Summary
recognizing defendant had right to discover medical records to determine whether plaintiff's preexisting medical condition impaired his driving at the time of the accident and to determine for impeachment purposes whether plaintiff's various medications affected his credibility
Summary of this case from Hardy v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys.Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-0842, SECTION: "R" (5)
November 7, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant the United States Department of Veterans Affairs' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For The following reasons, The Court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff sued defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in state court for negligently adjusting an insurance claim that arose from plaintiff's December 1998 car accident. The adjuster investigated the accident, including reviewing police and witness reports, and concluded that plaintiff was solely at fault. Plaintiff claimed that, as a result of the adjuster's conclusion, his insurance costs were increased and he lost chances for employment as a truck driver. He also claimed that he had suffered mental anguish and lost wages. On June 20, 2001, plaintiff filed an amended and supplemental complaint to clarify his claims. He now says that the amendment abandoned the mental anguish claim, although the amending paragraph was styled as a supplement, not as a replacement of its predecessor, and there is no explicit statement that the mental anguish claim was abandoned. Further, in paragraph ten of plaintiff's complaint to this Court, he again asserts damages for mental distress.
On November 2, 2001, the trial court granted partial summary judgment for State Farm on plaintiff's claims of an increase in insurance fees and bad faith. Plaintiff appealed this decision extensively in the state court system without success. On April 5, 2002, the state trial court granted summary judgment for State Farm on plaintiff's remaining claim for failing to adequately investigate the accident and wrongfully adjusting the insurance claims.
In the course of conducting discovery, State Farm sought information regarding plaintiff's medical history. On October 4, 2001, after plaintiff declined to produce his medical records, State Farm issued a formal notice of a medical records deposition along with a subpoena duces tecum, an affidavit, and a cover letter to defendant the Department of Veterans Affairs ("Department") at the Veterans Affairs medical center in New Orleans ("VAMC"). VANC forwarded these materials to its Office of Regional Counsel and sent State Farm a letter indicating that State Farm must provide a signed consent or a court order accompanied by an affidavit before VAMC would release plaintiff's records. Plaintiff does not dispute that he received copies of these documents.
On October 31, 2001, State Farm filed a motion for a court order directing VAMC to release plaintiff's records, which included facts explaining the relevance of the records request based upon plaintiff's answers to defendant's interrogatories in February 2000 and plaintiff's deposition on March 7, 2001. In his answers to defendant's interrogatories, plaintiff had stated that at the time of the accident, he suffered from a continuing medical condition and that he had been treated by a physician at VAMC for the three years before his accident. Moreover, in his deposition, plaintiff had stated that it was possible he was on medication for a different medical condition at the time of the accident and that he had been taking several medications since the accident, including Xanax. The court order was granted on November 5, 2001. Plaintiff acknowledges receiving a copy of the motion but denies receiving a copy of the signed order itself.
Sometime between November 1 and November 30, plaintiff contacted the VAMC and the Office of Regional Affairs Counsel. He told an individual in the records release department and a paralegal in the Office of Regional Affairs Counsel that State Farm was attempting fraudulently to obtain a court order for the release of his medical records and asked them not to release his records. Plaintiff was told that records must be released pursuant to a court order. The paralegal received the court order via fax from VAMC on November 30, 2001. In addition, VAMC states that it faxed the paralegal the deposition notice, the original affidavit, a second affidavit, the subpoena, and some notes made by VAMC.
State Farm's second affidavit accompanying the court order informed VAMC of the same facts contained in State Farm's motion for the court order, explaining the relevance of the records request based on plaintiff's own testimony and statements. After reviewing the court order and the affidavit, the paralegal informed VAMC that it must release plaintiff's records. VAMC then gave plaintiff's records to its acting supervisor to determine if the records contained sensitive information protected by 38 U.S.C. § 7132, such as records of drug or alcohol abuse, HIV, or sickle cell anemia. After determining that plaintiff's records contained no such information, VAMC released the records to State Farm. There is no record that VAMC notified plaintiff of the release. Plaintiff claims that he was not aware that the court order was granted and the records released until State Farm sent him copies of his records in February of 2002.
On March 21, 2002, plaintiff sued State Farm for invasion of privacy under state law. Plaintiff also sued the Department under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671e seg., under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and under 38 C.F.R. § 1.511 for improperly releasing his medical records to a private party without just cause and without notifying him of the release. On August 8, 2002, this Court dismissed plaintiff's FTCA claim against the Department for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Department now moves to dismiss plaintiff's claim under the Privacy Act and 38 C.F.R. § 1.511 on the grounds of failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Defendant moves to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court converts defendant' s motion to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 because matters outside of the pleadings have been presented to and not excluded by the Court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(C).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
The Fifth Circuit has "arguably articulated an even more lenient standard for summary judgment in certain nonjury cases." Phillips Oil Co. v. OKO Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 273 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1987). In Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit explained:
If decision is to be reached by the court, and there are no issues of witness credibility, the court may conclude on the basis of the affidavits, depositions, and stipulations before it, that there are no genuine issues of material fact, even though decision may depend on inferences to be drawn from what has been incontrovertibly proved.
