Robinson v. Guman

23 Citing cases

  1. Nyack v. Estate of Anthony J. Aiardo

    1992 Ct. Sup. 2040 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992)

    When timely objection to it was raised by the plea in abatement, the trial court was correct in sustaining the demurrer to the special defense to the plea and in dismissing the appeal." Heiser v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 566, 567; Phinney v. Rosgen, 162 Conn. 36, 42; Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 442. A motion to dismiss is the proper vehicle to utilize in order to attack the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.

  2. Brass City Local v. City of Waterbury

    337 Conn. 576 (Conn. 2020)   Cited 1 times

    Even if it did, the general tenet that directs a liberal construction of remedial statutes does not permit us to read words into such statutes when it is apparent that the legislature has opted not to include them. See, e.g., Dept. of Public Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations , 296 Conn. 594, 605, 996 A.2d 729 (2010) (in construing labor relations act, "[w]e are not permitted to supply statutory language that the legislature may have chosen to omit" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Robinson v. Guman , 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57 (1972) ("[t]his court should not be asked to read into the statutes words [that] are not there"). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction under § 52-417 to confirm an interest arbitration award issued pursuant to § 7-473c.

  3. All Brand Importers v. Dept. of Liquor Control

    213 Conn. 184 (Conn. 1989)   Cited 106 times
    Construing earlier statute

    "`Courts cannot, by construction, read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated.'" Glastonbury Co. v. Gillies, 209 Conn. 175, 179, 550 A.2d 8 (1988); Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57 (1972). The statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction.

  4. Red Hill Coalition v. Conservation Commission

    212 Conn. 710 (Conn. 1989)   Cited 219 times
    In Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Conservation Commission, supra, 212 Conn. 714-16, the defendant Red Hill Development Corporation (development corporation) submitted to the defendant conservation commission an application for a permit to conduct certain wetlands activities on its property in connection with the construction of a road.

    Absent such a direction by the legislature, we will not read such a requirement into the wetlands act. See Glastonbury Co. v. Gillies, 209 Conn. 175, 179, 181, 550 A.2d 8 (1988); State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709, 727, 546 A.2d 830 (1988); Burnham v. Administrator, 184 Conn. 317, 325, 439 A.2d 1008 (1981); Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57 (1972). See General Statutes 22a-19 (b) and 22a-41 (b), and Glastonbury Inland Wetland and Watercourse Regulations 6, 1.4(b).

  5. Glastonbury Co. v. Gillies

    209 Conn. 175 (Conn. 1988)   Cited 46 times
    Interpreting grandfather provision in insurance licensing statute to apply to an organization's licenses that had lapsed for periods from one to nine years

    "Courts cannot, by construction, read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated." Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57 (1972); Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 314, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S.Ct. 813, 88 L.Ed.2d 787 (1986); Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247, 251-52, 363 A.2d 121 (1975). "[T]he intent of the legislature is to be found not in what it meant to say but in what it did say."

  6. Johnson v. Manson

    196 Conn. 309 (Conn. 1985)   Cited 154 times
    Concluding statute clearly specifies that credit is available for time spent "while awaiting trial" and contains no language regarding credit for time spent "while awaiting extradition"

    Courts cannot, by construction, read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated. Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57; United Aircraft Corporation v. Fusari, 163 Conn. 401, 415, 311 A.2d 65. `It is not for us to search out some intent which we may believe the legislature actually had and give effect to it, but we are confined to the intention which is expressed in the words it has used.' Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295, 301, 57 A.2d 128.

  7. Point O'Woods Assn., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals

    178 Conn. 364 (Conn. 1979)   Cited 101 times

    Colli v. Real Estate Commission, 169 Conn. 445, 452, 364 A.2d 167; Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Water Resources Commission, 162 Conn. 89, 98, 291 A.2d 721. Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts cannot, by construction, read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated. Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247, 251, 363 A.2d 121; Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57. The plaintiff's ownership of land which abuts the premises in question fits squarely within the clear language of General Statutes 8-8. Therefore, the trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff had standing to appeal.

  8. Frazier v. Manson

    410 A.2d 475 (Conn. 1979)   Cited 69 times
    In Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 651, 410 A.2d 475 (1979), we stated: "Thus, [General Statutes] 18-7 and 18-7a remain to provide the means for determining eligibility for good time credits regardless of the type of sentence of imprisonment or institution involved."

    The statutory language of 18-7a and 18-7 is clear and unambiguous and, therefore, courts cannot, by construction, read into such statutes provisions which are not clearly stated. Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247, 251, 363 A.2d 121 (1975); Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57 (1972). To state it otherwise, where the legislative intent is clear, and the language used to express it is unambiguous, there is no room for statutory construction.

  9. Anderson v. Ludgin

    175 Conn. 545 (Conn. 1978)   Cited 114 times

    But "[c]ourts cannot, by construction, read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated. Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57; United Aircraft Corporation v. Fusari, 163 Conn. 401, 415, 311 A.2d 65." Houston v. Warden, supra, 251. International Business Machines Corporation v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 134, 355 A.2d 236 (1974).

  10. Vanbuskirk v. Knierim

    169 Conn. 382 (Conn. 1975)   Cited 20 times
    Addressing appeals from probate pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1972) § 45-288, predecessor to § 45a-186

    Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 419, 56 A. 881, appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 602, 26 S.Ct. 748, 50 L.Ed. 328.' Heiser v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 565, 192 A.2d 44." Robinson v. Guman, 163 Conn. 439, 444, 311 A.2d 57. The plaintiff also relies upon the decisions of this court which have defined "waiver" as the "voluntary relinquishment of a known right."