically objects to the R&R's finding that “the motion to dismiss was timely and before the default judgment.” (Doc. No. 42.)
Here, the record does not reflect that Respondent failed to file a timely response. Respondent filed a motion for a more definite statement on July 27, 2023, before the extended deadline to answer expired. (Doc. No. 13.) After the Court granted Respondent's motion for a more definite statement on September 12, 2023, Petitioner renewed the instant motion for default judgment on February 6, 2024. (Doc. No. 21.) However, Petitioner did not file an amended habeas petition until May 31, 2024. (Doc. No. 32.) Respondent then filed its motion to dismiss on June 28, 2024. (Doc. No. 36.) Respondent has not “failed to plead or otherwise defend” this matter. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a).
Even if Respondent failed to file a timely response, that would not change the outcome. Setting aside that default judgments are not applicable to habeas proceedings, see Arnoff, 2022 WL 2834663, at *1, even where there is a formal declaration of default, Rule 55(c) allows the court to set aside the default so that the case can be heard on the merits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c). “Federal law has a strong preference for considering cases on their merits.” Delawder v. Warden, Ross Corr. Inst., No. 1:16-CV-743, 2018 WL 776270, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2018), R&R adopted, 2019 WL 4743663 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2019) (“even if a default had been declared, the Court would be inclined to set it aside so as to hear the merits of the case”). Here, the Court would be inclined to set aside a default to hear the merits of the case. Id.
Finally, because Petitioner did not object to any of the R&R's recommendations regarding Rules 56 and 57, Petitioner waived de novo review of these issues, and the Court need not review portions of the R&R to which there are no objections. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149; see also Black v. Turner, No. 1:21-CV-0354, 2024 WL 183908, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 17, 2024); Washington v. Black, No. 1:20-CV-01468, 2023 WL 6129931, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2023).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner's objections are OVERRULED. The R&R is ADOPTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.