Therefore, in a nonjury case, such as this case, the Court is encouraged to draw inferences, even when they appear to be factual, if a "trial on the merits would reveal no additional data." Id. at 1124; see also Professional Geophysics, Inc. v. Placid Oil Co., 932 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1991).
B. The Privacy Act
The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (West 1996), prohibits the release by a government agency of medical records unless the release is authorized under one of eleven exceptions. One such exception allows disclosure without the consent of the owner of the records "pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11); see also Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hosp. Foundation, Inc., 5 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 1993). Under 38 C.F.R. § 1.511(0)(3)(ii), regarding disclosures compelled by court process, the records custodian is authorized to consult an affidavit, letter of explanation, or other such document to confirm "the need for such disclosure, set forth the character of the pending suit, and the purpose for which the documents or records sought are to be used as evidence."
In this case, defendant State Farm obtained a court order for the release of plaintiff's records on the basis of facts grounded in plaintiff's own interrogatory answers and deposition. (See Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Request Issuance of a Court Order for the Production of Medical Records, attached to Pl.'s Opp'n to Supplemental Mot. and Mem. in Response to Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. A-3.) State Farm submitted the court order to VAMC along with an affidavit alleging the same factual basis underlying its motion for a court order. ( See Buckley Aff., attached to Pl.'s Opp'n to Supplemental Mot. and Mem. in Response to Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. A-9.) This factual basis arose from plaintiff's own statements that at the time of the accident, he suffered from a continuing medical condition and that he had been treated by a physician at the VA hospital for the three years before his accident. (See Pl.'s Answers to Interrogatories, attached to Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B ¶¶ 5, 7.) Moreover, plaintiff had testified that it was possible he was on medication for a different medical condition at the time of the accident and that he had been taking several medications since the accident, including Xanax. ( See Robinett Depo. at 40-43, attached to Pl.'s Opp'n to Gov't's Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D.) The Court finds no credible evidence assailing defendant's representations that plaintiff made these statements.
It was well within State Farm's discovery rights to determine whether plaintiff's preexisting medical condition impaired his driving at the time of the accident, because plaintiff's medical records were relevant to State Farm's defenses against plaintiff's claim that it negligently investigated his accident and improperly concluded that he was at G.L.C. § fault. See LA. CODE CIVIL PROC. arts. 1422, 1465.1, 1469 (West 1984 Supp. 2002); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 510(B)(2)(a) (West 1995 Supp. 2002). Moreover, it was within defendant's discovery rights to determine for impeachment purposes whether plaintiff's various medications affected his credibility. Therefore, regardless of whether plaintiff withdrew his mental anguish claim from his complaint as he now asserts, State Farm's court order was proper, as plaintiff's medical condition was relevant to the litigation. For these reasons, State Farm properly obtained the court order. The Department's determination that plaintiff's records were subject to release based on the court order and the supporting affidavit was therefore correct. Having reviewed these documents in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 1.511(c)(3)(ii), the Department was required by law to release plaintiff's records, subject to protections under 38 U.S.C. § 7132 of records revealing drug or alcohol abuse, HIV, or sickle cell anemia (none of which were found by VAMC's acting supervisor).
Plaintiff also claims that VANC violated 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(8) and 38 C.F.R. § 1.511(d) by not notifying him of the release of his records. Under 38 C.F.R. § 1.511(d), "[w]henever a disclosure of Privacy Act protected records is made in response to the process of a . . . court, the custodian of the records disclosed will make reasonable efforts to notify the subject . . ." Under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(8), "Each agency that maintains a system of records shall . . . make reasonable efforts to serve notice on an individual when any record on such individual is made available to any person under compulsory legal process when such process becomes a matter of public record." The Privacy Act also provides for civil remedies "[w]henever any agency fails to comply with any provision of this section, or any rule promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D).
There is no record that VAMC itself notified plaintiff in writing of its release of his records. Plaintiff admits, however, that he was told in November of 2001 that VAMC would have to release the records in response to a court order. (See Robinett Aff. ¶ 10-13, 15.) Further, plaintiff brings forth no evidence that VAMC's failure to notify him adversely affected him. The Court finds that there was no adverse effect, because plaintiff had no legal basis to prevent VAMC from releasing his records. The fact is plaintiff knew of State Farm's request and the basis therefor before the release occurred, and he tried to prevent the release by contacting the Department. He was informed that the release would have to be made in response to a court order. Even if this communication did not technically satisfy the notice requirement, plaintiff was not adversely affected by a failure to receive notice after the records were disclosed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion and dismisses plaintiff's claim.