Opinion
Case No. 96 C 00092.
November 7, 2001
Ruling on Defendant's Motions in Limine
The court, having considered the defendant's motions in limine and the responses thereto filed by plaintiff, enters the following rulings:
First Motion to bar evidence of any claims other than quid pro quo sex discrimination that occurred between June 25, 1994 and September 1, 1994.
Defendant relies on the court's grant of summary judgment in which it "den[ied] summary judgment with respect to the quid pro quo Title VII claim but grant[ed] summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to all other claims." Robinson v. Board of Education of Chicago, No. 96 C 92, 1999 WL 675302, *9 (N.D. Ill.) Thus it is clear that any evidence in support of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred at trial. The same is true for a claim of retaliation if plaintiff seeks to demonstrate that she was disciplined for asserting her Title VII rights. Nevertheless, plaintiff alleges various adverse actions against her and that she was ultimately was transferred to another school after she refused sexual advances made by the Board's agent, Bradley. In this sense, she claims to have been retaliated against and can offer evidence of it. As to the time frame, the period for which recovery is available is only for the period between June 25, 1994 and September 1, 1994. Plaintiff will, however, be permitted to offer evidence of events occurring before that time in order to demonstrate Bradley's motive or intent when he made statements or did acts. See 1999 WL 675302 at *2 ("Although it is true that plaintiff may not recover for acts committed before the cut-off, it does not follow that evidence of such acts may not be introduced in a trial concerning those acts that are timely.") The motion is granted with respect to all claims except the quid pro quo harassment claim. The motion is denied with respect to the time limitation as stated above.
Second Motion to strike claims for punitive damages against Bradley and Davis and for future lost earnings.
Defendant argues that because the 1981 claim has been dismissed, neither Bradley nor Davis is a proper defendant and therefore cannot be subject to punitive damages. Section 2000e(b) defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person . . ." Nevertheless, under Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995), a supervisor does not, in his individual capacity, fall within Title VII's definition of employer. Therefore, damages are not recoverable against these defendants. Because liability in their capacity as agents would be the same as the liability of the employer, the motion is granted, and defendants Blondean and Bradley are dismissed as defendants.
Third Motion to bar evidence of unsubstantiated rumors of alleged sex harassment or affairs.
Defendant objects on grounds of relevance, hearsay, and unfair prejudice. Plaintiff states that she intends to offer evidence of rumors about Bradley's "bad acts" to prove why she was afraid to go alone into Bradley's office. Plaintiff herself may testify that she had heard rumors about Bradley's sexually assertive behavior towards other women at the school, and that was the reason she did not want to meet alone with Bradley. She may not, however, state specifically what she had heard or interrogate any other witness about what they had heard or said about Bradley's "bad acts." The court will instruct the jury not to consider plaintiffs statement as evidence that he engaged in conduct alluded to in rumors. The motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Fourth Motion to bar evidence of District Superintendent Blondean Davis's knowledge of the law of negligence, alleged disciplinary suspension of Davis, and negligent acts by Davis that post date the alleged tangible employment action.
Assuming that Dr. Davis was in the chain of command regarding sexual harassment, and assuming that plaintiff lodged a complaint, directly or within that chain of command, evidence of what Davis did with respect to that complaint is relevant to this case. Evidence that Davis was disciplined with respect to handling funds is unrelated to this case and not relevant. If plaintiff offers evidence of a statement Davis made to the EEOC, it may be an admission. Otherwise, if Davis testifies inconsistently with the statement made to the EEOC, plaintiff may use the statement to impeach her. Whether Davis had a motive to lie is an inference that the jury may draw from the facts such as Davis's position, her demeanor, and her credibility in general. She may not be interrogated about her knowledge of the law of negligence. She may be interrogated about her knowledge of her responsibilities with respect to a complaint of sexual harassment. The motion is granted, except as stated herein.
Fifth Motion to bar evidence of grievances filed against defendant, Bradley or of "bad acts" of Bradley that post-date the filing of plaintiff's complaint.
Evidence that Bradley allowed prayer meetings at Scanlan school, that Bradley's child was enrolled there, and that Bradley allegedly mishandled funds, and that grievances were filed against the Board or Bradley not directly related to any of these matters, is irrelevant. If Mary Harrington is called as a witness, she may be cross examined as to her "friendly" relationship with Bradley in order to show bias of the witness. Plaintiff may also call other witnesses who observed the friendly relationship at the time of the events at issue here. The motion is granted in part and denied in part as stated herein.
Sixth Motion to exclude the testimony of, and other evidence regard Pamela Moore, Joseph Curie, and John Green.
Defendant contends that plaintiff did not disclose these witnesses in her responses to written discovery, which plaintiff concedes. She argues, however, that the names were made known through the depositions of witnesses. Defendant cites Santiago v. Furniture Chauffeurs, Piano Movers, Packers, and Handlers Local 705, 2001 WL 11058 *7-*8 (N.D. Ill.), in which Judge Kennelly excluded testimony of witnesses who had not been disclosed in responses to interrogatories. The court there stated, however,
Plaintiffs assert that "[a]ll of the witnesses disclosed in the draft pre-trial order are persons who have been disclosed throughout written and oral discovery and whom the defendants have had an equal opportunity to interview and depose,". . . but they provide the Court with nothing to back up their assertion. This unsupported claim is insufficient to rebut defendants' argument.
Thus, the case does not stand for the proposition that disclosure of witnesses through oral discovery is insufficient, and this court does not so conclude here. Nevertheless, the testimony of Joseph Curie, Pamela Moore and John Green must be (a) limited to the matters contained in the deposition testimony and (b) probative of a fact in issue. The motion is denied as stated herein.