Opinion
SA-23-CV-734-OLG-HJB
03-12-2024
CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER V. ESCORZA, OFFICER K. GARZA, and ALAMO HEIGHTS POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.
Honorable United States District Judge Orlando L. Garcia
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
HENRY J. BEMPORAD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation concerns the Motion to Dismiss filed by Officers V. Escorza and K. Garza (“the Defendant Officers”). (Docket Entry 5.) Dispositive motions in this case have been referred to the undersigned for recommendation. (See Docket Entry 2.) For the reasons set out below, I recommend that the Defendant Officers' Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 5) be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff be required to seek leave to amend his complaint to state a claim for relief.
I. Jurisdiction.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this case alleging constitutional violations in the 166th District Court of Bexar County, Texas. (See Docket Entry 1-1.) The Defendant Officers removed the case to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Docket Entry 1, at 2.) I have authority to issue this Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
II. Background.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that one of the Defendant Officers (apparently Officer Escorza) “made a mistake” on the traffic “citation she wrote me,” and that either she or both Defendant Officers “pull[ed] me out of my vehicle hurting my arm,” engaged in an “illegal search of my vehicle,” and participated in an allegedly illegal “detainment.” (Docket Entry 1-1, at 5.) Plaintiff provided no additional factual allegations in his complaint.
Plaintiff styled his complaint as a suit against the Alamo Heights Police Department (id. at 1), but there are no factual allegations in the complaint regarding the Department, and there is no showing that the Department has ever been served in this case. (See Docket Entry 1, at 1 n.1.)
The Defendant Officers filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Docket Entry 5.) In the motion, the Defendant Officers stated that a traffic stop occurred on Broadway Street in Alamo Heights, Texas, in which Plaintiff was cited for operating a vehicle with a fictitious license plate, driving with an invalid license, failing to maintain financial responsibility, and operating an unregistered motor vehicle. (Id. at 6.) According to the motion, another officer drove Plaintiff to his home, where Plaintiff showed that he had a valid drivers license and automobile insurance. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff was then returned to the scene of the traffic stop, where his vehicle was returned to him and the traffic citations were voided. (Id.)
The Defendant Officers also state that they grabbed Plaintiff's left arm to extract him from the vehicle when he refused to step out. (Id. at 6.) The Defendant Officers claim that their actions were reasonable; they have attached video evidence to support their position. (See Docket Entry 5-1, at 2-3 (detailing the video evidence).) According to the Defendant Officers, the “video evidence clearly shows minimal force was used . . . to extract him from his vehicle after numerous attempts to gain his voluntary compliance.” (Docket Entry 5, at 13.)
Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss with a single-page document styled as an “Order.” (Docket Entry 14.) In the response, he stated that he was falsely accused of a crime; that his “arm was sliced” and he needed “stiches [in] my back” along with “[c]ountless other injuries sustain[ed] from this incident”; and that “a few of my Constitutional rights were violated w[h]ere I was detained and not [M]irandized.” (Id.) Plaintiff did not refer to the videos provided by the Officer Defendants, but stated generally that “the evidence coupled with the doctor's orders should suffice” for the Court to rule in his favor. (Id.)
III. Legal Standard.
Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docket Entry 5, at 2.) Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a cause of action in a complaint when it fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
To survive a motion to dismiss [under 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.Henley v. Biloxi H.M.A., L.L.C., 48 F.4th 350, 353 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “While the court must accept the facts in the complaint as true, it will not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Firefighters' Ret. Sys. v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 894 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 557 U.S. at 678).
In deciding whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he court's review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Allen v. Vertafore, Inc., 28 F.4th 613, 616 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
IV. Analysis.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may “recover[] . . . damages for constitutional violations by officers acting under color of state law.” Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S.Ct. 735, 747 (2020) (emphasis omitted). Claims against police officers under that statute are subject to the defense of qualified immunity insofar as the officers' conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation omitted). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. The Officer Defendants have invoked qualified immunity in moving to dismiss. (Docket Entry 5, at 4.) However, granting the motion to dismiss is required before even reaching the qualified-immunity question, due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's complaint.
