Opinion
CIVIL 1:20-CV-01736
01-31-2022
KASHIF M. ROBERTSON, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD ANGLEMEYER, et al ., Defendants.
Mannion, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Susan E. Schwab, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction.
Plaintiff Kashif M. Robertson claims that the defendants-two Dauphin County probation officers-kept him on probation supervision even after his maximum sentence expired. Currently pending is the defendants' motion to dismiss Robertson's amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we recommend that the court grant that motion.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Robertson began this action by filing a complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. After we granted Robertson's application to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered that the complaint be served on the defendants, the defendants appeared and filed a motion to dismiss. Robertson then filed an amended complaint, and the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
The amended complaint names two defendants employed by the Dauphin County Adult Probation and Parole Department: (1) Richard Anglemeyer, a probation officer; and (2) Jason Snyder, Anglemeyer's supervisor. Doc. 30 ¶¶ 1-2. Robertson sues the defendants in both their official and individual capacities. Id.
The following facts are taken from Robertson's amended complaint, the exhibits attached to the amended complaint, the docket sheets from some of Robertson's underlying state proceedings, and some of the exhibits attached to the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
In addition to considering the allegations of the complaint, in connection with a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court may consider “‘exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.'” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). Here, we consider the exhibits attached to Robertson's amended complaint. See docs. 30-1, 30-2. We also consider some, but not all, of the documents that the defendants submitted in connection with their motion to dismiss the amended complaint. More specifically, we consider documents that are matters of public record and of which we can take judicial notice, namely a docket summary, a copy of a corrected Court Commitment form (which Robertson also submitted as an exhibit), and sentencing orders from the court. See doc. 33-1, 33-2, 33-3 at 2-5, 7-8. But we do not consider two other documents submitted by the defendants. Those two document appear to be documents created by the Dauphin County Adult Probation and Parole Department. The first is a document titled “Credit For Time Served-APO.” See doc. 33-3 at 6. The second is a document titled “Probation/Parole/IPP Rules.” See doc. 33-4. It is not clear that these documents are matters of public record such that we can take judicial notice of them. And while the court may consider a document “attached to a defendant's motion to dismiss if it is ‘an undisputedly authentic document' and ‘plaintiff's claims are based on the document, '” Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 127 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196), here we cannot say that these documents are undisputedly authentic. Although Robertson's position on whether the first document is authentic is not clear, he asserts that the second document is a forgery. See doc. 39 at 14-16, 32.
Robertson has been charged with numerous crimes in numerous cases in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. In this case, Robertson claims that the defendants kept him under supervision with respect to Commonwealth v. Robertson, CP-22-CR-0002594-2016 (Dauphin Cty.) (“2016 docket”), even after his maximum sentence expired. Although the 2016 docket is the basis of Robertson's claim, in his amended complaint, Robertson also includes allegations regarding Commonwealth v. Robertson, CP-22-CR-0002276-2017 (Dauphin Cty.) (“2017 docket”). To place Robertson's allegations in context, before setting forth those allegations, we briefly summarize the salient proceedings from the 2016 docket and from the 2017 docket.
A search of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania Web Portal, https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch (last visited Jan. 27, 2022), shows that Robertson was involved with numerous criminal cases in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. The docket sheets for those cases are available on the web portal. “We may take judicial notice of the contents of another Court's docket.” Orabi v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Wilson v. McVey, 579 F.Supp.2d 685, 688 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (taking judicial notice of the state court docket).
A. Brief Summary of the 2016 docket.
On August 16, 2017, Robertson was convicted of numerous charges. See Docket Sheet as to the 2016 docket. Judge Tully “then immediately sentenced Robertson to a total of eight to twenty-three months' incarceration followed by 12 months' probation.” Commonwealth v. Robertson, No. 1606 MDA 2017, 2019 WL 441003, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2019). The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed that judgment of sentence. Id. at *8. And on August 7, 2019, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Robertson's petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Robertson, 217 A.3d 188 (2019) (Table).
On February 4, 2019, a probation detainer was issued. See Docket Sheet as to the 2016 docket. This detainer was based on both purported technical violations by Robertson of the terms of his probation and on the fact that he was charged with additional crimes in another criminal case, which is also a violation of the terms of Robertson's probation. Doc. 30-2 at 31-32 (Transcript of Sept. 16, 2019 hearing). Sometime after Robertson had a Gagnon I hearing, he moved for a Gagnon II hearing. Id. at 29-30. On September 16, 2019, Judge Tully held such a hearing, during which defendant Anglemeyer testified. Id. at 33-34. At that hearing, given that Robertson admitted to a technical violation of his probation, Judge Tully revoked Robertson's probation, and he stated that a revocation sentencing hearing would be scheduled. Id. at 34-36; see also doc. 33-3 at 7-8 (order of Sept. 16, 2019).
“A defendant generally is entitled to two separate hearings prior to revocation of parole or probation.” Johnson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 3:21-cv-00322, 2022 WL 55020, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2022) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 786 (1973)). “The purpose of the first, pre-revocation hearing (a Gagnon I hearing) is to determine that probable cause exists to believe that a violation has been committed.” Id. “The second, ‘more comprehensive hearing' (a Gagnon II hearing), is to determine whether facts exist to justify revocation of parole or probation.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 761 A.2d 613, 617 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)).
