"A claim for negligent entrustment may be based on the use of a motor vehicle." Roberts v. Vaughn, 214 Mich. App. 625, 631; 543 N.W.2d 79 (1996), rev'd on other grounds 459 Mich. 282; 587 N.W.2d 249 (1998). Clearly, an action based on allegations that the defendant negligently entrusted an automobile to an unfit operator is an action arising from the use of a motor vehicle.

The common-law fireman's rule generally waived the duty of care that third parties owe safety officers. Roberts v. Vaughn, 459 Mich 282, 285; 587 NW2d 249 (1998). Michigan courts recognized the existence of several exceptions to the common-law fireman's rule, for example, when a safety officer alleged wrongdoing that rose to the level of wilful, wanton, or intentional misconduct, or when the alleged wrongdoing occurred after the safety officer had been called to the scene and was independent of the reason that the safety officer was called to the scene.

We have not excluded them from the Fordham exception, but other jurisdictions have diverging decisions about the matter. CompareRoberts v. Vaughn , 459 Mich. 282, 587 N.W.2d 249, 252 (1998) (holding that the professional rescuer's rule does not apply to volunteers on public policy grounds), withWaggoner v. Troutman Oil Co., Inc. , 320 Ark. 56, 894 S.W.2d 913, 916 (1995) (holding that the rule does apply to volunteers on public policy grounds), andBuchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc. , 203 Neb. 684, 279 N.W.2d 855, 860 (1979) (holding that the rule does apply to volunteers under assumption-of-the-risk principles). The dissent's compensation argument does not apply to volunteer professional rescuers, but the harsh consequence of the dissent's suggested expansion of the Fordham professional rescuer's rule most certainly would.

When confronted with this issue, courts in other jurisdictions have come to opposite conclusions. Compare Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc., 203 Neb. 684, 279 N.W.2d 855, 858–60 (1979) (applying the Fireman's Rule to a volunteer firefighter and noting that volunteer firefighters "although uncompensated, undertake the same duties as paid [firefighters]"), with Roberts v. Vaughn, 459 Mich. 282, 587 N.W.2d 249, 251–53 (1998) (declining to apply the Fireman's Rule to a volunteer firefighter and permitting the volunteer firefighter to pursue the cause of action). Because we conclude that the plain language of RSA 507:8–h does not bar Mr. Antosz's negligence claim, we need not decide whether the statute applies only to claims by paid firefighters.

When such arise, it is often appropriate for the judiciary to interpret public policy. In fact, this Court interpreted public policy last year when it dealt with the fireman's rule in Roberts v Vaughn, 459 Mich. 282 (1998). See also Michigan Educational Employees Mut Ins Co v Morris, 460 Mich. 180, 190 (1999), where, this year, we stated that "`Courts have acknowledged that resolution of the . . . issue ultimately turns on considerations of fairness and public policy.'"

See also Roberts v Vaughn, 214 Mich App 625, 631; 543 NW2d 79 (1996) ("A claim for negligent entrustment may be based on the use of a motor vehicle."), rev'd on other grounds 459 Mich 282 (1998). that the motor vehicle was driven with the permission and authority of the owner; that the entrustee was in fact an incompetent driver; and that the owner knew at the time of the entrustment that the entrustee was incompetent or unqualified to

See also Roberts v Vaughn, 214 Mich App 625, 631; 543 NW2d 79 (1996) ("A claim for negligent entrustment may be based on the use of a motor vehicle."), rev'd on other grounds 459 Mich 282 (1998). that the motor vehicle was driven with the permission and authority of the owner; that the entrustee was in fact an incompetent driver; and that the owner knew at the time of the entrustment that the entrustee was incompetent or unqualified to

See also Roberts v. Vaughn , 214 Mich.App. 625, 631, 543 N.W.2d 79 (1996) ("A claim for negligent entrustment may be based on the use of a motor vehicle."), rev’d on other grounds 459 Mich. 282, 587 N.W.2d 249 (1998). that the motor vehicle was driven with the permission and authority of the owner ; that the entrustee was in fact an incompetent driver; and that the owner knew at the time of the entrustment that the entrustee was incompetent or

Several courts applying the firefighter's rule have held that other types of professional rescuers are not barred by the rule. See Krause v. United States Truck Co., 787 S.W.2d 708, 713 (Mo. 1990) (firefighter's rule does not apply to ambulance attendant who responded to emergency scene due to negligence of others); Roberts v. Vaughn, 459 Mich. 282, 289-290 (1998) (court declined to extend rule to volunteer firefighters). Primary assumption of risk "involves a circumstance where the plaintiff agrees in advance to relieve the defendant of a duty of care owed the plaintiff."