Plaintiff's complaint is entirely conclusory: he alleges virtually no facts in support of his claims. (Docket Entry 1-1.) And the few facts Plaintiff does allege do not state a constitutional violation: he asserts only that Officer Escorza made a mistake on a citation she issued, and that the officers pulled him out of his vehicle hurting his arm. (Id. at 5.) A mistaken citation is not a constitutional violation in and of itself; as the Defendant Officers correctly argue, the question under the Fourth Amendment is whether there was sufficient reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop. (See Docket Entry 5, at 9 (citing Smith v. Heap, 31 F.4th 905, 911 (5th Cir. 2022).) As for the Defendant Officers' use of force, the question is not whether there was force or injury, but whether the force used was unreasonable. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.”). Plaintiff's threadbare allegations simply do not address these issues.
It does not appear that Plaintiff alleges he was arrested without probable cause, as opposed to simply being detained. (See Docket Entry 1-1, at 5 (complaining of Plaintiff's “detainment”); Docket Entry 14 (complaining of being “detained”).)
Plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss does little to fill in the gaps. It does provide more detail on his injuries, including that he was apparently cut and needed stitches. (Docket Entry 14.) Such assertions address the severity of the injury Plaintiff allegedly suffered, which is relevant to the excessive-force inquiry. See, e.g., Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018) (to prevail on excessive-force claim, plaintiff must show injury). However, neither these facts nor any others relevant to that claim are set out in the complaint.For all these reasons, the Defendant Officers' motion (Docket Entry 5) should be granted, without the necessity of further addressing the qualified-immunity issue at this time.
Plaintiff also avers in passing that his Miranda rights were violated. (See Docket Entry 14.) However, even assuming this to be true, a suit for damages based on a Miranda violation is not actionable under § 1983. Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S.Ct. 2095, 2107 (2022).
As a pro se party, Plaintiff should be given an opportunity to seek leave to amend his complaint to state facts supporting a plausible claim for relief before his case is dismissed. See Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores, 982 F.3d 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Generally a district court errs in dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.”). Under most circumstances, leave to amend an otherwise defective complaint is freely given as justice requires. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). But leave may be denied if any amendment would be futile, which courts evaluate under the Rule 12(b)(6) standards for dismissal. Mandujano v. City of Pharr, 786 Fed.Appx. 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, Plaintiff should be required to articulate facts that plainly support his constitutional claims in any amended complaint. The Defendant Officers may then oppose the Court's granting leave, or alternatively seek dismissal under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
Should Plaintiff wish to assert claims against the Alamo Heights Police Department, he must also state claims as to the Department and request issuance of a summons so that the Department may be served with process and respond. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4, 12.
Finally, even though this Report and Recommendation does not address the Defendant Officers' qualified-immunity defense, it is relevant to any amended complaint that Plaintiff may seek to file. A defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity must be determined “at the earliest possible stage of the litigation.” Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). This is because qualified immunity is more than “a mere defense to liability”; it is also “an immunity from suit.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237 (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[u]nless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.” Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2022) (emphasis and citation omitted). To do so, Plaintiff must “identify[] a case in which an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the [Constitution], and . . . explain[] why the case clearly proscribed the conduct of that individual officer.” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 205 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). In other words, “unless existing precedent ‘squarely governs' the conduct at issue, an official will be entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004)).
For these reasons, in seeking leave to amend his complaint, Plaintiff should be required not only to allege facts to support his constitutional claims, but also to present allegations which, taken as true, would defeat the defense of qualified immunity. The Defendant Officers may seek consideration of their qualified-immunity defense either by way of opposition to leave to amend or by a renewed motion to dismiss.
V. Conclusion.
Based on the foregoing, I recommend that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 5) be GRANTED. Plaintiff should be required to seek leave to amend his complaint to state a plausible claim for relief. Any proposed complaint should also address the defense of qualified immunity.
VI. Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object.
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation on all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as a “filing user” with the Clerk of Court, or (2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified mail, return receipt requested. Written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).
The parties shall file any objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the objections on all other parties. Absent leave of Court, objections are limited to twenty (20) pages in length. An objecting party must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusory, or general objections. Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo review by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-52 (1985); Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to file timely written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed findings and conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).