Roberts v. State

5 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Delpriore

    3:18-cr-00136-SLG (D. Alaska Jan. 4, 2023)

    Docket 197 at 11. But see Roberts v. State, 700 P.2d 815, 817 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (holding that former AS 28.35.230(b) (renumbered AS 28.90.010(a)) “is a generic penalty provision, broadly applicable to violations of all Title 28 provisions” for which another penalty is not specifically provided). Exhibit G, Docket 331-7.

  2. State v. Bowie

    999 P.2d 947 (Kan. 2000)   Cited 9 times
    In Kansas v. Borne, 268 Kan. 794, 999 P.2d 947 (2000), for example, the Supreme Court of Kansas interpreted a statutory scheme in which separate code provisions also required all drivers to have a license and prohibited driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license.

    In Fielding v. State, 733 P.2d 271 (Alaska App. 1987), Fielding had a valid driver's license when his string of driving convictions began; therefore, his issue differed significantly from the issue in the present case. In Roberts v. State, 700 P.2d 815 (Alaska App. 1985), Roberts did not have a valid driver's license, and the question he raised was substantially similar to the issue in the present case. The governing statute, however, invested "privilege" with a peculiar meaning.

  3. Kennedy v. State

    786 P.2d 928 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 2 times

    It is clear that Kennedy was entitled to post-conviction relief since one who has no driver's license cannot be convicted of driving with license suspended or driving while license revoked. Roberts v. State, 700 P.2d 815, 818 (Alaska App. 1985); Francis v. Anchorage 641 P.2d 226, 228 (Alaska App. 1982). Alaska Statute 28.15.291 provides in relevant part:

  4. Schowengerdt v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue

    14 Kan. App. 2 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 5 times
    In Schowengerdt v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 14 Kan. App.2d 147, 784 P.2d 387 (1989), the driver argued that his expired license could not be suspended.

           Schowengerdt cites two Alaska cases, both criminal in nature, which hold that, because there is no "innate privilege to drive" and the defendant had no license, it was impossible for the State to have suspended his driving privileges. Roberts v. State, 700 P.2d 815 (Alaska App.1985).        The Department, however, asserts that the Kansas implied consent law is to be liberally construed to effectuate its obvious purpose of protecting the safety and welfare of the motoring public.

  5. Fielding v. State

    733 P.2d 271 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 4 times
    In Fielding v. State, 733 P.2d 271 (Alaska App. 1987), Fielding had a valid driver's license when his string of driving convictions began; therefore, his issue differed significantly from the issue in the present case.

    See Francis v. Anchorage, 641 P.2d 226, 228 n. 5 (Alaska App. 1982). Fielding relies chiefly on this court's rulings in Roberts v. State, 700 P.2d 815 (Alaska App. 1985), and Francis v. Anchorage, 641 P.2d 226 (Alaska App. 1982). There, we construed applicable state statutes and municipal ordinances to require that a person be licensed or in some other manner privileged to drive before that person's license could properly be suspended or revoked.