On October 1, 2019, Judge Tully held a revocation sentencing hearing. See doc. 30-2 at 38-68 (Transcript of Oct. 1, 2019 hearing). At that hearing, Judge Tully found that Robertson violated his probation given the new charges against him. Id. at 54. In light of that finding and given Robertson's previous admission to a technical violation, Judge Tully then asked the probation officer for a recommendation regarding an appropriate sentence. Id. The probation officer recommended a sentence of another 12 months of probation with a special condition of electronic monitoring with house arrest. Id. at 55. Judge Tully then sentenced Robertson to a period of 12 months intermediate punishment (“IP”). Id. at 59. And he gave Robertson credit for the seven months that he had been incarcerated because of the probation detainer. Id. Judge Tully explained that “[t]he balance of the IP will be electronic monitoring, house arrest.” Id. at 59-60. He also added, however, that depending on how Robertson responds to supervision, the balance of the sentence will be “[electronic monitoring. But doesn't have to be house arrest. It can be by curfew.” Id. at 60. And after addressing some of Robertson's concerns, Judge Tully by way of summary stated: “All right. Then we'll make arrangements to get him on electronic monitoring today, get him released and under supervision.” Id. at 63. And when Judge Tully asked if there was anything else from probation, the probation officer asked for clarification, which Judge Tully provided:
The identity of the probation officer at this hearing is not clear from the transcript of the hearing. Robertson alleges in his amended complaint that both defendant Anglemeyer and defendant Snyder were present in court on October 1, 2019. See doc. 30 ¶ 3.9.
APO: No, Your Honor. Just some clarification. 12 months' IP. You're giving him 7 months' credit; correct?
THE COURT: Correct.
APO: So how long is the house arrest, the EM?
THE COURT: Right now -APO: Is it five months?
THE COURT: Right now, for that five months, but he can step down as he responds - -
APO: Understood.
THE COURT: - - gets employment, and, ultimately, he can be back in the form of probation when Probation thinks that he's at that stage.
APO: Understood.Id. at 63-64.
Robertson later filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition, and on December 17, 2019, Judge Tully issued a Memorandum Opinion and an Order stating his intent to dismiss the PCRA petition. See doc. 30-2 at 70-76. That Memorandum Opinion and Order addressed Robertson's original underlying conviction as to the 2016 docket, not the subsequent revocation of his probation. Nevertheless, Robertson references that Memorandum Opinion and Order in his amended complaint. See doc. 30 at ¶¶ 3.3, 4 (alleging that he provided the defendants with that Memorandum Opinion and Order). And he attaches that Memorandum Opinion and Order to his amended complaint as an exhibit. See doc. 30-2 at 70-76. In that Memorandum Opinion, when setting forth the procedural history of the case, Judge Tully recited the following as to the probation revocation:
On September 16, 2019, at [Robertson's] request, a revocation hearing was held before this Court. [Robertson's] probation was revoked and sentencing was deferred to October 1, 2019. [Robertson] was sentenced to twelve (12) months of intermediate punishment - time credit was applied to the first seven (7) months and he was immediately paroled. The balance of five (5) months is to be served on electronic monitoring and house arrest, and his sentence is currently set to expire on March 1, 2020.Id. at 71.The defendants submitted a written document that they represent is Judge Tully's written sentencing order. See doc. 33-3 at 2-6. Only the first page has a signature, apparently of a Judge. Id. at 2. Additional pages are not signed. Id. at 36. Of note, is a page Titled “Credit for Time Served-APO.” Id. at 6. On this page, a box next to the phrase “credit NOT applied, ” is checked, and then below that, the document references 7 months and 29 days from 2/2/19 to 10/1/19. Id. It is not clear whether this page is part of the sentencing order or a document prepared by the Probation Department. As noted above, we do not consider this document in connection with the motion to dismiss. See supra note 1.
On April 28, 2020, Judge Tully issued an order that provided:
AND NOW, this 28th day of April 2020, upon consideration of Defendant's Reconsideration for Motion for the Imposition of Full and Complete Time Credit and this Court's October 1, 2019 sentence wherein Defendant was sentenced to twelve (12) month of intermediate punishment with the first seven (7) months satisfied by his time credit and to serve the balance of five (5) months on electronic monitoring and house arrest, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the abovecaptioned docket is CLOSED and he is released from supervision. Defendant's sentence was complete on April 1, 2020.Doc. 30-2 at 81.
It is not clear how Judge Tully arrived at April 1, 2020, as the date the sentence was complete given that he states that Robertson had a balance of five months on his sentence as of October 1, 2019, and March 1, 2020, is five months from October 1, 2019, whereas April 1, 2020, is six months from October 1, 2019.
