Opinion
Record No. 2501-93-3
Decided: June 21, 1994
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, Charles H. Smith, Jr., Judge
Affirmed.
(Robert Austin Vinyard; Vinyard and Moise, on brief), for appellant.
(Daniel R. Bieger; Copeland, Molinary Bieger, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Wilbert Wayne Roberts (husband) appeals the decision of the circuit court awarding a divorce to Janice L. Roberts (wife). Husband raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court considered all the factors contained in Code Sec. 20-107.1 before awarding spousal support to wife; (2) whether the trial court erred in crediting husband with the full value of husband's gun and knife collections; and (3) whether the trial court erred in valuing husband's car collection.
Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
"On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the . . . prevailing party. Our function is not to substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge, but to determine if the record contains sufficient credible evidence in support of the judgment from which the appeal is taken." Ward v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Social Servs., 13 Va. App. 144, 148, 408 S.E.2d 921, 923 (1991). "[A] divorce decree based solely on depositions is not as conclusive on appellate review as one based upon evidence heard ore tenus, but such a decree is presumed correct and will not be overturned if supported by substantial, competent and credible evidence." Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 127, 341 S.E.2d 827, 828 (1986).
I.
"Courts have no power to enter a decree of spousal support except pursuant to statutory authority." Smith v. Smith, 4 Va. App. 148, 151, 354 S.E.2d 816, 818 (1987).
In awarding spousal support, the chancellor must consider the relative needs and abilities of the parties. He is guided by the nine factors that are set forth in Code Sec. 20-107.1. When the chancellor has given due consideration to these factors, his determination will not be disturbed on appeal except for a clear abuse of discretion.
Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 129, 341 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1986).
The record demonstrates that the trial court gave due consideration to the statutory factors before awarding spousal support to wife. In its letter opinion, the trial court reviewed in detail evidence relevant to the statutory factors listed in Code Sec. 20-107.1. The trial court concluded that:
[i]n consideration of the evidence, and taking into account those factors enumerated in Section 20-107.1 of the Code, the court is of the opinion that Mrs. Roberts is entitled to spousal support from Mr. Roberts. The court will require him to continue to pay the $100 per week as previously ordered.
There is no indication that the decision to award spousal support was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Therefore, the decision of the trial court on this point will not be disturbed on appeal.
II.
"In reviewing an equitable distribution award on appeal, we have recognized that the trial court's job is a difficult one, and we rely heavily on the discretion of the trial judge in weighing the many considerations and circumstances that are presented in each case." Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App. 132, 137, 354 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987). "Unless it appears from the record that the chancellor has abused his discretion or has failed to consider or has misapplied one of the statutory factors, his determination will not be reversed on appeal." Klein v. Klein, 11 Va. App. 155, 161, 396 S.E.2d 866 870 (1970).
Husband argues that the trial court erred in crediting him with the value of both his gun and knife collections because those assets were allegedly missing. However, in husband's deposition, he was equivocal as to whether or not he believed wife had taken the collections. Wife admitted removing her own gun and five or six knives, but denied removing other pieces of either collection. The trial court noted that husband had made no previous claim that the collections were missing and stated, "Oddly enough, no complaint was ever made about this to his attorney, to law enforcement, or to this court during the course of these proceedings."
The decision of the trial court to award the gun and knife collections to husband and credit husband with their agreed-upon value was supported by substantial, competent, and credible evidence in the record. Moreover, there is no indication that the trial court abused its discretion or misapplied the statute. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's decision on this point.
III.
The trial court also credited husband with $104,000 as the value of the automobile collection. The evidence before the court consisted of husband's testimony that the collection was worth between $69,300 and $72,900, and wife's testimony that the collection was worth $138,372. In addition, a personal financial statement signed by husband in January 1991 valued the collection at $120,000.
Code Sec. 20-107.3(A) directs the trial court to "determine the legal title . . . and value of all property . . . of the parties." Even if the court qualified husband as an expert on the value of the automobiles based upon husband's experience as a collector of classic cars, husband's opinion in this instance could not be described as disinterested. Moreover, while expert testimony may be the preferable method for valuing marital property, "the finder of fact is not required to accept as conclusive the opinion of an expert." Lassen v. Lassen, 8 Va. App. 502, 507, 383 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1989).
As there was substantial, competent, and credible evidence before the trial court to support its determination to value the car collection at $104,000, the trial court's decision will not be reversed on appeal.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.