Summary
denying motion for new trial because movant failed to cite to trial transcript or record
Summary of this case from Hilt Constr. & Mgmt. Corp. v. Permanent Mission of Chad to United Nations in N.Y.Opinion
9:13-CV-01213 (TWD)
09-26-2019
RENDELL ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. LORENZO A. BALLARD, et al., Defendants.
APPEARANCES: RENDELL ROBINSON Plaintiff pro se 3001900384 Eric M. Taylor Center (EMTC) 10-10 Hazen Street East Elmhurst, NY 11370 LETITIA JAMES Attorney General for the State of New York Attorneys for Defendants The Capitol Albany, NY 12224 OF COUNSEL: AIMEE M. PAQUETTE, ESQ Assistant Attorney General
APPEARANCES: RENDELL ROBINSON
Plaintiff pro se
3001900384
Eric M. Taylor Center (EMTC)
10-10 Hazen Street
East Elmhurst, NY 11370 LETITIA JAMES
Attorney General for the State of New York
Attorneys for Defendants
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224 OF COUNSEL: AIMEE M. PAQUETTE, ESQ
Assistant Attorney General THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge DECISION and ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Rendell Robinson commenced this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting several claims arising out of his confinement while he was an inmate-patient in the Marcy Residential Mental Health Unit at the Marcy Correctional Facility on July 14, 2010. (Dkt. No. 1.) After initial review, discovery, and dispositive motions, claims remaining for trial were (1) an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendants Ballard, Onyan, Wojtanowski, Holmes, and Cacciotti; (2) an Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim regarding the alleged excessive force against Defendant Strassburger; and (3) claims of supervisory liability against Defendants Hilton, Bellnier, and Harper. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 41, 66.) A jury trial of these remaining issues began on September 24, 2018, and resulted in a jury verdict in favor of all Defendants which was returned on September 28, 2018. (Dkt. No. 137.) Following the trial, the Court filed a judgment in favor of Defendants. (Dkt. No. 138.)
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff initially requested an extension of time to file any post-trial motions and requested a copy of the trial transcript. (Dkt. No. 139.) Before the Court had a chance to rule on the request, he filed a preliminary motion for a new trial and asked permission to supplement that motion. (Dkt. No. 140.) The Court granted Plaintiff's requests and directed that any supplemental motion should be filed by December 17, 2018. (Dkt. No. 141.) By letter to Plaintiff dated November 7, 2018, the court reporter advised Plaintiff of the estimated cost of the trial transcript with further instructions on how to obtain the transcript. (Dkt. No. 142.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff did not file any request to waive the transcript fee, but he did file a request to further extend his time to supplement his post-trial motion which was granted. (Dkt. Nos. 143, 144.) He was directed to file any further supplemental motion by January 17, 2019. (Dkt. No. 144.) Without any additional requests to extend the time to supplement his motion or address the issue of the trial transcript, Plaintiff filed a supplemental motion for a new trial with an oversized supplemental brief. (Dkt. Nos. 147, 147-4.) The supplemental motion and brief were filed three weeks after the second extended deadline set by the Court had expired. (See Dkt. Nos. 144, 147.) Plaintiff did not provide any reason for the late filing, nor did he request permission to file an oversized brief. Defendants sought to have the late supplemental motion and brief stricken (Dkt. No. 145), but the Court denied that request and accepted Plaintiff's supplemental motion and brief. (Dkt. No. 148.) The Court then extended Defendants' time to respond to Plaintiff's supplemental motion, and Plaintiff's time to file a reply. Id. Defendants timely filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. No. 149), but Plaintiff did not file any reply.
Therefore, currently before the Court is Plaintiff's motion and supplemental motion (collectively "motion" or "Plaintiff's motion") for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) and to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), and Defendants' response in opposition. (Dkt. Nos. 140, 147, 149.) The Court has thoroughly considered all of the parties' filings on this motion. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is denied in its entirety.
III. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Legal Standard Governing a Motion for a New Trial
Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues-and to any party- . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The Second Circuit has interpreted this standard to permit the granting of new trials when "in the opinion of the district court, the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." DLC Mgmt. Corp.v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 911 (2d Cir. 1997). Examples of such a serious error or a miscarriage of justice include when "the verdict is against the weight of the evidence," or when "for the reasons stated the trial was not fair to the moving party." Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 691 (2d Cir. 1983). However, "the court should only grant a motion for a new trial when the jury's verdict is 'egregious.'" DLC Mgmt. Corp., 163 F.3d at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted); Dunlap-McCuller v. Riese Org., 980 F.2d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993). "[I]n addressing a Rule 59 motion, the court may 'independently weigh the evidence presented at trial to determine whether the jury's verdict is 'seriously erroneous' or resulted in a 'miscarriage of justice.'" Edwards v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l., Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 3, 8 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). "In doing so, the court 'is afforded considerable discretion.'" Edwards, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
Additionally, "[i]t is well-settled that Rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple." Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). "The standard for granting a new trial under Rule 59 is less stringent [as compared to the standard for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50], but still relatively high." Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am Claims Mgmt., 131 F. Supp. 3d 185, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd, 665 Fed. App'x 27 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order).
B. Legal Standard Governing a Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not prescribe any specific grounds for granting a motion to alter or amend a final judgment. However, in agreeing with other circuits, the Second Circuit stated "[t]hat district courts may alter or amend judgment to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A Rule 50(e) motion "may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008). "When a Rule 59(e) motion addresses a matter already considered by the court, it is governed by an even more exacting standard. In such an instance, reconsideration is generally granted only in the event of an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Mere disagreement with the court's prior ruling does not constitute a basis for reconsideration of a judgment entered." Cargill, Inc. v. Sears Petroleum & Transport Corp., 388 F. Supp. 2d 37, 80-81 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
IV. ANALYSIS
Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff's motion for a new trial asserts the following arguments: (1) the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence; (2) the Court erred in permitting testimony regarding an incident in which Plaintiff threw hot water on a correction officer and was convicted of a crime as a result; (3) Plaintiff was not allowed to present all evidence regarding his claims; (4) prejudicial evidence was admitted regarding Plaintiff's alleged gang affiliation, a prior incident of Plaintiff taking a correction officer's baton, and testimony that the Office of Special Investigations found Plaintiff's excessive force complaint unsubstantiated; (5) an incomplete document was admitted into evidence; (6) Defendants' counsel made improper closing arguments; and (7) jury instructions were improper. (See generally Dkt. No. 147.)
Defendants oppose each of Plaintiff's arguments, and further argue that Plaintiff's supplemental brief exceeds the allowable twenty-five page limit and should be disregarded since Plaintiff did not obtain prior permission from the Court to exceed the permissible page limit. (See generally Dkt. No. 149.)
In view of Plaintiff's pro se status on the motion, and as set forth above, the Court granted Plaintiff liberal extensions to submit his post-trial motion, and the Court has likewise accepted and thoroughly considered his oversized brief.
A. Motion for a New Trial
After carefully considering the matter, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) for a new trial. Initially, the Court notes that for the bulk of Plaintiff's arguments, he fails to cite to any transcript or record from the trial to support them. These "unsupported contentions . . . are insufficient to justify the grant of a new trial." AMW Materials Testing, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, No. 01 CV 4245 (ADS) (ETB), 2008 WL 11449231, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2008). Nevertheless, the Court has considered each of Plaintiff's arguments and will address them in the same order as presented by Plaintiff.
1. Weight of the Evidence
Plaintiff argues there was no evidentiary basis for the jury to find for the Defendants and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 10-20.) Plaintiff recites his testimony at trial and the testimony of Defendants' witnesses regarding the details of the events giving rise to his claims of excessive force. The Court has thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff's voluminous arguments and exhibits in this regard and finds that Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence to show that the jury reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict was a miscarriage of justice. Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 2003). For the most part, Plaintiff argues that his testimony was more credible than the testimony of the Defendants. (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 11-16.) However, in considering a Rule 59 motion for a new trial, "the court should only grant such a motion when the jury's verdict is egregious . . . [and] a court should rarely disturb a jury's evaluation of a witness's credibility." DLC Mgmt. Corp., 163 F.3d at 134 (citations and internal punctuation omitted). As such, the Court declines to disturb the jury's findings on this basis.
Page references to documents identified by docket number refer to the page numbers inserted by the Court's electronic filing system maintained by the Clerk's office. --------
2. Testimony Regarding Hot Water Incident
Plaintiff claims plain error of the Court because there was testimony presented during trial by Defendant Harper regarding an incident where Plaintiff threw hot water on a correction officer and was subsequently convicted of a crime as a result. (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 20.) While Plaintiff is correct that the Court ruled in a motion in limine that only the number of felony convictions and the fact that Plaintiff was sentenced to more than one year were admissible (Dkt. No. 131), the testimony at issue was actually elicited by Plaintiff on cross-examination of Defendant Harper. (Dkt. No. 149-4 at 11.) Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that he objected to this testimony or moved to strike it during trial. Koch v. Greenberg, 14 F. Supp. 3d 247, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff'd, 626 F. App'x 335 (2d Cir. 2015) (claimed improper character evidence admitted at trial not error where opposing counsel elicited the testimony on cross-examination and then did not move to strike it). Further, Plaintiff has not shown that the testimony swayed the jury in such a way as to affect the outcome of the case. The Court, therefore, finds a new trial is not warranted on this basis.
