Opinion
A150717
11-01-2018
TOM ROBINSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RAEWYN GLASGOW, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RF11606700)
Tom Robinson, appearing in propia persona, appeals from the trial court's order renewing a restraining order against him for five additional years. The renewed restraining order protects Raewyn Glasgow and Glasgow's adult daughter, Tui Glasgow-Rademaker, from Robinson. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in renewing the order, so we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In early December 2011, Glasgow filed for a restraining order against Robinson, with whom she broke off a relationship at the end of 2010. She sought the order in part because Robinson repeatedly attempted to force her to take a 310-page book he wrote about her. At the hearing, the court found the book "very threatening," his behavior to be "absolutely . . . harassing," and that Robinson lacked insight into his own behavior. The court issued the requested order. It required Robinson to stay at least 100 yards away from Glasgow and forbade him from making any direct or indirect contact with her. He could not attempt to get messages to her through other people. The order prohibited Robinson from publishing anything about Glasgow in hard copy or online. Tui was also protected by the order. In issuing the order, the court explained to Robinson, "I would strongly recommend that you cease and desist from e-mailing her friends about your opinions about her. [¶] . . . If [Glasgow] comes in with a bunch of emails from you about this or that, that might constitute harassment, and you need to be very careful about that." The restraining order was put in place for five years with an expiration date of December 30, 2016, at midnight.
In November 2016, Glasgow moved to renew the order permanently. In January 2017, the court held a hearing on the request, at which both parties, represented by counsel, appeared and testified under oath.
Testifying as to the reasons for her renewal request, Glasgow identified three emails from December 2011 (when the initial order was issued) and early 2012 in which Robinson disparaged her to friends. In Glasgow's view, the December 2011 email was ostensibly for Robinson to inform friends he had to leave a theater group "but it was in a blaming . . . [Glasgow]-has-done-this-to-me kind of thing," and he also commented on her mental state. In a January 2012 email, she considered him to "bad-mouth[]" her to friends. In that email, Robinson wrote: " 'I'm still the same guy Raewyn liked so much for so long. Now she says I'm a monster. That's the same problem she always has with guys she's done with [¶] . . . [¶] If she is saying I've ever done her wrong, well, for one reason or another she's not telling the truth.' " The three emails were admitted into evidence.
Glasgow also testified about two occasions where Robinson was at the "Dickens Fair" the same day she was. The Dickens Fair, held annually during the holiday season weekends at the Cow Palace, recreated a quasi-English village for holiday entertainment, which included dancing. Glasgow had no set dates she would attend, and they would change from year to year. Glasgow knew that Robinson usually attended the fair, and she had attended the fair with him in the past.
In December 2012, Glasgow was at the fair as a member of a performing dance group. After dancing for half-an-hour in "a very small space," she saw Robinson "about three feet" away from her dancing. She could not remember whether he made eye contact with her but believed he had seen her based on his proximity to her on the dance floor. Glasgow said she "was utterly freaked out" and that she "was so frightened when [she] saw him" based on the book and his prior stalking. At that point, she alerted the director of the dance group of the situation. The director asked Robinson to leave, and he left.
While at the fair one day in December 2013, Glasgow received a text from Tui informing her that Robinson was also there. Tui also alerted one of Glasgow's friends accompanying them that Robinson was there. The friend approached Robinson and asked him to leave. Glasgow learned that Robinson told her friend that he was concerned about suicide rates for people with restraining orders. Even though Glasgow did not see Robinson, she stated she felt "sick" and was "really frightened of the situation." Since then, Glasgow has not returned to the fair because she has been "too afraid to go back."
Addressing the emails during his testimony, Robinson acknowledged that when he initially received the restraining order, the trial court strongly recommended that he not email Glasgow's friends about his opinions of her and that he was told not to send or email abusive messages about her. He explained the December 2011 email informed the recipients of his resignation from a theater group he was a part of for 20 years to which Glasgow was also connected. He pointed out that he asked the recipients to not forward the message to Glasgow. With respect to the January 2012 emails, Robinson stated the trial court did not prohibit him from sending any emails to Glasgow's friends, only "abusive things." Robinson sent a number of messages to people to let them know what was going on in his life in light of the restraining order.
With respect to the Dickens Fair, Robinson stated he had been attending the fair since at least 1986 and became a season ticket holder in 2012. He described the fair as "huge" and that it occupied an estimated 120,000 square-foot event space. He was aware that Glasgow attended the fair annually and was a dancer in a performance group, but he had no knowledge about any particular day Glasgow went. On the day in December 2012 he was asked to leave by the dance group director, he had no advance knowledge that Glasgow would be there, never saw Glasgow there, and only learned of her presence when he was asked to leave. He had been there with a number of friends but left when asked. As for the date when their attendance overlapped in December 2013, Robinson had no interaction with Glasgow and had not seen Glasgow or Tui there. He clarified that when Glasgow's friend approached him and instructed him to leave, he actually told her that she should look up the suicide rates for people with borderline personality disorders, and that he was concerned for Glasgow for that reason. But he never asked that she pass that information on to Glasgow. After that, he left. Previously, he had been told by two psychotherapists that Glasgow had a borderline personality disorder based on his description of her.
Robinson testified that since the restraining order, he has had no communication with Glasgow. He has never reached out or attempted to reach out to her, nor has he ever asked anyone else to reach out to Glasgow on his behalf. He has withdrawn from an organization to which they both had ties. He has not gone to places he knew Glasgow to be, including her home, work, and friends' houses. He has not caused anything to ever be delivered to her house, nor has he published or distributed the book he wrote about her.
Under the totality of the evidence, the court found it necessary to renew the restraining order. The court remarked on the proceedings from the initial restraining order, observing Robinson's apparent failure to grasp the inappropriateness of his conduct. It found the subsequent emails he sent to be a continuation of such behavior and that Robinson took "potshots" at Glasgow in his messages. The court further found that Robinson's message to Glasgow's friend regarding suicide rates for people suffering from borderline personality disorder demonstrated Robinson "just doesn't seem to have borders or boundaries." The court renewed the restraining order on the exact same terms and conditions as the original order for five years, until midnight on December 30, 2021, not permanently as Glasgow requested. The court also ordered the renewal apply to Tui. Robinson now appeals the renewal order.
DISCUSSION
Family Code Section 6345, subdivision (a) provides that a trial court may renew a restraining order "upon the request of a party, either for five years or permanently, without a showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original order, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party." (§ 6345, subd. (a).) When contested, a request to renew a restraining order should not be granted pursuant to section 6345 simply because the requesting party has "a subjective fear the party to be restrained will commit abusive acts in the future." (Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1288 (Ritchie).) "The 'apprehension' those acts will occur must be 'reasonable.' " (Ibid.) "That is, the court must find the probability of future abuse is sufficient that a reasonable woman (or man, if the protected party is male) in the same circumstances would have a 'reasonable apprehension' such abuse will occur unless the court issues a protective order." (Ibid.)
All statutory references are to the Family Code. --------
An imminent and present danger of abuse is not required, however. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288.) "In other words, under this objective test, '[a] trial court should renew the protective order, if, and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected party entertains a "reasonable apprehension" of future abuse. . . . [T]his does not mean the court must find it is more likely than not future abuse will occur if the protective order is not renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party's apprehension is genuine and reasonable.' " (Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 332-333 (Lister).)
"We review the trial court's ruling under an abuse of discretion standard, to determine ' "whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason." ' " (Lister, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 333.)