B. Brief Summary of the 2017 Docket.
On August 8, 2019, Judge Tully held a hearing to address several motions pending in Robertson's 2017 docket. See doc. 30-1 at 14-55. After discussing some of the issues surrounding those motions, the prosecutor suggested that the case be resolved by Robertson pleading guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Id. at 30, 44. Robertson agreed and pleaded guilty. Id. at 44, 50. Judge Tully accepted Robertson's guilty plea, and sentenced him to a fine and a term of imprisonment of 6 to 23 months in the Dauphin County Prison. Id. at 50, 53. Judge Tully also gave Robertson six-months credit toward that sentence for some of the time he had already spent in jail. Id. at 53. Judge Tully then immediately paroled Robertson to his outstanding detainer. Id .
Robertson submitted as an exhibit to his amended complaint a document titled “Credit for Time Served” relating to his 2017 docket. See doc. 30-2 at 4. That document suggests that Robertson was entitled to 11 months and 17 days of credit toward his sentence for the period he was incarcerated from January 5, 2017, to December 22, 2017. Id. The period from January 5, 2017, to December 22, 2017, is 352 days. The original Court Commitment form relating to the 2017 docket stated that Robertson was entitled to 352 days of time credit. Id. at 5. But a corrected Court Commitment form stated that Robertson was entitled to 152 days of time credit. Id. at 7. The second page of the corrected Court Commitment form shows that the 152 days was based on credit for the period from January 5, 2017, to June 5, 2017. Id. at 8. January 5, 2017, to June 5, 2017, is five months. Given that Judge Tully stated when sentencing Robertson that he was given six-months credit toward his sentence, it is not clear from where the five months, or 152 days, came.
Although Judge Tully initially referred to this outstanding detainer as a parole detainer, he later mentioned probation and the detainer. Doc. 30-1 at 53. From the context, it appears that Judge Tully was referring to the probation detainer on the 2016 docket.
Robertson filed several motions contending that he was entitled to additional credit toward his sentence relating to the 2017 docket and asking the court to correct his sentence and close the 2017 docket. See e.g., doc. 30-1 at 2-12; see also docket sheet as to the 2017 docket. Judge Tully initially denied those motions. See doc. 30-2 at 10; see also docket sheet as to the 2017 docket. But on July 7, 2021, Judge Tully issued an order that provided: “AND Now, to wit: July 7, 2021 it is hereby ordered and decreed that the above defendant's detainer be lifted and he be discharged from any further supervision of the Dauphin County Adult Probation/Parole Office and his docket be closed at this time.” Doc. 40-1 at 2.
Robertson filed a motion to supplement his amended complaint to include Judge Tully's July 7, 2021 Order as an exhibit. The defendants have not opposed that motion. Moreover, the July 7, 2021 Order is a matter of public record as which this court can take judicial notice. Thus, by a separate order, we granted Robertson's motion to supplement. And we will consider Judge Tully's July 7, 2021 Order in connection with the motion to dismiss.
C. Robertson's allegations.
Robertson alleges the following facts in his amended complaint. On October 1, 2019, Judge Tully sentenced Robertson on the 2016 docket to a sentence of 12 months of IP with seven months credit for time served. Doc. 30 ¶ 3. Defendant Anglemeyer made all personal contacts with Robertson after his release on October 2, 2019. Id. ¶ 3.1. And although Robertson was supervised by Officer Tanya of the Dauphin County Juvenile Probation and Parole Division, Officer Tanya explained to Robertson that all probation directives were given by defendants Anglemeyer and Snyder. Id.
In his amended complaint, Robertson refers to this person as both Ms. Tanya and Officer Tanya. We use Officer Tanya throughout.
On March 3, 2020, Officer Tanya removed Robertson's ankle monitor and advised him that as per the directive of defendant Anglemeyer, he was to report to the probation office that same day because Anglemeyer felt that Robertson was still under supervision. Id. ¶ 3.2. Robertson and his attorney then met with defendants Anglemeyer and Snyder. Id. ¶¶ 3.2, 4. Robertson provided the defendants with a copy of the transcript of the October 1, 2019 hearing and a copy of the court's Memorandum Opinion on his PCRA petition as to the 2016 docket, which, according to Robertson, shows that the court intended for his sentence to expire on March 1, 2020. Id. ¶¶ 3.3, 4. Anglemeyer advised Robertson that Robertson had served only the restrictive portion of his sentence from the 2016 docket, and, thus, according to Anglemeyer, Robertson still had seven months of probation remaining on that sentence. Id. ¶ 3.2. Snyder agreed with Anglemeyer. Id. ¶ 4.2. Both defendants claimed that Judge Tully misinterpreted the nature of an IP sentence, and they stated that time-credit could not be applied toward the 12-month sentence unless a revocation hearing was held and Robertson was resentenced. Id. ¶¶ 3.4, 4.2.
Officer Tanya and defendant Snyder told Robertson and his attorney that defendant Snyder calculates the sentences imposed by the court for the Dauphin County Probation and Parole Department. Id. ¶ 4.1. And Snyder personally participated in the calculation of Robertson's sentence as to the 2016 docket. Id. ¶ 4.3. Ignoring the clear direction of the court, Anglemeyer advised Robertson that his sentence did not expire until October 1, 2020. Id. ¶ 3.5. Snyder directed Anglemeyer to continue to detain Robertson on the 2016 docket, and Robertson remained under supervision until the court's order on April 28, 2020. Id. ¶ 4.3.
Defendant Anglemeyer ignored the direction of the court, and he advised Robertson and his attorney that they would have to file a motion with the court to have the expired sentenced closed on the 2016 docket. Id. ¶ 3.5. Anglemeyer also advised Robertson and his attorney that Robertson was being supervised on the 2017 docket. Id. ¶ 3.6. He further advised Robertson that to be removed from supervision as to the 2017 docket, he would also have to file a motion with the court in that case as well. Id. ¶3.8.
Robertson petitioned the sentencing court. Id. ¶ 3.9. According to Robertson, he was not released from supervision on the 2016 docket until April 28, 2020, approximately 59 days beyond his maximum sentence. Id. ¶ 3.9.
As to the 2017 docket, according to Robertson, he expected to receive a 6-to-12 month sentence with time credit from January 5, 2017, to December 22, 2017, which would satisfy that sentence. Id. ¶ 3.7. Judge Tully, however, imposed a sentence of 6 to 23 months. Id. Robertson characterizes that sentence as an “unlawful sentence, ” and he alleges that he immediately instructed his counsel to withdraw his “unknowing guilty plea[.]” Id. Robertson continues to challenge that sentence in the appellate courts. Id.
As noted above, Judge Tully issued an Order on July 7, 2021, discharging Robertson “from any further supervision of the Dauphin County Adult Probation/Parole Office” and closing the 2017 docket. See doc. 39-1 at 2.
Defendants Anglemeyer and Snyder were both present in open court on October 1, 2019, when Judge Tully sentenced Robertson, and thus, they were both aware of the terms of his sentence. Id. ¶ 3.9. Contending that the defendants had no legal authority to extend his maximum sentence, Robertson claims that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by detaining him beyond the expiration of his sentence on the 2016 docket for nearly two months from March 1, 2020, to April 28, 2020. Id. ¶¶ 3.9, 4.5. Robertson contends that defendant Snyder is liable both because he was Anglemeyer's supervisor and because he personally participated in calculating his sentence as to the 2016 docket.
Robertson further alleges that the April 28, 2020 Order as to the 2016 docket was a favorable resolution of his claim. Id. ¶ 3.10. He also contends that he has a pending appeal as to the 2017 docket, and he request that if the court find that he is under supervision under the 2017 docket, the court stay his claim given that appeal. Id. ¶¶ 3.10, 4.4. Cryptically, he also alleges that he “never should have been released from prison under the plea agreement he struck with the Commonwealth in the brevity of all parties interest in the belief he were bringing finality to said matter with no further punishment and then illegally sentenced by the trial court in the unknowing guilty plea.” Id. ¶ 3.10.
As relief, Robertson requests that as to the claims against the defendants in their official capacities, the court order injunctive relief in the form of an order that prohibits Dauphin County Probation and Parole officers who are “not legally licensed by a state Bar association or state statute to calculate any Probationer/Parolee minimum and maximum” given that they are not legally trained to interpret court orders and compute sentences. Id. ¶¶ 5.1, 6. Robertson also requests damages-compensatory and punitive-against the defendants in their individual capacities. Id. ¶¶ 5.2, 6.1.
III. Pleading and Motion-to-Dismiss Standards.
In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “[w]e must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that determination, we “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff's] claims are based upon these documents.” Id. at 230.
“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).” I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F.Supp.2d 762, 769-70 (M.D. Pa. 2012). “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff's claim and of the grounds upon which the claim rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than “labels, ” “conclusions, ” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has to ‘show' such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court “‘must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'” Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and “‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
IV. Discussion.
Defendants Anglemeyer and Snyder argue that the court should dismiss Robertson's amended complaint for numerous reasons. They contend that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and absolute immunity. They also contend that the favorable-termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Robertson's claim. They further contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. We address each of their arguments.
A. Eleventh Amendment.
Defendants Anglemeyer and Snyder contend that the Eleventh Amendment bars Robertson's claim for damages against them. We conclude that the Eleventh Amendment bars the claim against the defendants in their official capacities, but it does not bar the claim against the defendants for damages in their individual or personal capacities.
The defendants' argument regarding the Eleventh Amendment is not clear. The defendants start by discussing official-capacity claims. See doc. 33 at 10. Then, amid their argument regarding the Eleventh Amendment, they address absolute immunity of probation and parole officers. Id. at 10-11. And they conclude by contending that the Eleventh Amendment bars Robertson's claims for damages against them. Id. at 11. Such unfocused and scattershot briefing is not helpful to the court.
“Our federalist system of government accords respect for the sovereignty of the States in a variety of ways, including the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which immunizes States from suits brought in federal court by both their own citizens and citizens of other States.” Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 2016). The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Although its text appears to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted ‘“to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.”' Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)). That presupposition is that each state is a sovereign entity in our federal system and it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty that a sovereign is not amenable to suit unless it consents. Id.
“Immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment is designed to preserve the delicate and ‘proper balance between the supremacy of federal law and the separate sovereignty of the States.'” Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999)). It “serves two fundamental imperatives: safeguarding the dignity of the states and ensuring their financial solvency.” Id. It serves those interests by barring suits against the nonconsenting states. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (stating that “the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States”); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
There are two circumstances when the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit against a state or state agency. First, a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). Second, Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity when it unequivocally intends to do so and when it acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Geness v. Admin. Off. of Pennsylvania Cts., 974 F.3d 263, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2020). Neither of those circumstances are present here. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b) (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”); Downey v. Pennsylvania Dep t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Pennsylvania has not waived its sovereign immunity defense in federal court.”). And 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which Robertson brings his claim, does not override a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
“The Eleventh Amendment's protection . . . is not limited to the States alone, but rather extends to entities that function as ‘arms of the State.'” Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 81. “The Pennsylvania constitution provides for the vesting of the Commonwealth's judicial power in a ‘unified judicial system' which includes all of the courts in Pennsylvania.” Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Pa. Const. art. V, § 1.). “Moreover, the constitution provides that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will exercise ‘general supervisory and administrative authority' over the unified judicial system.” Id. (quoting Pa. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 2, and 10.) “All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system . . . are part of ‘Commonwealth government' and thus are state rather than local agencies.” Id. (citing Pa. Const. art. V, § 6(c); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 102; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 301). Thus, the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County as well as its probation and parole department are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that “as an arm of the State, an individual judicial district and its probation and parole department are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, ” but holding that in that case, the Eleventh Amendment immunity was waived by acceptance of federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act).
Here, Robertson has not sued the Court of Common Pleas or its Probation and Parole Department. Rather, he sued defendants Anglemeyer and defendant Snyder. He sued Anglemeyer and Snyder in both their official capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual or personal capacities for damages. Claims against a state official in his individual or personal capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991). Thus, the claims against Anglemeyer and Snyder in their individual or personal capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
But claims for damages against a state official in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Official-capacity suits are “only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978). In an official-capacity suit, the entity of which the officer is an agent is the real party in interest. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As such, claims against state officials in their official capacities for damages are treated as suits against the state and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Secy U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013).
Although claims against state officials in their official capacities for damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, under Ex parte Young, claims against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Here, Robertson has sued defendants Anglemeyer and Snyder in their official capacities for injunctive relief. He seeks an order enjoining any Dauphin County Probation or Parole officer who is not “legally licensed by a state Bar association or state statute” from calculating probation or parole sentences. Doc. 30 ¶¶ 5.1, 6.
In determining if Ex parte Young applies, the court “must look to the substance rather than the form of the relief requested to determine whether [the] claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698 (3d Cir. 1996). And “[t]he type of prospective relief permitted under Young is relief intended to prevent a continuing violation of federal law.” Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148, 166 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1986) (observing that “Young has been focused on cases in which a violation of federal law by a state official is ongoing”). “In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (concurring opinion)).
Here, Robertson does not allege an ongoing violation of federal law. Rather, he alleges that the defendants in the past misconstrued or miscalculated his sentences. He does not allege facts that raise a reasonable inference that either defendant Anglemeyer or defendant Snyder will in the foreseeable future be in a position to misconstrue or miscalculate another sentence of his. Thus, Robertson is not truly seeking prospective injunctive relief, and Ex parte Young does not apply. Accordingly, Robertson's claims against the defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Moreover, given that Robertson does not allege an ongoing violation of federal law or that he is likely to suffer future injury from the defendants' conduct, he has not alleged that he has standing to seek injunctive relief. Previous exposure to allegedly illegal conduct is not sufficient to establish standing for injunctive relief. See O 'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974) (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”). Rather, “the plaintiff must show that he is ‘likely to suffer future injury' from the defendant's conduct.” McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 223 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)). And “[m]ere ‘allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.'” Schaller v. United States Soc. Sec. Admin., 844 Fed.Appx. 566, 571 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)). Rather, “the ‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.'” Thorne v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack Inc., 980 F.3d 879, 893 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409). “And there must be at least a ‘substantial risk' that the harm will occur.” Id. (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5). Here, because Robertson does not allege that the defendants are engaging in an ongoing violation of his federal rights or that there is a substantial risk that they will again subject him to excessive supervision by miscalculating a sentence of his, Robertson has not pleaded facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that he has standing to seek injunctive relief.
B. Absolute Immunity.
Defendants Anglemeyer and Snyder also contend that they are entitled to absolute immunity from Robertson's claim for damages. Because it is not clear from the face of the amended complaint that the defendants were engaged in adjudicatory functions, they are not entitled to dismissal of the amended complaint based on absolute immunity.
“The text of § 1983 does not provide any immunities from suit.” Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 2020). “Although § 1983 purports to subject ‘[e]very person' acting under color of state law to liability for depriving any other person in the United States of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,' the Supreme Court has recognized that §1983 was not meant to ‘abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.'” Yarris v. Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). There are two kinds of immunity under § 1983: qualified immunity and absolute immunity. Id. at 135. Although most public officials are entitled to only qualified immunity, public officials who perform ‘“special functions'” are entitled to absolute immunity. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978)). “[A]bsolute immunity attaches to those who perform functions integral to the judicial process.” Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006). “This immunity was and still is considered necessary ‘to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.'” McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1084 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
A functional approach is used to determine whether absolute or qualified immunity applies. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997). The inquiry focuses on the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2008). Probation and parole officers perform some functions as to which absolute immunity applies and other functions as to which only qualified immunity may apply.
“[P]robation and parole officers are entitled to absolute immunity when they are engaged in adjudicatory duties.” Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1989). Examples of adjudicatory duties by probation and parole officers include: “(1) hearing evidence; (2) making recommendations as to whether to parole a prisoner; or (3) making decisions whether to grant, revoke or deny parole.” Mills v. Martinez, 1:CV-04-0871, 2008 WL 763579, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2008) (citing Breslin v. Brainard, No. 01-CA-7269, 2002 WL 31513425, at *7 n. 10 (E.D.Pa.2002)). Conversely, only qualified immunity applies to actions taken by probation and parole officers in their executive or administrative capacities and then only if their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known. Id.; Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 1986). “[T]he general responsibilities of a parole or probation officer” are among the many functions of probation and parole officers that are considered executive or administrative functions. Breslin, 2002 WL 31513425, at *7 n.10; see also Heilman v. T.W. Ponessa & Assocs., No. 4:07-CV-1308, 2008 WL 275731, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008) (“The allegations against the probation officers in this case-that they supervised Heilman's probation, investigated his compliance with probation conditions, and issued the probation violation that led to his arrest-are executive or administrative acts.”), aff'd on other grounds, 2009 WL 82707, at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2009); Shaw v. Thomas, No. CIV. 4:CV-04-1217, 2005 WL 2035364, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2005) (concluding that the computation of the amount of prior sentence credit due to the plaintiff was not a function protected by absolute immunity).
“In order for the defendants to succeed on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on absolute immunity, the allegations of [the] complaint must indicate the existence of absolute immunity as an affirmative defense; the defense must clearly appear on the face of the complaint.” Wilson, 878 F.2d at 776. Here, Robertson alleges that the defendants failed to comply with the court's sentencing order as to the 2016 docket and continued his probation supervision even after his maximum sentence expired. Taking the allegations of the amended complaint as true and construing those allegations in the light most favorable to Robertson, we cannot say that the defendants were engaged in adjudicatory duties. Accordingly, the defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity.
C. The Favorable-Termination Rule.
The defendants also contend that Robertson's claim is barred by the favorable-termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Because Robertson has alleged that he received a favorable termination, we conclude that his claim is not barred by the favorable-termination rule of Heck.
In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a Section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such [a] determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87, 490 (footnote omitted). “Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. The “favorable-termination requirement is rooted in pragmatic concerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter and the related possibility of conflicting civil and criminal judgments.” McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149, 2157 (2019). “The requirement likewise avoids allowing collateral attacks on criminal judgments through civil litigation.” Id.
Even if the plaintiff has exhausted available state remedies, he has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. “[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
The favorable-termination rule of Heck applies in the probation and parolerevocation context. See e.g. Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cty., 804 F.3d 338, 345, 347 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding, in connection with claims for damages for wrongful incarceration relating to probation violations, that “[b]ecause [the plaintiff] seeks damages for this ‘illegal' imprisonment, he must satisfy the favorable termination rule if his claims are to proceed” and finding that the plaintiff satisfied the favorable-termination rule as to one such probation revocation but not as to two other such revocations); Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that Williams's claims that he was falsely incarcerated for parole violations were barred by Heck because success on Williams's claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the Parole Board's decision revoking his parole, which decision had not been declared invalid). Here, Robertson is not challenging the revocation of his probation as to the 2016 docket or the sentence he received after that revocation. Rather, he claims that the defendants kept him on supervision even after the maximum term of his sentence expired. Thus, success in this action would not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his probation revocation or the duration of his sentence as imposed by the court.
Nevertheless, “[t]he ‘favorable termination rule' of Heck applies in the context of Eighth Amendment claims involving allegations that the plaintiff was confined unlawfully beyond his statutory maximum sentence.” King v. Bennage-Gregory, No. 1:19-CV-318-SPB, 2020 WL 5701937, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2020); see also e.g. Gause v. Haile, 559 Fed.Appx. 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding that “a ruling that Gause was held in excess of the maximum sentence would necessarily imply the invalidity of his ‘confinement or its duration,' and would therefore violate Heck. ”); Abbott v. Pennsylvania Dep t of Corr., 426 Fed.Appx. 42, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Under Heck, as relevant here, a civil-rights plaintiff cannot recover damages for harm caused by actions that implicate the length of his confinement unless he can prove that the erroneous calculation has been reversed, invalidated, or called into question by a grant of federal habeas corpus relief.”); Royal v. Durison, 254 Fed.Appx. 163, 165 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Were we to hold that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did, in fact, incarcerate Royal beyond the statutory maximum, we would necessarily be holding that the ‘confinement or its duration' was invalid in violation of the favorable termination requirement announced in Heck.”); but see Chappelle v. Varano, No. 4:11-CV-00304, 2013 WL 5876173, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2013) (concluding that because the plaintiff “does not dispute the validity of his conviction or his corresponding sentence” and “[t]he conflict centers on the amount of time he was held in excess of his valid conviction and sentence[, ]” “[a] finding for Plaintiff under § 1983 based on the period he was held beyond his original sentence would not imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence, and therefore does not trigger the application of the favorable termination rule” of Heck).
Further, Heck is implicated by wrongful supervision on parole or probation past a maximum sentence. See Powell v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338, 346 (3d Cir. 2014) (addressing the favorable-termination rule and concluding that plaintiff's claim that “he was deprived of a protected liberty interest when he was supervised on parole seven months past his maximum sentence date” was not a collateral attack on his sentence and not barred by Heck's favorable-termination rule where the plaintiff had “successfully challenged the duration of his sentence in the Commonwealth Court, which . . . held that the DOC had miscalculated his term”); Martin v. SCI-Huntingdon, No. 3:CV-18-805, 2018 WL 4832358, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2018) (concluding that claim that defendant miscalculated plaintiff's sentence resulting in the plaintiff being improperly required to serve a period of parole supervision following his release from prison was barred by Heck given that “a finding in [the plaintiff's] favor would imply the invalidity of the period of parole supervision imposed in [his] case” and the plaintiff had not successfully challenged the computation of his sentence).
Here, we conclude that Robertson has sufficiently alleged that he received a favorable termination. He alleges in his amended complaint that Judge Tully's April 28, 2020 Order is a favorable termination. As discussed above, on April 28, 2020, Judge Tully issued an order closing the 2016 docket, releasing Robertson from supervision, and stating that his sentence expired on April 1, 2020. See doc. 30-2 at 81. Although the defendants contend that Robertson did not receive a favorable termination of the 2016 charges (or the 2017 charges), they do not address Judge Tully's April 28, 2020 Order. See doc. 44 at 4. Construing Robertson's allegations in the light most favorable to him, as we must at this early stage of the proceedings, and given Judge Tully's April 28, 2020 Order, we conclude that Robertson has sufficiently alleged that he received a favorable termination as to the calculation of this sentence as to the 2016 docket. Thus, the defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the amended complaint based on the favorable-termination rule of Heck.
D. Qualified Immunity.
The defendants contend that Robertson has not pleaded a constitutional claim and, in any event, they are entitled to qualified immunity. We conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Robertson's claim for damages.
Despite their participation in constitutionally impermissible conduct, government officials “may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity ensures that before officers are subjected to suit, they have notice that their conduct is unlawful. Id. “Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
The qualified immunity analysis has two prongs. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. One prong of the analysis is whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right. Id. The other prong of the analysis is whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The court is permitted to exercise its discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis should be addressed first considering the circumstances of the particular case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Thus, the court may forego difficult constitutional issues and award qualified immunity to a defendant if it is apparent that the defendant did not violate rights that were clearly established at the time the defendant acted. Id. In fact, the Supreme Court has stressed “that lower courts ‘should think hard, and then think hard again,' before addressing both qualified immunity and the merits of an underlying constitutional claim.” D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589 n.7 (2018) (quoting Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 707 (2011)).
Here, although the defendants contend that Robertson fails to state any cognizable constitutional claim, they do not address that he purports to assert an Eighth Amendment over-detention claim. Detaining a prisoner beyond his maximum sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1110 (3d Cir. 1989). The Third Circuit's “standard for analyzing overdetention claims is well-established.” Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2017). “In the context of an Eighth Amendment claim for incarceration without penological justification, . . . a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements to establish § 1983 liability against a prison official: (1) a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the official either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating that his response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's plight; and (3) a causal connection between the official's response to the problem and the unjustified detention.” Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 252 (3d Cir. 2010).
The above cases concerned keeping a prisoner in prison after his sentence expired. The parties do not address whether, and if so how, an over-detention claim based on keeping an individual on probation supervision after the expiration of his maximum term would differ. Given this and given the defendants' complete failure to address the elements of Robertson's claim, we will not decide whether the amended complaint states an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted. Rather, we turn to the other prong of the qualified-immunity analysis-i.e., whether the right was clearly established.
“To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent.” Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 589. In other words, “[t]he rule must be ‘settled law,' which means it is dictated by ‘controlling authority' or ‘a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority.'” Id. at 589-90 (internal citations omitted). “It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent.” Id. at 590. Rather, “[t]he precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id. Still, “the facts of the existing precedent need not perfectly match the circumstances of the dispute in which the question arises.” Williams v. Sec y Pennsylvania Dep 't of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 570 (3d Cir. 2017). “A public official does not get the benefit of ‘one liability-free violation' simply because the circumstance of his case is not identical to that of a prior case.” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 2004)). But if the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, qualified immunity is appropriate. Bayer v. Monroe County Children & Youth Services, 577 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2009). “In other words, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.'” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). “This exacting standard ‘gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments' by ‘protecting] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'” City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743).
Rather than address Robertson's claim as pleaded, the defendants contend that Robertson misunderstands his sentences. And they include only a cursory discussion regarding qualified immunity in their briefs. Were only the 2016 docket mentioned in the amended complaint, we would conclude that it was premature to address whether the right at issue was clearly established at the pleading stage. See Williams v. Papi, 30 F.Supp.3d 306, 314 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (concluding that that case “is one of the ‘vast majority of cases' in which a determination of qualified immunity is inappropriate at the pleading stage” (quoting Newland v. Reehorst, 328 Fed.Appx. 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009)); Martucci v. Borough, No. CV 3:171671, 2018 WL 1755728, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2018) (concluding that determining whether qualified immunity was appropriate as to a certain defendant was inappropriate at the pleading stage in that case).
But the wrinkle here is that Robertson also alleges in his amended complaint that the defendants told him he was being supervised under the 2017 docket as well as the 2016 docket. And Robertson submitted a copy of the sentencing transcript as to the 2017 docket, which shows that on August 8, 2019, Judge Tully sentenced Robertson to 6 to 23 months in the Dauphin County Prison, gave him six-months jail-time credit toward that sentence, and then immediately paroled him to his probation detainer. See doc. 30-1 at 50, 53. Based on this sentencing order, Robertson was still on parole as to the 2017 docket during the relevant time.Because Robertson's claim is that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by supervising him on the 2016 docket after his maximum sentence as to that docket expired, the relevant time frame is from April 1, 2020 (the date that Judge Tully says in his April 28, 2020 Order is the date Robertson's sentence as to the 2016 docket was complete) to April 28, 2020 (the date Judge Tully closed the 2016 docket and the date Robertson alleges in his amended complaint that the defendants stopped supervising him as to the 2016 docket, see doc. 30 ¶¶ 4.3, 4.5). And given that Robertson was on parole as to the 2017 docket during the relevant time frame, we cannot say that the defendants violated clearly established federal law in keeping him under supervision even if they erroneously told him that he was being supervised during the relevant time frame under the 2016 docket as well as the 2017 docket. In this regard, the parties have not pointed to any cases, nor are we aware of any cases, that hold that a probation or parole officer violates an individual's Eighth Amendment rights by continuing supervision under similar circumstances. Thus, we conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Robertson's claim for damages.
Robertson requests that if the court concludes that he was under supervision under the 2017 docket, the court stay this case while he proceeds with his challenge to his sentence as to the 2017 docket. But this case does not concern a claim based on the sentence in the 2017 docket. Rather, the 2017 docket is relevant here only to the extent it sheds light on whether Robertson was under supervision under the 2017 docket for the relevant period that the defendants contend he was also under supervision under the 2016 docket. Moreover, as set forth above, Judge Tully closed the 2017 docket on July 7, 2021. Robertson has not provided a basis for the court to stay this case pending any further appeals- whatever they may be-as to the 2017 docket.
As noted above, the original commitment form stated that Robertson was entitled to 352 days of jail-time credit. See supra note 7. As both Judge Tully's oral sentence and the amended commitment order do not give Robertson 352 days credit, there is no reasonable basis to think that Robertson was entitled to that amount of credit. Nevertheless, using that number for the sake of argument as that is the number most favorable to Robertson, Robertson was still on parole as to the 2017 docket during the relevant period. Assuming that Robertson was entitled to 352 days credit toward his sentence (and rounding 352 days up to 12 months), as of August 8, 2019, Robertson would have had 11 months to serve on parole. And because the relevant time frame of April 1, 2020, to April 28, 2020, is less than 11 months from August 8, 2019, Robertson was still on parole as to the 2017 docket during the relevant time frame. The calculation in this regard is as follows. As to the 2017 docket, Robertson was sentenced on August 8, 2019, to 6 to 23 months and then immediately paroled. See doc. 30-1 at 53. Because Judge Tully gave Robertson six-months jail-time credit, as of August 8, 2019, Robertson had 17 months to serve on parole. And because the relevant time frame of April 1, 2020, to April 28, 2020, is less than 17 months from August 8, 2019, Robertson was still on parole as to the 2017 docket during the relevant time frame.
Robertson argues that the defendants were not supervising him under the 2017 docket because Judge Tully's sentencing order did not say that he was to be supervised by the defendants. But given that the sentence as to the 2017 docket was for less than two years, the court, rather than the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, was responsible for granting parole. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9775 (“A sentencing court shall grant parole from a term of imprisonment for less than a maximum period of two years, and . . . parole shall be without supervision by the board.”); 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9776(a) (“Except as otherwise provided under this chapter or if the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole has exclusive jurisdiction, a court of this Commonwealth or other court of record having jurisdiction may, after due hearing, release on parole an inmate in the county correctional institution or that judicial district.”). And the Court of Common Pleas supervises defendants through its Probation Department, which is a part of the Court of Common Pleas. Robertson points to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9776(d) in support of his argument that the defendants were not supervising him under the 2017 docket. See doc.39 at 13, 15, 24, 31. That Section provides: “After the hearing [regarding parole], the court shall make such order as it may deem just and proper. In case the court paroles the inmate, it shall place the inmate in the charge of and under the supervision of a designated probation officer.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9776(d). Robertson highlights that Judge Tully did not explicitly place him under the supervision of the defendants. See doc. 39 at 31-32. While that may be true, the issue is whether the defendants violated clearly established law in supervising him, not whether the trial court complied with every detail of state law when paroling him.
V. Recommendation.
For the foregoing reasons, we recommend that the court grant the defendants' motion (doc. 32) to dismiss to the extent that that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Robertson's damages claim and to the extent that the Eleventh Amendment bars Robertson's claim against the defendants in their official capacities.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.