Opinion
CV164007706
03-27-2019
Tyrone Robinson #185140 v. Commissioner of Correction
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Newson, John M., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Hon. John M. Newson Judge of the Superior Court
The petitioner was the defendant in a case in the Judicial District of Hartford under docket HHD-CR06-597140, where he was charged with the murder of one Leonard Lindsey, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, and criminal possession of a firearm, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217(a)(1). He was represented by Attorneys George Flores and William O’Connor of the Hartford Office of the Public Defender, and elected to be tried by a jury. According to the decision of the Appellate Court, the jury could reasonably have found the following facts:
At the time that the victim, Leonard Lindsay, was shot, the defendant was living with his girlfriend, Lashonda Barno. On occasion, the defendant exhibited jealousy and controlling behavior toward Barno, particularly with regard to the victim.
Sometime in the spring of 2001, the victim, who had known Barno for fifteen years because they had gone to school together, manhandled her at a dance club. When the defendant learned about this incident, he became upset and confronted the victim. Following the incident at the dance club, rumors of a sexual relationship between Barno and the victim began to circulate in the neighborhood.
In the early morning of October 6, 2002, the victim drove into a gasoline station on Albany Avenue in Hartford and parked his car so that the driver’s side window faced the street. Following a report of gunshots fired at the station, the police found the victim in his car with a gunshot wound to the head and a bullet hole in the driver’s side window of the car. The victim was transported to a hospital, where he died later that day. The defendant was not immediately identified as having committed the crime.
At trial, the state presented evidence that the defendant had admitted to four individuals that he had killed the victim. Immediately after having shot the victim, he confessed the killing to Barno and to her cousin. In September 2004, he similarly confessed to Eric Smith, a longtime friend, who so informed the police in 2005, when Smith was incarcerated. In April 2008, the defendant confessed to Larry Raifsnider, a fellow inmate in a federal prison in Pennsylvania. Although the defendant’s earlier confessions were consistent with his claim, at trial, that he had intended only to frighten the victim, his confession to Raifsnider described a planned killing.State v. Robinson, 125 Conn.App. 484, 486-87, 8 A.3d 1120 (2010). The jury convicted him of both charges, and on September 2, 2008, the trial court sentenced him a total effective sentence of fifty years, to be served consecutively to a federal sentence the petitioner was already serving.
The petitioner, represented by Attorney Richard Condon, Jr., appealed his convictions, which were affirmed. State v. Robinson, 125 Conn.App. 4848 A.3d 1120 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 911, 12 A.3d 1006 (2011). The petitioner, represented by Attorney Robert Rimmer, then brought a habeas corpus action challenging his conviction and alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective. That petition was denied following a trial, and the denial was subsequently affirmed on appeal. Robinson v. Warden, Superior Court judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV08-4002623 (Kwak, J., Oct. 9, 2011), affirmed sub nom, Robinson v. Commissioner of Correction, 167 Conn.App. 809, 144 A.3d 493, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 925, 149 A.3d 982 (2016).
The petitioner commenced the present action on November 30, 2015. In the an amended petition filed June 5, 2018, he claims that the State withheld exculpatory evidence, commonly referred to as a "Brady" claim; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); and that Attorney Rimmer was ineffective in representing him in his prior habeas for not litigating and proving the Brady claim. The matter was tried before the Court on December 17, 2018. Further facts and procedural background will be provided as necessary throughout the body of this decision.
CLAIM ONE: "BRADY" CLAIM
The petitioner alleges that the State failed to turn over a statement dated October 16, 2002, and bank documents related to a police investigation into Robert Hudson and an illegal check cashing scheme he allegedly entered into with the victim shortly before the victim was killed. More specifically, the petitioner claims these documents should have been turned over as exculpatory information and was viable evidence to support a third-party culpability defense. Here, even if the evidence was considered exculpatory and should have been turned over to the defense, the petitioner has failed to establish that it was "material." See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
Exhibits 1 (Statement), and 2 (Bank transaction printout). The respondent does not appear to contest the fact that this information, which was originally gathered by the Bloomfield Police Department, was turned over to the Hartford Police Department and was contained in the filed related to the murder of the victim. What is not clear, nor established by any evidence before this Court, is exactly when it was delivered to the Hartford Police, or why.
