Robertson v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority

15 Citing cases

  1. Robertson v. New York City Housing Authority

    91 N.Y.2d 955 (N.Y. 1998)

    Decided April 7, 1998 Reported below, 237 A.D.2d 501. Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, as untimely.

  2. Robertson v. New York City Hous. Auth

    90 N.Y.2d 844 (N.Y. 1997)

    Decided June 5, 1997 Appeal from the 2d Dept: 237 A.D.2d 501 FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS

  3. Balbuenas v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp.

    209 A.D.3d 642 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)   Cited 11 times

    The respondents' contention that they would suffer prejudice was also undermined by their expert's ability to offer the opinion that the hospital's medical staff did not deviate from the accepted standard of care and that any alleged deviation played no causal role in the stillbirth. A petitioner may be able to establish a reasonable excuse for not timely serving a notice of claim based on an injury or medical condition, but only "through admissible medical evidence that he [or she] was incapacitated to such an extent that he [or she] could not have complied with the statutory requirement" ( Matter of Smith v. Westchester County Health Care Corp., 165 A.D.3d 1150, 1151, 86 N.Y.S.3d 548 ; seeRobertson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 237 A.D.2d 501, 501–502, 655 N.Y.S.2d 572 ). Similarly, even absent incapacitation, a reasonable excuse may be established by an allegation that a petitioner was more concerned and preoccupied with his or her alleged injuries or those of a spouse or child than with retaining counsel to pursue a legal claim, but only when such an allegation is supported by medical evidence (seeMatter of Hampson v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., 114 A.D.3d 790, 791, 980 N.Y.S.2d 132 ; Matter of Klass v. City of New York, 103 A.D.3d 800, 801, 959 N.Y.S.2d 738 ).

  4. Torres v. Tuckahoe Union Free Sch. Dist.

    2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 2507 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)

    The petitioners failed to provide a reasonable excuse for their failure to serve a timely notice of claim (see Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 147). The infancy of one of the petitioners, without any showing of a nexus between the infancy and the delay, was insufficient to constitute a reasonable excuse (see Robertson v Somers Cent. School Dist., 90 AD3d 1012; Matter of Tonissen v Huntington U.F.S.D., 80 AD3d 704; Matter of Padgett v City of New York, 78 AD3d 949; Grogan v Seaford Union Free School Dist., 59 AD3d 596), and no medical documentation was submitted to show that the delay was due to the infant petitioner's physical and emotional injuries (see Robertson v New York City Hous. Auth., 237 AD2d 501; Matter of Nunes v City of New York, 233 AD2d 399, 400; Matter of Caruso v County of Westchester, 220 AD2d 746). Moreover, the petitioners failed to establish that the appellant, the Tuckahoe Union Free School District (hereinafter the School District), had actual knowledge of the essential facts within 90 days of the alleged underlying incidents or a reasonable time thereafter (see Nuamah v City of New York, 13 AD3d 502; Matter of Rodrigues v Village of Port Chester, 262 AD2d 491, 492; Matter of Cuffee v City of New York, 255 AD2d 440).

  5. Torres v. Tuckahoe Union Free Sch. Dist.

    94 A.D.3d 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 1 times

    The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim. The petitioners failed to provide a reasonable excuse for their failure to serve a timely notice of claim ( see Matter of Felice v. Eastport/South Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 A.D.3d 138, 147, 851 N.Y.S.2d 218). The infancy of one of the petitioners, without any showing of a nexus between the infancy and the delay, was insufficient to constitute a reasonable excuse ( see Robertson v. Somers Cent. School Dist., 90 A.D.3d 1012, 935 N.Y.S.2d 145; Matter of Tonissen v. Huntington U.F.S.D., 80 A.D.3d 704, 915 N.Y.S.2d 296; Matter of Padgett v. City of New York, 78 A.D.3d 949, 912 N.Y.S.2d 75; Grogan v. Seaford Union Free School Dist., 59 A.D.3d 596, 873 N.Y.S.2d 225), and no medical documentation was submitted to show that the delay was due to the infant petitioner's physical and emotional injuries ( see Robertson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 237 A.D.2d 501, 655 N.Y.S.2d 572; Matter of Nunes v. City of New York, 233 A.D.2d 399, 400, 650 N.Y.S.2d 16; Matter of Caruso v. County of Westchester, 220 A.D.2d 746, 633 N.Y.S.2d 75). Moreover, the petitioners failed to establish that the appellant, the Tuckahoe Union Free School District (hereinafter the School District), had actual knowledge of the essential facts within 90 days of the alleged underlying incidents or a reasonable time thereafter ( see Nuamah v. City of New York, 13 A.D.3d 502, 786 N.Y.S.2d 312; Matter of Rodrigues v. Village of Port Chester, 262 A.D.2d 491, 492, 692 N.Y.S.2d 102; Matter of Cuffee v. City of New York, 255 A.D.2d 440, 680 N.Y.S.2d 580). Finally, the petitioners failed to establish that the delay in serving a notice of claim would not substantially prejudice the School District ( see Matter of Landa v. City of New York, 252 A.D.2d 525, 675 N.Y.S.2d 377; Matter of Deegan v. City of New York, 227 A.D.2d 620, 643 N.Y.S.2d 596).

