Approving the language of its previous holdings, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated: "Extreme cruelty" as defined in Robertson v. Robertson, 73 Okla. 299, 176 P. 387, and applied in a long line of cases including Peterson v. Peterson, 206 Okla. 68, 240 P.2d 1075, is conduct on the part of either spouse which so grievously wounds the mental feelings of the other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other, as to seriously impair the bodily health, or such as utterly destroys the legitimate ends of matrimony.Vincent v. Vincent, 208 Okla. 470, 473, 257 P.2d 512, 515 (1953).
We have not attempted, and it is unnecessary, to describe all of the various details in which the testimony on behalf of the defendant contradicts that of plaintiff, or how her conduct that plaintiff complains of was explained, excused or mitigated by circumstances she testified to. Suffice it to say that defendant's evidence tends to minimize the effect of the parties' differences and to indicate that their arguments have been infrequent or intermittent rather than continuous, and that no irreconcilable differences exist between them. Also, defendant evidenced a desire to "patch up" the marriage and a hope that they would be given that opportunity. "Extreme cruelty" as defined in Robertson v. Robertson, 73 Okla. 299, 176 P. 387, and applied in a long line of cases, including Peterson v. Peterson, 206 Okla. 68, 240 P.2d 1075, is conduct on the part of either spouse which so grievously wounds the mental feelings of the other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other as to seriously impair the bodily health, or such as utterly destroys the legitimate ends of matrimony. On the basis of the record we think there is no doubt that defendant's conduct fulfilled neither of the above-noted requirements.
"An action for divorce is one of equitable cognizance, and the judgment in such an action will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence." Extreme cruelty has been defined in Robertson v. Robertson, 73 Okla. 299, 176 P. 387, as: "The conduct on the part of either spouse which grievously wounds the mental feelings of the other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other as to seriously impair the bodily health, . . . or such as utterly destroys the legitimate ends . . . of matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty."
"Physical violence is not a necessary element of extreme cruelty, as defined by the statutes as ground for divorce, but that cruelty which is contemplated is that conduct which renders cohabitation intolerable, which destroys the concord, the harmony and affection of the parties and utterly destroys the legitimate objects and aims of matrimony or unjustifiably wounds the mental feelings or so destroys the peace of mind as seriously to impair the health or endanger the life of the other." In the case of Robertson v. Robertson, 73 Okla. 299, 176 P. 387, it is said: "The conduct of either spouse which grievously wounds the mental feelings of the other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other as to seriously impair the bodily health, or such as utterly destroys the legitimate end of matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty, within the meaning of section 4962, R. L. 1910 (sec. 665, O. S. 1931.)" 1931.)"
"The law at one time required proof of physical violence where extreme cruelty was relied upon as a ground for divorce; but the later and better considered cases have repudiated this doctrine, as taking too low and sensual a view of the marriage relation, and it is now very generally held that any unjustifiable conduct on the part of either spouse which so grievously wounds the mental feelings of the other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other, as to seriously impair the bodily health or endanger the life of the other, or such as utterly destroys the legitimate ends * * * of matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty," within the meaning of "the statutes, although no physical or personal violence be inflicted or even threatened." See, also, Robertson v. Robertson, 73 Okla. 299, 176 P. 387; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164, 240 P. 62. The evidence in this case is voluminous, and we are of the opinion that no substantial good can possibly result from setting out the details of the unpleasant and unfortunate circumstances related by the witnesses, but we find from the evidence that the conduct of the defendant was such as to entitle the plaintiff to a decree of divorce under the rules above announced.
It is not necessary that conduct of the defendant should extend to physical violence. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 30 Kan. 712, 2 P. 122; Pearson v. Pearson, 230 N.Y. 141, 129 N.E. 349; Robertson v. Robertson, 73 Okla. 299, 176 P. 387; Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 41 Okla. 306, 137 P. 711. In Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164, 240 P. 62, the rule is stated:
Even if the conclusions of the trial court were erroneous, we are in no position to say that the division of property as made by it has been shown by the plaintiff in error to be unfair and inequitable. In contested divorce cases, where the evidence is conflicting, and there is sufficient evidence to support the findings of the court and the decree based thereon, the same will not be disturbed on appeal. Stovall v. Stovall, 29 Okla. 125, 110 P. 791; Johnson v. Johnson, 72 Oklahoma, 179 P. 595; Adams v. Adams, 30 Okla. 327, 120 P. 566; Penn v. Penn, 37 Okla. 650, 133 P. 207; Robertson v. Robertson, 73 Oklahoma, 176 P. 387. In the absence of the record or special findings of fact showing the contrary, this court must presume that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court, showing all the facts and circumstances surrounding the accumulation of the property in question, to warrant the trial court concluding the division which was made was fair and equitable.
This court has frequently held that in a contested divorce case, where the evidence is conflicting, and there is sufficient evidence to support the findings of the court and the decree based thereon, the same will not be disturbed on appeal." (Stovall v. Stovall, 29 Okla. 125, 116 P. 791; Adams v. Adams, 30 Okla. 327, 120 P. 566; Penn v. Penn, 37 Okla. 650. 133 P. 207; Vick v. Vick, 45 Okla. 412, 145 P. 815; Robertson v. Robertson, 73 Oklahoma, 176 P. 387.) Bearing in mind what has been said hereinabove as to the considerations that enter into the question of an equitable division, the question presents itself as to what, under the facts in this case, would constitute an equitable division of the property.
"In an action of an equitable nature, the Supreme Court will weigh the evidence, and will affirm the judgment unless the same is against the clear weight of the evidence." To the same effect, see Elliott v. Bond, 72 Oklahoma, 176 P. 242; Bruner v. Oswald, 72 Oklahoma, 178 P. 693; Day v. Keechi Oil Gas Co., 72 Oklahoma, 180 P. 366; Robertson v. Robertson, 73 Oklahoma, 176 P. 387. In Tescier v. Goyer, 72 Oklahoma, 181 P. 503, McNeill, J., said:
( Whitmore v. San Francisco Savings Union, 50 Cal. 149; Bull v. Coe, 77 Cal. 63 [11 Am. St. Rep. 235, 18 P. 808].) In the case of Keohane v. Keohane, 33 Cal.App., at page 408 [ 176 P. 387], Lennon, C.J., said: "A party seeking to quiet his title to the realty or remove a cloud thereon will as a condition precedent to relief be compelled to do equity. A court of equity setting aside a judicial sale under a void execution as a cloud on title should decree that the purchase money be refunded.