"The Defendant has a right to the disclosure of exculpatory evidence under the due process clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Connecticut Constitution." (Quotation marks omitted.) State v. Caracoglia, 134 Conn.App. 175, 185, 38 A.3d 226 (2012). "In order to prove a Brady violation, the defendant must show: (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence after a request by the defense; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material ... General Statutes § 54-86c has amplified the first prong of the Brady test in Connecticut by imposing a continuing duty on the state to disclose both all exculpatory information in its possession and exculpatory information of which it subsequently becomes aware, regardless of a request by the defendant." (Citations omitted.) Id.
The petitioner offered the information in the October 16, 2002, statement and related documents in support of his claim that it could have been used at trial to establish a third-party culpability defense. "The admissibility of evidence of third-party culpability is governed by the rules relating to relevancy ... Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is material to the determination of the proceeding more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence ... Accordingly [the requirement for the admission of third-party culpability evidence] is that the proffered evidence establish a direct connection to a third party, rather than raise merely a bare suspicion regarding a third party ... [S]uch evidence is relevant, exculpatory evidence, rather than merely tenuous evidence of third-party culpability [introduced by a defendant] in an attempt to divert from himself the evidence of guilt ... In other words, evidence that establishes a direct connection between a third party and the charged offense is relevant to the central question before the jury, namely, whether a reasonable doubt exists as to whether the defendant committed the offense. Evidence that would only raise a bare suspicion that a third party, rather than the defendant, committed the charged offense would not be relevant to the jury’s determination ... Whether a defendant has sufficiently established a direct connection between a third party and the crime with which the defendant has been charged is necessarily a fact intensive inquiry." (Citation omitted.) State v. Baltas, 311 Conn. 786, 810-11, 91 A.3d 384 (2014).
Even if accepted for the absolute truth of the matters contained therein, the documents in question would only establish that Hudson and the victim knew each other and agreed to engage in a scheme to defraud banks by depositing bogus checks and withdrawing the funds. According to the statement, Hudson was offered $10,000 of the $23,000 in proceeds for opening the account under his own name. According to the statement, the petitioner was able to withdraw $10,000, which he claims to have split with the victim, but the police showed when he was attempting to withdraw the second $10,000, which was about two weeks after the victim had been killed. There was no evidence that Hudson, who allegedly profited $5,000 from scheme, bore any animosity towards the victim, ever made any threats to the life or safety of the victim, or that he was in the State of Connecticut, let alone near the scene of the crime, when the victim was murdered. As such, there is no reasonable probability that this information would have been relevant or admissible third-party culpability evidence at the criminal trial. Id. As to the claim that these reports, if turned over, could have led to admissible third-party culpability evidence, that is mere speculation which the petitioner has failed to support with actual evidence. See Nieves v. Commissioner of Correction, 51 Conn.App. 615, 622-24, 724 A.2d 508, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 905, 731 A.2d 309 (1999) (for the proposition that it is petition’s burden to support claims with affirmative evidence). Having failed to establish that this information would have been relevant or admissible as third-party culpability evidence, or that it actually led to admissible evidence on that theory, the petitioner has failed to establish that it was "material," within the meaning of Brady, so there is no violation. State v. Caracoglia, supra, 134 Conn.App. 185.
CLAIM TWO: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF HABEAS COUNSEL
In his second claim, the petitioner alleges that Attorney Robert Rimmer rendered ineffective assistance representing him in his prior habeas. Although stated three different ways, the sole substantive allegation against Attorney Rimmer is that he failed to prove the Brady violation alleged in Claim One. The claim fails, however, because the petitioner has failed to establish that he was prejudiced. Hall v. Commissioner of Correction, 124 Conn.App. 778, 783, 6 A.3d 827 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 928, 12 A.3d 571 (2011).
"To succeed in his bid for a writ of habeas corpus [against habeas counsel], the petitioner must prove both (1) that his appointed habeas counsel was ineffective, and (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective. A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction ... has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient ... Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 842-43, 613 A.2d 818 (1992). Proof of deficient performance requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Proof of prejudice requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. "[T]he petitioner’s failure to prove either [deficient performance or prejudice] is fatal to a habeas petition." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Commissioner of Correction, 124 Conn.App. 778, 783, 6 A.3d 827 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 928, 12 A.3d 571 (2011).
As addressed in the first section of this decision, the petitioner has failed to establish that not having the documents related to the police investigation of Hudson’s involvement in the alleged check cashing scheme with the victim resulted in any prejudice. Id. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that that information would have been admissible as third-party culpability evidence, so there is no reasonable probability that it would have changed the outcome of the prior habeas trial. Id. "[T]he petitioner’s failure to prove [prejudice] is fatal to [the] petition." Id.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.