3. Presentation of All Evidence
Plaintiff next argues that a new trial should be ordered because his deposition transcript, his affidavit submitted to the Court in opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion, and his treatment records from the Office of Mental Health should have been entered into evidence at trial. (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 22-28.) He claims this testimony, affidavit, and records should have been admitted "as trial evidence to support [his] case" and "as proof to the quality of evidence" (id. at 26), and to "support [his] trial testimony." (Id. at 27.) However, this evidence was never offered at trial. Additionally, Plaintiff testified in person at trial regarding his claims and the events leading up to them, and his attorneys cross-examined all of Defendants' witnesses. Plaintiff essentially seeks to relitigate his claims, but as noted above, "[i]t is well-settled that Rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple." Sequa Corp., 156 F.3d at 144 (citations omitted). Accordingly, this argument fails.
4. Prejudicial Evidence
Plaintiff claims a new trial should be conducted because prejudicial evidence was admitted pertaining to (1) his alleged gang affiliation; (2) another incident where Plaintiff took an officer's baton; and (3) information that the Office of Special Investigations found Plaintiff's excessive force claim unsubstantiated. (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 28-30.) Plaintiff does not argue that this evidence was objected to at trial, or that he requested any limiting or curative instructions. See id. For these reasons alone, Plaintiff's argument fails.
Additionally, Rule 61 provides "unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence . . . is ground for granting a new trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Courts "must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights." Id. Whether an evidentiary error implicates a substantial right depends on "the likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the case." Malek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 994 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1993). Here, Plaintiff has not shown that the jury's decision was influenced by the evidence at issue. Further, there was significant testimony, video evidence, and documentary evidence to support the jury's verdict. Therefore, a new trial is not warranted on these grounds.
5. Incomplete Document
Next, Plaintiff claims that defense counsel destroyed or significantly altered evidence and a spoliation instruction was therefore warranted. (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 30-32.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts a document admitted into evidence was missing a page. (Id. at 31; Dkt. No. 147-12 at 2-7.) However, the complete document was admitted into evidence as Trial Joint Exhibit 14. (Dkt. No. 149-2 at 1-12.) As such, no new trial is warranted under these circumstances since the entire document was before the jury.
6. Improper Closing Statements of Defendants' Counsel
Plaintiff claims defense counsel's closing statement "was undignified and intemperate, containing improper instructions and assertions calculated to mislead the jury . . . ." (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 32.) Plaintiff does not assert that he objected during the summation. Under these circumstances, a new trial is warranted only where counsel's conduct prejudices the opposing party or unfairly influences a jury's determination. Tesser v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist., 370 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2004). "The relevant inquiry in assessing undue prejudice is whether there is a reasonable probability that the jury's verdict was influenced by the improper conduct of counsel." Claudio v. Mattituck-Cutchogue Union Free Sch. Dist., 955 F. Supp. 2d 118, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "Moreover, when the complaining party fails to object at trial to statements made during summation, the court will only grant a new trial when the error is so serious and flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the trial." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff argues that defense counsel mislead the jury regarding his alleged lack of injuries. (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 33.) Since Plaintiff's relevant medical records generated after the claimed excessive force at issue were admitted into evidence as Joint Exhibit 12, the Court finds any error in this regard is not serious or flagrant. (See Dkt. No. 135 at 2.)
Plaintiff also argues defense counsel improperly referred to Plaintiff "yelling to his 'gang brothers.'" (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 33.) Video evidence of a gang related comment made by Plaintiff, as interpreted by a Defendant, was introduced at trial without any objection by Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 149-4 at 21; see also Dkt. No. 135 at 1 (referencing video as Joint Exhibit 1)), and no objection was made during the summation. Under these circumstances as noted above, the Court is required to find "flagrant abuse" before granting a new trial. Claudio, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 156. Given that evidence regarding a gang related comment was introduced during the trial, without objection, the Court concludes there are no grounds for a new trial based upon such statements of defense counsel in Defendants' summation.
