Roberts v. Johnson

37 Citing cases

  1. Carpenter v. Elway

    97 Wn. App. 977 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 19 times
    Holding arbitrator's notation on bottom of arbitration award reading "[o]riginal to the Clerk for filing with copies to each party" insufficient proof of service because notation lacked time, place, and manner of service

    Thou then filed a notice of appeal, cause No. 23258-8-II. While the appeal was pending, Thou filed with the trial court a CR 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment. Citing Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 84, 969 P.2d 446 (1999), Thou argued that their proof of service for a trial de novo was not untimely filed because the arbitrator had not yet filed proof of service of the arbitration award. The trial court, noting that the matter was on appeal, denied the motion on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction under RAP 7.2 until the appellate court remanded the matter.

  2. Pulich v. Dame

    99 Wn. App. 558 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 3 times
    Applying doctrine of invited error in mandatory arbitration context

    "RCW 7.06 authorizes mandatory arbitration of civil cases." Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 84, 88, 969 P.2d 446 (1999). RCW 7.06.030 authorizes promulgation of rules to govern mandatory arbitration procedures.

  3. Newton v. Legarsky

    97 Wn. App. 375 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 5 times
    In Newton, proof of delivery was in the form of a filed request for trial de novo, stamped with a "Certificate of Delivery" to the messenger service for delivery of the request to opposing counsel.

    Legarsky's request for trial de novo stamped with a "certificate of delivery" to the process server is not proof of service and does not satisfy the strict mandate of Nevers. In an even more recent case, Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 84, 969 P.2d 446 (1999), the Supreme Court explained and extended Nevers. But the result in Roberts favors Legarsky.

  4. Inman v. Netteland

    95 Wn. App. 83 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 9 times
    Holding facsimile "does not constitute service on an attorney or party" where the rules provide for other methods of service

    Sherry Inman appeals from a judgment entered following arbitration. Based upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 84, 969 P.2d 446 (1999), we agree that the 20-day period in which to request a trial de novo under MAR 7.1 does not commence until the arbitrator files proof of service of the award, pursuant to MAR 6.2. Thus, we reverse. MAR 7.1(a) provides in pertinent part:

  5. Cook v. Von Stein

    97 Wn. App. 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that party who went to trial absent filing of proof of service request waived post-verdict objection to MAR 7.1 defect

    In oral argument before this court, Cook argued alternatively that the arbitrator's failure to file a proof of service contemporaneously with the filing of the arbitration award requires a remand to allow such a filing. See Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 84, 969 P.2d 446 (1999). We address both arguments but decide that neither Nevers nor Roberts requires a reversal in this case.

  6. Wiley v. Rehak

    143 Wn. 2d 339 (Wash. 2001)   Cited 66 times
    In Wiley, the Supreme Court held that the SCCAR 1.3(b)(1)'s predecessor provision, former MAR 1.3(b)(1) (1989), foreclosed reliance on CR 4(h) or CR 60 as a means to cure a defect in the request for trial de novo.

    The Nevers rationale mandates strict compliance based on the plain, unambiguous language of the rule. The Court later held in Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 84, 93, 969 P.2d 446 (1999), that the strict compliance standard applies to MAR 6.2, governing the filing of an arbitrator's decision. The Court based both rulings on the plain language of the rules, but also noted that strict compliance better effectuates the Legislature's intent in enacting the statutes upon which the arbitration rules are based, namely to "alleviate the court congestion and reduce the delay in hearing civil cases."

  7. Wiley v. Rehak

    101 Wn. App. 198 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 1 times

    This strict compliance standard applies not only to the request for a trial de novo; it also applies to timely filing of proof of service. Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 84, 90, 969 P.2d 446 (1999); Inman v. Netteland, 95 Wn. App. 83, 90, 974 P.2d 365 (1999); Kim, 95 Wn. App. 443. MAR 7.1(a) provides that a request for a trial de novo " shall be in the following form: . . . Please take notice that [name of aggrieved party] requests a trial de novo from the award filed [date]."

  8. Seto v. American Elevator, Inc.

    159 Wn. 2d 767 (Wash. 2007)   Cited 9 times
    In Seto v. American Elevator, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 767, 769, 154 P.3d 189 (2007), our Supreme Court held that the 20-day period to request a trial de novo under MAR 7.1 begins once service of the award is complete.

    We have previously interpreted the wording of MAR 7.1(a) and 6.2 to mean that "the 20-day period begins to run only when both the award and proof of service thereof have been filed." Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 84, 92, 969 P.2d 446 (1999) (emphasis added). Thus, the question before us is what "proof of service of a copy on each party" means.

  9. Seto v. American Elevator, Inc.

    129 Wn. App. 146 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 3 times

    Our Supreme Court has strictly interpreted the requirements of MAR 7.1. See Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 84, 90-93, 969 P.2d 446 (1999); Simmerly v. McKee, 120 Wn. App. 217, 84 P.3d 919, review denied, 152 Wn.2d 1033 (2004). The MAR implement the basic procedural requirements of RCW 7.06.050.

  10. Malted Mousse v. Steinmetz

    150 Wn. 2d 518 (Wash. 2003)   Cited 79 times
    Rejecting piecemeal appeal of an arbitration award is "in harmony with the plain language of RCW 7.06.050 and MAR 7.1-7.2"

    Id. at 815. In Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wn.2d 84, 969 P.2d 446 (1999), we examined whether the failure of an arbitrator to file proof of service of a mandatory arbitration award tolls the 20-day period for filing a request for a trial de novo. We followed the reasoning from Nevers and held that the 20-day time limit in MAR 7.1(a) did not begin to run until the arbitrator had both filed the award with the court and served it on each party.