Moreover, ETS recorded the Notice of Trustee's Sale on May 27, 2010, setting a date for the sale of the Property on August 31. Delo did not file the tax-lien foreclosure lawsuit until June 10, 2010, and did not record the lis pendens until August 12. Accordingly, the trial court's reliance on Ticktin is misplaced. “[I]f the holderof a tax-lien certificate wants to foreclose the redemption right of an owner or a person who has a legal or equitable interest in the property, the holder must join those parties in the foreclosure action.” Roberts v. Robert, 215 Ariz. 176, ¶ 16, 158 P.3d 899, 903 (App.2007). Although the Limited Title Search obtained by Delo had attached to it the Deed of Trust showing MERS's interests in the Property, Delo failed to join MERS as a party in the lawsuit.

Even absent § 42-18202's mandate, lienholders must obtain sufficient service of process under Rule 4.1 to bring property owners to court. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1 ; see Roberts v. Robert , 215 Ariz. 176, 180 ¶¶ 16, 18, 158 P.3d 899, 903 (App. 2007). That is, § 42-18202 adds an additional tier of due process not required by Flowers .

In Sprang, we held that a "‘due diligent effort‘ requires such pointed measures as an examination of telephone company records, utility company records, and records maintained by the county treasurer, county recorder, or similar record keepers." 165 Ariz. at 261, 798 P.2d at 399; see also Preston v. Denkins, 94 Ariz. 214, 222-23, 382 P.2d 686, 691-92 (1963) (court lacked jurisdiction to enter default judgment following service by publication based on alleged lack of knowledge of defendants' residences when simple inquiry would have revealed information); Roberts v. Robert, 215 Ariz. 176, 181, ¶ 24, 158 P.3d 899, 905 (App. 2007) ("[Although] the lienholders suggest they properly served Roberts . . . by publication, the record contains no evidence of what steps, if any, [they] took to identify and locate [him] before attempting service by publication. Therefore, we reverse").

"Reasonable diligence requires contacting known third parties who may have knowledge of the defendant's whereabouts." Pascua v. Heil, 108 P.3d 1253, 1258 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); Cf. Roberts v. Robert, 215 Ariz. 176, 180, ¶ 19, 158 P.3d 899, 903 (App. 2007) ("A diligent search and inquiry for heirs is all that is required, similar to the type of diligence required to justify and effect service of process by publication. Thus, depending on the circumstances, a tax lien holder may need to examine public records or court records, or may need to ask relatives, friends, or neighbors of a decedent property owner about the existence of heirs.").

Id. This court held the foreclosing party failed to exercise due diligence in its search: "[a] 'due diligent effort' requires such pointed measures as an examination of telephone company records, utility company records, and records maintained by the county treasurer, county recorder, or similar record keepers." Id.; cf. Roberts v. Robert, 215 Ariz. 176, 180, ¶ 19, 158 P.3d 899, 903 (App. 2007) (to conduct a "diligent search and inquiry . . . similar to the type of diligence required to justify and effect service of process by publication," a tax lien holder "may need to examine public records or court records, or may need to ask relatives, friends or neighbors" to discover unknown heirs.) ¶13 Here, as in Sprang, the record does not demonstrate MJG's search for Defendants rose to the level of a "due diligent effort."

See, e.g. In Re Guardianship of Pacheco, 2 19 Ariz. 421, 430, ¶ 39, 199 P.3d 676, 685 (App. 2008); Neal v. Brown, 219 Ariz. 14, 20, ¶ 22, 191 P.3d 1030, 1036 (App. 2008); Roberts v. Robert, 215 Ariz. 176, 181-82, ¶ 25, 158 P.3d 899, 904-05 (App. 2007); Bed Mart, Inc. v. Keller, 202 Ariz. 370, 375, ¶ 24, 45 P.3d 1219, 1224 (App. 2002); McGovem v. McGovem, 201 Ariz. 172, 180, ¶ 28, 33 P.3d 506, 514 (App. 2001); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fonk, 198 Ariz. 167, 172, ¶ 25, 7 P.3d 973, 978 (App. 2000); Matter of Wilcox Revocable Trust, 192 Ariz. 337, 341, ¶ 21, 965 P.2d 71, 75 (App. 1998); ` Bank One, Arizona, N.A. v. Beauvais, 188 Ariz. 245, 251-52, 934 P.2d 809, 815-16 (App. 1997); Haynes v. Syntek Finance Corp., 184 Ariz. 332, 341,'909 P.2d 399, 408 (App. 1995); Steiner v. Steiner, 179 Ariz. 606, 613, 880 P.2d 1152, 1159 (App. 1994); Mission Ins. Co. v. Cash, Sullivan Cross, 170 Ariz. 105, 110-11, 822 P.2d 1, 6-7 (App. 1991), disapproved of on other grounds by Panzino v. City of Phoenix, 196 Ariz. 442, 445, ¶ 7, 999 P.2d 198, 201 (2000); City of Phoenix v. Phoenix Civil Service Bd., 169 Ariz. 256, 260, 818 P.2d'241, 245 (App. 1991); City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 172, 177, 696 P.2d 7

Because the court does not preauthorize service by publication, the determination whether publication constitutes adequate service is made later in the case. See also Roberts v. Robert, 215 Ariz. 176, 181, ¶¶ 22-24, 158 P.3d 899, 904 (App. 2007). ¶ 9 Here, § 42-18206 authorizes service by publication when a holder of a tax lien seeks to foreclose on the property owner's interest.

Section 14-3901, in turn, generally provides that title to a decedent's property passes to his heirs or devisees at the time of his death. See A.R.S. § 14-3901 ("In the absence of administration, the heirs and devisees are entitled to the estate in accordance with the terms of a probated will or the laws of intestate succession."); Roberts v. Robert, 215 Ariz. 176, 179, ¶ 12, 158 P.3d 899, 902 (App. 2007). Prior to 2006, A.R.S. § 14-3971(G) read: "Nothing in this section shall limit the rights of heirs and devisees under § 14-3901."

Ct. App. 2018) (citing Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(k)(3)); see also Ritchie v. Salvatore Gatto Partners, L.P., 222 P.3d 920, 923 ¶ 8 n.4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); Roberts v. Robert, 158 P.3d 899, 904 ¶¶ 21-24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Shirley J. McAuliffe, 2 Arizona Practice - Civil Trial Practice § 12:6 (Nov. 2019 update) ("There is no requirement . . . that there be a prior order authorizing service by publication, and securing one serves no meaningful purpose."). Whether service by publication complied with due process and applicable procedural rules is evaluated later.

"The decision whether to pursue personal service or service by publication is that of the plaintiff, not the court [and] [b]ecause the court does not preauthorize service by publication, the determination whether publication constitutes adequate service is made later in the case." Ritchie v. Salvatore Gatto Partners, 222 P.3d 920, 923 n. 4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(n) and Roberts v. Robert, 158 P.3d 899, 904 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)). Because Plaintiff need not seek Court approval to effect service by publication, Plaintiff's motion for authorization of service by publication is denied.