Robinson argues the trial court erred in renewing the restraining order for several reasons. First, he contends the court erred by basing its renewal order in part on his conduct before the initial December 2011 restraining order. Focusing on the book he wrote about Glasgow in 2011, Robinson contends that both the court that issued the original restraining order and the court which renewed the order "cited the book to condemn [him] and neither judge knew anything substantive about the book he was citing." We will disregard Robinson's attacks on the initial order. The time to challenge that order has long expired. Plus, on a renewal request, Robinson's challenge to "the truth of the evidence and findings underlying the initial order" has no place. (See Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) With respect to the renewal order, the trial court could look behind the initial order itself to "the evidence and findings on which the order was based in appraising the risk of future abuse." (Ibid.) The court in Ritchie explained, "[T]he mere existence of a protective order, typically issued several years earlier, seldom if ever will provide conclusive evidence the requesting party entertains a 'reasonable apprehension' of future abuse of any kind should that order expire. But the existence of the initial order certainly is relevant and the underlying findings and facts supporting that order often will be enough in themselves to provide the necessary proof to satisfy that test." (Id. at p. 1291.) The trial court was not precluded from considering the facts and circumstances underlying the initial order as part of its analysis.
Robinson argues the court erred in considering the three emails he sent to his friends in the months immediately following the initial restraining order. He argues the emails were not abusive and did not violate the order. On appeal, we are bound to " 'resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge all reasonable inferences to support the trial court's order. [Citations.]' " (Phillips v. Campbell (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 844, 849-950.) "When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." (Lister, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 333.) After receiving these emails into evidence and listening to testimony from both sides on the nature of Robinson's email exchanges with friends, the trial court found Robinson's emails took "potshots" at Glasgow in violation of the court's initial order. We have no grounds to conclude the emails were completely benign or neutral, and the court did not err in considering such emails as evidence of harassment in reaching its decision.
Robinson also contends the court erred in considering the "single spoken comment" he made to Glasgow's friend about suicide rates for people with borderline personality disorder. He says that the comment did not even reference Glasgow, and that the court "couldn't rule appropriately" on this issue without knowledge about the dangers of borderline personality disorder. Not so. As an initial matter, Robinson acknowledged he mentioned Glasgow by name. Counsel asked him, "You also informed [Glasgow's friend] you were concerned for Ms. Glasgow because of the suicide rates for people with borderline personality disorder; is that correct?" He answered, "That's not an 'also.' It was one sentence. And it expressed my concern." Even if he never said her name, based on the situation and context, one could reasonably infer Glasgow was the target of his comment. Further, there is no expert testimony in the record regarding anyone's mental health, and Robinson's contentions about Glasgow's amount to speculation at the very least. Based on these unsubstantiated assertions to Glasgow's friend which the court could reasonably infer would get back to Glasgow, the trial court found Robinson "did not seem to have borders or boundaries." It was not an error for the court to view this as harassing conduct indicative of a risk of future abuse, rather than the laudatory "life-saving action" Robinson portrays.
In addition, Robinson argues that Glasgow never substantiated her purported fear of him and was unable to "adduce instances of [him] confronting or threatening or attacking her" and that there "is nothing [in] the record to show why she should be so petrified of being in [his] presence." We recognize there were no allegations or evidence of physical abuse, but there is no requirement that a party requesting a renewal have a fear of such. (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1464.) Section 6345, subdivision (a) expressly states that a restraining order "may be renewed . . . without a showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original order." (§ 6345, subd. (a); see also Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288 [imminent and present danger of abuse is not required].) Based on the circumstances underlying the initial restraining order and his subsequent emails and communications to third parties about Glasgow, the court could reasonably conclude that Robinson's behavior sufficiently disturbed Glasgow's peace and emotional well-being that her apprehension of future abuse was reasonable even without confrontation, threats, or attacks.
We do not need to address Robinson's remaining arguments. He attacks Glasgow's counsel's closing arguments, but these largely repeat alleged errors we have already rejected. He accuses Glasgow of using the restraining order as a "bludgeon" against him and describes the order's harm to him and others to the extent it has prevented him from participating in activities he has previously enjoyed. These latter arguments are not supported by any legal authority, so we may pass on them without consideration. (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1050.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Siggins, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Pollak, J. /s/_________
Jenkins, J.