Opinion
C.A. No. 05C-04-021-RFS.
Submitted: April 18, 2005.
Decided: April 26, 2005.
DECISIONS ON MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND UPON REVIEW OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Charles M. Robinson ("plaintiff") has filed a complaint seeking damages for alleged constitutional violations and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Set forth below are my decisions on both matters.
Plaintiff has established he is indigent. That determination, however, does not allow for the case to proceed automatically. Instead, the Court first must review the complaint and determine whether it is factually frivolous, malicious, or legally frivolous. 10 Del. C. § 8803(a), (b). If the Court determines such to be the case, then it dismisses the complaint. 10 Del. C. § 8803(b).
Addressing the complaint requires an examination of the file inState v. Robinson, Def. ID# 0112008933, plaintiff's criminal case.
On June 19, 2002, plaintiff pled guilty to a charge of rape in the fourth degree. On that date, he was sentenced to ten years at Level 5, with credit for time served, suspended for one year at Level 4, Home Confinement, followed by nine years of decreasing levels of probation. Plaintiff was violated on his probation, and at his sentencing thereon on January 27, 2003, he was resentenced to ten years at Level 5, suspended for one year at Level 4, Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program and upon successful completion of such, the balance was suspended for decreasing levels of probation.
In July, 2003, Plaintiff was violated at the Crest Program, the Level 4, Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program to which he was assigned. The Violation of Probation Report ("VOP Report") alleges as follows:
On 7-2-03 Mr. Robinson was unsuccessfully discharged from the Crest South Residential Treatment Program. Crest Clinical Staff indicate that Mr. Robinson continued to exhibit a negative attitude, manipulative behavior, refusing to take a.m. psychotrohic [sic] medication and failure to accept re-direction and maintain accountability On 6-24-03 he was cited by clinical staff for exhibiting covertness and noncompliant behavior. He was placed on a Behavorial [sic] Contract on 7-1-03. On 7-2-03 he was again cited for exhibiting behavior that was disruptive and he had become "a liability to the treatment community as a whole."
The memorandum accompanying the VOP Report details various episodes of misconduct on plaintiff's part. A refusal to shave facial hair was not mentioned in that report.
Plaintiff wrote several letters to the Court during the time from when he was cited for this violation until his hearing thereon. He blamed his problems at the Crest Program on his mental health issues. Never once did he mention that his refusal to shave his facial hair and/or his religious beliefs were the alleged true reasons for his dismissal from the Crest Program.
A hearing on the violation of probation took place on July 22, 2003. At the hearing, plaintiff explained his problems at the Crest Program arose from his mental illness, and he requested he be placed at the Delaware Psychiatric Center ("DPC"). He did not assert that he was dismissed from the Crest Program because he refused to shave his facial hair or due to his religious beliefs. Transcript of Proceedings dated July 22, 2003, Docket Entry # 59 in State v. Robinson, Def. ID# 0112008933.
The Court rejected plaintiff's request for placement at DPC and found plaintiff in violation of his probation. It sentenced him to nine years at Level 5 and upon successful completion at Supervision Level 5 of the Key and Family Problems Programs, the balance was suspended for one year at Level 4, Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program, and upon successful completion thereof, the balance was suspended for decreasing levels of probation. Plaintiff filed an appeal therefrom, raising issues regarding his mental health. Robinson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 415, 2003, Berger, J. (July 20, 2004). He did not advance any retaliation theory regarding a beard and/or his religious beliefs. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. Id.
Now, in a civil suit, plaintiff argues that the defendants are liable to him for damages incurred when they violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, he alleges they terminated him from the Crest Program because he was a Muslim who refused to shave his facial hair.
The Court concludes plaintiff is barred from bringing this suit. See Taylor v. State, 402 A.2d 373, 375 (Del. 1979) ("The test for applying collateral estoppel requires that (1) a question of fact essential to the judgment, (2) be litigated and (3) determined (4) by a valid and final judgment.") At the time of the violation of probation hearing, why plaintiff was terminated from the Crest Program was the essential factual issue before the Court. The Court found the reason for his termination to be as set forth in the violation report. Not once did plaintiff assert an ulterior motive on the part of defendants, such as retaliation for plaintiff's refusal to shave his facial hair and/or religious discrimination. Plaintiff should have advanced this factual issue as a reason for his termination from the Crest Program at the time of his violation of probation hearing. His failure to do so prevents him from making such an assertion in this complaint seeking damages for his removal from the Crest Program based on an allegedly illegal reason. In other words, since the reason for plaintiff's termination from the Crest Program has been litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, plaintiff is estopped from relitigating this fact in this personal injury suit.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses this complaint with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.