Opinion
No. 7539.
June 30, 1976. Rehearing Denied July 29, 1976. Writ Refused October 29, 1976.
APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS, DIVISION "D", NO. 588-430, STATE OF LOUISIANA, HONORABLE S. SANFORD LEVY, J.
Jack Mark Stolier, and Jane Johnson, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Marion Weimer, James A. Piper and James A. McGraw, Baton Rouge, for Administrator of Dept. of Employment Sec., State of La., defendant-appellee.
Milling, Benson, Woodward, Hillyer Pierson, Elizabeth Ridnour Haak, New Orleans, for The Leon Godchaux Clothing Co., Ltd., defendant-appellee.
Before GULOTTA, STOULIG and MORIAL, JJ.
Appellant, Moran Robertson, has appealed a judgment of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, upholding an administrative ruling denying him unemployment compensation benefits because he was discharged for good cause.
Dorothy Boucher, vice president and store manager of The Leon Godchaux Clothing Company, Limited, verbally instructed Robertson that the crew of store keepers under his supervision must assume a new duty, i. e., changing light bulbs throughout the store on a daily basis. She further confirmed this with a written memorandum.
When one of the men under Robertson's supervision refused to assume this new duty, Miss Boucher contacted appellant by telephone to advise him of this event and was told by him that he (Robertson) had no intention of instructing his men to change light bulbs. Among Miss Boucher's duties was the direct supervision of Robertson. She fired him for insubordination.
The reason for complainant's separation from employment given by Miss Boucher to the Division of Employment Security is: "Insubordination. Refused to delegate work to be performed to his personnel. Manner most discourteous when refusing to carry out his functions as a supervisor."
Appellant's factual version varies in that he said he was fired after he was directed to change the bulbs himself. From the administrative ruling it is apparent the referee assigned more credibility to Miss Boucher's statements.
Robertson's version is: "The store manager wanted me to have 2 men screw light bulbs for 3 hrs. a day, the work load we had to do was too heavy already. This came up all of a sudden. There was no rule about this. The other 2 employees involved names were Willie Small, Jerry Keys. I was not aware of this rule. I worked for this employer for 8 years as a receiving clerk. I was never asked to change light bulbs or do maintenance work before." (Robertson admitted that he refused to change the light bulbs at Miss Boucher's request and also advised her that he would not resign from his employment and that she would have to fire him.)
L.R.S. 23:1634 limits our jurisdiction to questions of law unless the record contains insufficient evidence to support the conclusion of the administrative agency and preponderates to the effect that a fraud has been perpetrated. See Fruchtzweig v. Southern Specialty Sales Company, 161 So.2d 374 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1964) and Shelton v. Doyal, 316 So.2d 526 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1975).
In the case before us there is ample evidence to support the finding appellant was properly disqualified by L.R.S. 23:1601(2) because he was justly discharged for insubordination.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MORIAL, J., dissents with written reasons.
I respectfully dissent.
In my opinion the record does not support appellant's disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits on the basis of misconduct.
Guidelines relative to misconduct barring a claimant's recovery of unemployment compensation benefits were expressed in Heard v. Doyal, 259 So.2d 412 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1972) as follows:
"Misconduct under LSA-R.S. 23:1601(2) has been defined on numerous occasions by the courts to mean an act of willful or wanton disregard of the employer's interest, a deliberate violation of the employer's rules, a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful interest, or evil design, or show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. Horns v. Brown, 243 La. 936, 148 So.2d 607 (1963); Payne v. Antoine's Restaurant, 217 So.2d 514 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1969).
"The employer has the burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. Payne v. Antoine's Restaurant, supra; Gardere v. Brown, 170 So.2d 758 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1964); Fruchtzweig v. Southern Specialty Sales Company, 161 So.2d 374 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1964); Lee v. Brown, 148 So.2d 321 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1962)."
The uncorroborated testimony of Dorothy Boucher when considered against the testimony of the claimant and his former subordinate does not constitute evidence sufficient to support the essential and important finding of misconduct by the Board of Review. Appellees' construction of the evidence of claimant's conduct, while fully justifying the termination of his employment in the eyes of his employer for insubordination, nevertheless, hardly amounts to misconduct.
In my opinion, appellant's isolated refusal to perform a task which had not been previously assigned to him in the course of eight years satisfactory employment as a receiving clerk/storekeeper does not amount to a wilful disregard of the employer's interest or a deliberate violation of the employer's rules.