7. Jury Instructions
Plaintiff argues the Court's jury instructions in response to two requests from the jury during their deliberations were misleading. (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 34.) The jury requested "clarification of excessive force guidelines" and "what happens if we can't be agreeable on verdict?" (Dkt. No. 134.) In advance of calling the jury back into the Courtroom, the Court conferred with counsel for the parties. The jurors had a written copy of the jury instructions, therefore the Court referred the jurors to that part of the jury instructions that defined excessive force, and gave an Allen charge in response to the second request. (Dkt. No. 149-3 at 13-15; Text Minute Entry 9/28/2019.) Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants objected at that time, or at the time of the original jury charge conference, or before or after the instructions were delivered to the jury on the record in advance of any deliberations.
To the extent any such motion for a new trial is premised on an objection to a jury instruction, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 requires the movant to have raised that objection before the jury retires, in order to preserve the objection. See Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982). Rule 51 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] court may consider a plain error in the instructions that has not been preserved as required by Rule 51(d)(1) if the error affects substantial rights." Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c) and (d). As such, "to establish plain error, [the movant] must show there was (1) error (2) that is plain and (3) that affects substantial rights." U.S. v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The error should be corrected only if it "seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." Id. at 87 (citations and punctuation omitted). "The plain error doctrine should only be invoked with extreme caution in the civil context." Feeley v. City of New York, 362 F. Supp. 3d 153, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "To constitute plain error, a court's action must contravene an established rule of law and the substantial right affected must go to the very essence of the case." Id. (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
Here, there is no such error. Plaintiff argues the Court only gave the jurors "law in favor of the defendant[]s and [did] not give the law to the jurors on plaintiff's behalf as to what excessive force is." (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 35.) Plaintiff does not provide any argument on what part of the instruction on excessive force specifically favored Defendants or what was lacking as to Plaintiff. Id. A fair reading of the instructions on excessive force (Dkt. No. 149-3 at 13-15) and in a reading of the instructions in their entirety, fails to establish that any alleged error was prejudicial. A jury instruction is erroneous, and a new trial warranted, only if it misleads a jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law. Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 556 (2d Cir. 1994). Plaintiff speculates that the jury "[d]idn't understand the readable jury instructions and really didn't know what to do and didn't know that prison officials violate inmate constitutional rights." (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 35.) However, the Plaintiff has not shown the jury instructions were legally incorrect, led to any jury confusion, or caused any prejudice. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show the instructions resulted in a seriously erroneous result or a miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial. Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 392 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
After conferring with counsel, the Court read the Allen charge in response to the jury's question "what happens if we can't be agreeable on verdict?" (See Dkt. No. 134.) "The term 'Allen charge' is a generic term used for a type of supplemental instruction that is given to a deadlocked jury, first approved by the Supreme Court in Allen v. United States . . . [which] reminds the jurors of the importance of obtaining a verdict and encourages jurors to listen 'to each other's arguments' while also emphasizing that 'the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows.'" Smalls v. Batista, 191 F.3d 272, 275 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff does not specifically provide what part of the charge he finds objectionable other than to assert the Court "rushed the jury to make an improper verdict." (Dkt. No. 147-4 at 36.). "[T]here is nothing improper with instructions that encourage a deadlocked jury to reach a verdict, as long as jurors are not encouraged to abandon, without any principled reason, doubts that any juror conscientiously holds . . . ." Baker v. Kirkpatrick, 768 F. Supp. 2d 493, 507 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (citations and punctuation omitted). Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that the Court rushed the jurors or made any other comments to infer they should acquiesce to other jurors to reach a verdict. Accordingly, the Court finds no error here warranting a new trial.
B. Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment
Plaintiff has not made any argument that the jury verdict was clear error of law or that it is necessary to alter or amend it to prevent manifest injustice. (See generally Dkt. No. 147-4.) Additionally, Plaintiff does not assert that new evidence is available or that there has been an intervening change in controlling law. Id. Plaintiff clearly disagrees with the jury's verdict, and apparently wants to relitigate the issues that have been decided by the jury. Under these circumstances, there is no basis to reconsider the judgment entered in accordance with the jury's verdict.
The Court has considered all of Plaintiff's arguments and finds no legally sufficient reason to disturb the jury's verdict.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. Nos. 140, 147) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Decision and Order, along with copy of the unpublished decision cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Dated: September 26, 2019
Syracuse, New York
/s/_________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge