Opinion
20-CV-8409 (LTS)
06-29-2021
JAZMINE ROBERTS; MINOR CHILD, Plaintiffs, v. WESTCHESTER COUNTY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES; WESTCHESTER COUNTY POLICE; WESTCHESTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; WESTCHESTER COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH; SECTION 8 HOUSING CVR; THE GUIDANCE CENTER OF WESTCHESTER; WESTCHESTER MANAGEMENT/HUGUENOT COURT LLC; MT. VERNON POLICE DEPARTMENT; YONKERS POLICE DEPARTMENT; NEW ROCHELLE POLICE DEPARTMENT; WHITE PLAINS POLICE DEPARTMENT; WHITE PLAINS HOSPITAL; WESTCHESTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE; LEGAL SERVICES OF THE HUDSON VALLEY; U.S. POST OFFICE, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD VALID CLAIMS AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, alleging that Defendants violated her rights. By order dated February 4, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants, but grants Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint, to replead valid claims against the municipalities Plaintiff intends to sue, within sixty days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, ” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Using the Court's general complaint form, Plaintiff Jazmine Roberts brings this amended complaint on behalf of herself and her minor child. Plaintiff checks the box indicating that she seeks to invoke the Court's federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff names as Defendants various departments and agencies located in Westchester County, New Rochelle, Mt. Vernon, Yonkers, and White Plains.
Plaintiff identifies herself as a person with disabilities, and she asserts that her “rights have been tremendously obliterated, ” and “her voice almost was taken away.” (ECF No. 4 at 7.) Plaintiff attaches to her complaint a document that appears to list 16 defendants. It is followed by brief summaries of 17 sets of mostly unrelated events; each set of events includes a heading that appears to correspond with the relevant defendant. Among the events she describes are Family Court proceedings, supportive housing assignments, landlord-tenant disputes, and criminal proceedings. Because Plaintiff provides little detail as to each set of events, it is unclear when and where the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred. Plaintiff also fails to describe any injuries or the relief she seeks.
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim
Because Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her constitutional rights, the Court construes Plaintiff's claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
Although Plaintiff asserts that her rights were violated, it is not clear from her complaint what she believes any defendant did or failed to do that violated her rights under the United States Constitution or any federal law. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under section 1983. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her complaint to assert enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Plaintiff's complaint is deficient in other respects, which are discussed below.
B. Nonattorney Parent Cannot Represent Child
The claims that Plaintiff seeks to assert on behalf of her minor child must be dismissed. It is well established that a nonattorney parent cannot represent a minor child pro se. See Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Because pro se means to appear for one's self, a person may not appear on another person's behalf in the other's cause.”); Wenger v. Canastota Central Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (minor children, “are entitled to trained legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected”); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found., 906 F.2d 59, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1990) (“A non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel bringing an action on behalf of his or her child.”); Fauconier v. Committee on Special Education, No. 02-CV-1050, 2003 WL 21345549, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2003) (a “court has an affirmative duty to enforce the rule that a non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel when bringing an action on behalf of his or her child”) (citing Cheung, 906 F.2d at 61). But see Maldonado v. Apfel, 55 F.Supp.2d 296, 302-308 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (nonattorney parents may represent their minor children without assistance of counsel in appeals to district court from administrative denial of supplemental security income (SSI) benefits).
Plaintiff's claims on behalf of her minor child are therefore dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. Persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 provides that an action may be maintained against a “person” who has deprived another of rights under the “Constitution and Laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. None of the Defendants are “persons” within the meaning of section 1983. See generally Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state is not a “person” for the purpose of § 1983 claims); Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., Second Dep't Supreme Court, 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (court not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Whitley v. Westchester Cnty. Corr. Fac. Admin., ECF 1:97-CV-420, 1997 WL 659100, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) (correctional facility or jail not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against all named Defendants must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
D. Municipal Liability
In addition to Defendants not being persons within the meaning of section 1983, the various agencies and departments of Westchester County, New Rochelle, Mt. Vernon, Yonkers, and White Plains that Plaintiff names as Defendants do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law. See Omnipoint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F.Supp.2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In New York, agencies of a municipality are not suable entities.”); Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F.Supp.2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue or be sued.”); see also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2 (“The term ‘municipal corporation,' as used in this chapter, includes only a county, town, city and village.”).
Plaintiff may have intended to sue the municipalities themselves rather than their agencies and departments. To state a claim against a municipality based on the actions of its employees, a plaintiff must plead facts explaining how a policy, custom, or practice of these municipalities was a “moving force” in her injuries. See Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff “must demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the alleged injury.”). To the extent that Plaintiff may be seeking to assert claims against the municipalities, she does not include any facts about what the County of Westchester, the City of Mt. Vernon, the County of Yonkers, the City of New Rochelle, or the City of White Plains did or failed to do that caused a violation of her rights. Plaintiff's allegations thus fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted against these municipalities under § 1983.
Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that a policy, custom, or practice of Westchester County, the City of Mt. Vernon, the County of Yonkers, the City of New Rochelle or the City of White Plains caused her any injury. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to name one or more of these municipalities, and to allege facts about what these municipalities did or failed to do that violated her rights and how any such alleged violation was caused by a municipal policy, custom or practice.
E. Claims against the United States Postal Service
Plaintiff names the United States Postal Service as a defendant. She accuses the Postal Service of “taking my mail, not returning my mail to me and violating the rules protocols and procedures concerning passports for COVID-19.” (ECF No. 4 at 11.) The Court construes Plaintiff's claim against the United States Postal Service as arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (“FTCA”). This claim must be dismissed, however, because the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts from hearing all suits for monetary damages against the federal government, including its agencies and employees acting in their official capacities, except where sovereign immunity has been waived. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)); Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 177 (2d Cir. 2005); Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because an action against a federal agency or federal officers in their official capacities is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are also barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived.”). As “an independent establishment of the executive branch of the Government of the United States, ” 39 U.S.C. § 201, the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) and its employees acting in their official capacities are entitled to sovereign immunity. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 484 (2006).
Under the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., the USPS is “an independent establishment of the executive branch of the Government of the United States.” 39 U.S.C. § 201; Kuhner v. Montauk Post Office, 12-CV-2318, 2013 WL 1343653, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013).
While the FTCA, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80, abrogated that immunity for certain claims for monetary damages arising from the tortious conduct of federal government officers or employees acting within the scope of their office or employment, see § 1346(b)(1), Congress has carved out certain exceptions to this broad waiver of sovereign immunity. One such exception, commonly referred to as the “postal matter exception, ” preserves sovereign immunity for “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b); Raila v. United States, 355 F.3d 118, 119 (2d Cir. 2004). Because Plaintiff's claim arises out of the miscarriage or negligent transmission of her mail, it is precluded by the postal matter exception and must be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity.
The Postal Rate Commission (“PRC”) has exclusive jurisdiction over service complaints involving the USPS. See 39 U.S.C. § 3662 (2006); Nolen v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 11-CV-114, 2013 WL 660153, at *8 (D. Vt. Feb. 22, 2013); Shelby Res., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 619 F.Supp. 1546, 1548-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that a hearing by the PRC is the “sole remedy for a user of postal services who is not receiving adequate service”). An adverse ruling from the PRC may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See 39 U.S.C. § 3663; Foster v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., No. 11-CV-303, 2012 WL 2997810, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2012).
F. Claims against Family Court
In Plaintiff's numbered list of claims, she includes “Family Court” as the first claim. (ECF No. 4 at 9.) Because each other item on Plaintiff's list of claims corresponds with a defendant, it appears Plaintiff may have intended to name Family Court as a defendant. Any claims against Family Court, however, must be dismissed. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity ....” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states' immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977).
Because Family Court and other state courts are part of the New York State Unified Court System, see N.Y. Const., Art. 6, § 1(a), the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's claims against the state court from proceeding in federal court. See Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 368 (holding that the New York State Unified Court System “is unquestionably an ‘arm of the State,' and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Family Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
G. Motion for Permission for Electronic Case Filing
Plaintiff submitted a motion for permission for electronic case filing. Plaintiff's motion (ECF No. 3) indicates that she has not completed the Court's required CM/ECF introduction course. Her request for permission for electronic case filing is therefore denied without prejudice to renewal at a later date.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state valid claims against municipalities, the Court grants Plaintiff sixty days' leave to file a second amended complaint to detail her claims against one or more of the abovereferenced municipalities.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her complaint to provide more facts about her claims against the municipalities she intends to sue. First, Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of her federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, she may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the second amended complaint. The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending her complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, she must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, she should write “see attached list” on the first page of the Amended Complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2010, at Sullivan Correctional Facility, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.”
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the second amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the second amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the second amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's second amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's second amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original and amended complaints, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original and amended complaints must be repeated in the second amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants, but grants Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint to replead valid claims against the municipalities she intends to sue that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the second amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as a “Second Amended Complaint, ” and label the document with docket number 20-CV-8409 (LTS). A Second Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff's motion for permission for electronic case filing (ECF No. 3) is denied without prejudice to renewal at a later date.
The Clerk of Court is directed to transmit a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.