[T]he court shall appoint separate counsel for defendants who have such conflicting interests that they cannot properly be represented by the same counsel. * * * Ford v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 346, 379 F.2d 123 (1967); Lollar v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 200, 376 F.2d 243 (1967); Campbell v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 352 F.2d 359 (1965); Robertson v. United States, D.C.App., 252 A.2d 518 (1969). In Ford v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 346, 379 F.2d 123 (1967), the court, referring to the responsibility imposed upon trial courts by the Criminal Justice Act, declared, at 348-349, 379 F.2d at 125-126:

We conclude that the trial court was diligent and thorough in carrying out its duty to make an affirmative, on-the-record determination that appellant was aware of the possible dangers and elected to assume the risks involved. See Robertson v. United States, 252 A.2d 518, 520 (D.C. 1969); Lord v. District of Columbia, 235 A.2d 322, 323 (D.C. 1967). Appellant's waiver was effective and he cannot now, in his own words, "use [the claim of ineffective assistance] on appeal." One court has held, in a case involving multiple representation, that "the court's inquiry [regarding waiver of counsel free from conflict of interest] . . . should take place after the defendants have had a reasonable time to digest and contemplate the risks posed by joint representation."