  6. In re Schoen

    86 A.D.3d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 5 times

    The petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her failure to serve a timely notice of claim. The record reveals that while the petitioner may have been physically incapacitated for the first three or four months after the accident, she failed to demonstrate that the additional delay in retaining an attorney was due to her physical or mental incapacity ( see Matter of Portnov v City of Glen Cove, 50 AD3d 1041, 1043; Matter of Embery v City of New York, 250 AD2d 611; Robertson v New York City Hous. Auth., 237 AD2d 501, 502). Furthermore, the respondent did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter by virtue of the New York City Fire Department Prehospital Care Report, since there was nothing in the report to connect the occurrence with any negligence on the part of the respondent ( see Matter of Portnov v City of Glen Cove, 50 AD3d at 1042; Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 147-148; Matter of Yearusskaya v New York City Tr. Auth., 279 AD2d 583; Matter of Guiliano v Town of Oyster Bay, 244 AD2d 408, 409; Caselli v City of New York, 105 AD2d 251, 258).

  7. In re Coplon

    82 A.D.3d 1095 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 5 times

    own's Highway Department responded to correct the icy condition ( see Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 141; Matter of Mounsey v City of New York, 68 AD3d 998, 999; Matter of LaMay v County of Oswego, 49 AD3d 1351; Bazer v Town of Walworth, 277 AD2d 994; Matter of Morgan v New York City Hous. Auth., 181 AD2d 890, 891; Caselli v City of New York, 105 AD2d 251, 256). Furthermore, the petitioners demonstrated that there was no prejudice to the Town by the four-month delay in making this application. The condition of the drain pipe was nontransitory and uninfluenced by the delay in making this application ( see Matter of Shapiro v County of Nassau, 5 AD3d 690, 691). While the petitioners failed to support their assertion that the decedent's failure to serve a timely notice of claim was due to her hospitalization ( see Matter of Papayannakos v Levittown Mem. Special Educ. Ctr., 38 AD3d 902; Matter of Welch v New York City Hous. Auth., 7 AD3d 805, 806; Robertson v New York City Hous. Auth., 237 AD2d 501, 502), where, as here, there was actual notice and an absence of prejudice, the failure to establish a reasonable excuse does not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim ( see Matter of Billman v Town of Deerpark, 73 AD3d 1039; Matter of Mounsey v City of New York, 68 AD3d at 1000; Matter of Speed v A. Holly Patterson Extended Care Facility, 10 AD3d 400, 402). Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the petition for leave to serve a late a notice of claim on behalf of the decedent.

  8. Papayannakos v. Memo. Spec. Educ. Cent

    38 A.D.3d 902 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 17 times

    The petitioners did not offer a valid excuse for their failure to timely serve a notice of claim. The injured petitioner's assertion that the six-month delay in seeking leave to serve a late notice was due to her physical incapacity and pain was supported solely by her own conclusory and self-serving allegations and those of her counsel ( see Matter of Aliberti v City of Yonkers, 302 AD2d 456; Robertson v New York City Hous. Auth., 237 AD2d 501; Matter of Caruso v County of Westchester, 220 AD2d 746). Furthermore, the petitioner George Papayannakos did not proffer any acceptable excuse on his own behalf for the delay in seeking leave to serve a late notice ( see Matter of Bensen v Town of islip, 99 AD2d 755, 756). Moreover, there is no evidence in the record establishing that the respondents acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from accrual of the claim or a reasonable time thereafter ( see Matter of Alexander v Board of Educ. for Vil. of Mamaroneck, 18 AD3d 654; Matter of Pico v City of New York, 8 AD3d 287; Matter of Termini v Valley Stream Union Free School Dist. No. 13, 2 AD3d 866 ). Finally, given the transitory nature of the alleged pavement depression, the six-month delay substantially prejudiced the respondents' ability to investigate the defect and other circumstances surrounding the accident ( see Matter of Aguilar v Town of Islip, 294 AD2d 358, 359; Matter of Konstantinides

  9. Matter of Kliment v. City of Syracuse

    294 A.D.2d 944 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 6 times

    Petitioner further asserts in a reply affidavit that his nine-day hospitalization as a result of his injuries constitutes a reasonable excuse for the delay. We disagree. Petitioner failed to establish "that [his] physical incapacitation was of such extent and duration that [he] was prevented from filing a notice of claim within the 90-day statutory period" ( Matter of Pope v. City of New York, 282 A.D.2d 236; see Robertson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 237 A.D.2d 501, 502, appeal dismissed 90 N.Y.2d 844, rearg denied 90 N.Y.2d 937; Carroll v. City of New York, 130 A.D.2d 702). With respect to actual or constructive notice of the essential facts constituting the claim, we reject petitioner's contention that respondent had such notice as a result of the police report of the accident in which petitioner was injured.

  10. Matter of Hunte v. City of N.Y

    284 A.D.2d 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 2 times

    ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. In deciding whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the court must consider whether the petitioner demonstrated a reasonable excuse for his or her failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality to be served acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within the 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense on the merits (see, Robertson v. New York City Housing Auth., 237 A.D.2d 501; Levette v. Triborough Bridge Tunnel Auth., 207 A.D.2d 330). Here, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her delay, actual knowledge of the claim on the part of the respondent, and the absence of prejudice to the respondent.