Roberts v. State

9 Citing cases

  1. Barstad v. State

    329 Ga. App. 214 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 7 times

    (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Roberts v. State, 309 Ga.App. 681, 683(1), 710 S.E.2d 878 (2011). Evidence of recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods may be sufficient to give rise to an inference that the defendant committed the offenses of burglary and theft by taking.

  2. Johnson v. State

    350 Ga. App. 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 3 times

    utually engage in fight after defendant had called victim out supported mutual-combat charge, and thus, counsel did not perform deficiently in not objecting to charge); Millen , 267 Ga. App. at 881-82 (2) (a) (i), 600 S.E.2d 604 (finding that mutual-combat instruction was warranted given that there was evidence that defendant and victim had been fighting throughout evening; that defendant was armed; and that victim's son brought a rifle to the house before victim and son went upstairs to confront defendant).See Sanders , 283 Ga. at 375 (2) (c), 659 S.E.2d 376 (holding that because evidence supported mutual-combat charge, trial counsel was not deficient in failing to object to charge); Hutto , 320 Ga. App. at 238-39 (2) (b), 739 S.E.2d 722 (same); Millen , 267 Ga. App. at 881-82 (2) (a) (i), 600 S.E.2d 604 (same); see also Ventura v. State , 284 Ga. 215, 218 (4), 663 S.E.2d 149 (2008) (holding that "[t]he failure to pursue a futile objection does not amount to ineffective assistance"); Roberts v. State , 309 Ga. App. 681, 685 (3), 710 S.E.2d 878 (2011) (holding that trial court's jury charge was not error, and thus, any objection by defendant's trial counsel would have been futile). Moreover, although the charge on mutual combat may have carried a cost to the justification defense, "it presented the benefit of improving the chances that the jury might find [Johnson] guilty of only voluntary manslaughter, not murder."

  3. Watson v. State

    337 Ga. App. 16 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 4 times

    Thus, the jury would have been authorized to convict Watson of robbery based on his DNA evidence at the crime scene. See Barstad v. State, 329 Ga.App. 214, 216–17(1), 764 S.E.2d 453 (2014) (the jury was authorized to infer defendant's guilt based on, among other things, the lack of evidence showing how his DNA was left at the crime scene other than the commission of the offenses); Roberts v. State, 309 Ga.App. 681, 683(1), 710 S.E.2d 878 (2011) (concluding that the unexplained presence of defendant's blood at crime scene authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of crime). Because there was evidence showing that Watson was connected to the crimes of robbery and theft by receiving, the trial court did not err in denying Watson's motion for directed verdict.

  4. Tabb v. State

    313 Ga. App. 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 5 times

    A trial court's legal conclusions in this regard, however, are reviewed de novo. (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Roberts v. State, 309 Ga.App. 681, 684–685(3), 710 S.E.2d 878 (2011). Melvin was charged with cruelty to children in the first degree by maliciously causing D.W. cruel and excessive physical pain by repeatedly striking D.W. with an electric extension cord between the dates of November 1, 2008, and November 11, 2008. Melvin was also charged jointly with Leilani on a second count of cruelty to children in the first degree by maliciously causing D.W. cruel and excessive physical pain by repeatedly striking D.W. with a belt on November 13, 2008. At trial, Melvin admitted to the conduct charged in both counts of the indictment, but testified that he intended only to impose disciplinary punishment upon D.W.

  5. Sevostiyanova v. State

    313 Ga. App. 729 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that appellant waived challenge to indictment but, even if it had not been waived, the challenge would fail because indictment charged that defendant committed act "unlawfully," and relying upon Tidwell

    (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Roberts v. State, 309 Ga.App. 681, 684(2), 710 S.E.2d 878 (2011). 20. Sevostiyanova claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel Aronow.

  6. Sevostiyanova v. State

    A11A1864 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2012)

    (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Roberts v. State, 309 Ga. App. 681, 684 (2) (710 SE2d 878) (2011). --------

  7. Anderson v. State

    716 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 3 times

    Id. at 417(3)(a), 710 S.E.2d 616 (citation omitted). FN21. Ventura v. State, 284 Ga. 215, 218(4), 663 S.E.2d 149 (2008) (citation omitted); see alsoRoberts v. State, 309 Ga.App. 681, 685(3), 710 S.E.2d 878 (2011). FN22. Goldey v. State, 289 Ga.App. 198, 199(2)(a), 656 S.E.2d 549 (2008) (footnote and punctuation omitted).

  8. United States v. Gundy

    842 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016)   Cited 111 times
    Holding that Georgia's burglary statute qualifies as a violent felony under the enumerated crimes clause

    Other Georgia decisions have framed the location element in slightly different terms, substituting "dwelling place " or "dwelling house " for "dwelling." See, e.g. , Roberts v. State , 309 Ga.App. 681, 710 S.E.2d 878, 881 (2011) (upholding validity of jury instructions where court charged jury on the burglary statute's "requirement of proof that a defendant entered ‘the building or dwelling place of another’ "); Hart v. State , 238 Ga.App. 325, 517 S.E.2d 790, 792 (1999) (upholding, as "sufficient to inform the jury of the essential elements of the offense" of burglary, jury instruction that stated, in part, a defendant "enters in a building or dwelling house of another"). But these slight variations make no difference to the elements-versus-means analysis.

  9. Thornton v. United States

    CRIMINAL INDICTMENT NO. 1:13-CR-0466-AT-JFK-1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 28, 2018)

    Movant appears to argue that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Gundy got it wrong based on Georgia cases Roberts v. State, 309 Ga. App. 681, 710 S.E.2d 878, 881 (2011), and Hart v. State, 238 Ga. App. 325, 517 S.E.2d 790, 792 (1999). (Mov't Reply to Resp't Second Resp. at 5-6).