Opinion
3:10-cv-00025-ECR-VPC
10-19-2011
CYNTHIA F. ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. FIRST HORIZON HOME LOAN CORPORATION; LANDAMERICA ONESTOP, INC.; METLIFE HOME LOANS, a division of METLIFE BANK, N.A.; COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., a New York corporation; BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, N.A.; JOHN ROUSSEL, individually; MERSCORP, INC., a Virginia corporation; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a subsidiary of MERSCORP, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1-25 CORPORATIONS; DOES and ROES 1-2 5 individuals, [Partnerships, or anyone claiming any interest to the property, Defendants.
Order
Plaintiff is a homeowner who alleges that she is the victim of a predatory lending scheme perpetrated by Defendants. Now pending are Plaintiff's Motion to Certify State Law Question to the Nevada Supreme Court (#53); a Motion to Dismiss (#54) filed by Defendant MetLife Bank, N.A. ("MetLife"); a Motion to Dismiss (#55) filed by Defendants Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank of America"), Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. ("Countrywide"), First Horizon Home Loan Corporation ("First Horizon"), and John Roussel; and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (#66).
I. Background
On or about November 30, 2005, Plaintiff Cynthia F. Roberts purchased the property located at 596 Ranch Road, Fernley, Nevada 89408 with a first and second loan from Defendant First Horizon. (Compl. ¶ 28 (#1 Ex. A).) Plaintiff refinanced the second loan with a new loan and second deed of trust from Countrywide on February 23, 2007. (Id. ¶ 24.) On June 30, 2009, Defendant LandAmerica OneStop, Inc. ("LandAmerica") recorded a notice of default with respect to the first loan. (Id. ¶ 58.) The notice of trustee's sale with respect to the first deed of trust on the property was recorded on October 12, 2009, scheduling the sale for October 23, 2009. (Id.) Plaintiff has no documents verifying that the sale was ever completed. (Id.) It further appears that no notice of default or any other foreclosure notices relating to Countrywide's second deed of trust have been recorded.
On November 23, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (#1 Ex. A) in the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Lyon alleging the following fourteen claims for relief: (1) Violation of Unfair Lending Practices, N.R.S. § 598D.100; (2) Conspiracy to Commit Fraud and Conversion; (3) Permanent Injunction; (4) Declaratory Relief; (5) Wrongful Foreclosure; (6) Fraud Through Omission; (7) Quiet Title; (8) Contractual Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (9) Tortuous [sic] Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (10) Civil Conspiracy; (11) Racketeering (NRS 207.470); (12) Unjust Enrichment; (13) Conspiracy to Commit Fraud Related to MERS System; and (14) Fraud in the Inducement. In connection with the Complaint, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens on the property.
On March 26, 2010, all of Plaintiff's claims related to the formation and/or operation of the MERS system were transferred to the MERS Multidistrict Litigation Court (the "MDL court"). On March 21, 2011, the MDL Court issued an order (#49) clarifying that the parts of Plaintiff's claims 1, 3, 4, and 10-12 unrelated to the formation and/or operation of MERS were remanded to this Court.
On April 4, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Certify State Law Question to the Nevada Supreme Court (#53). On April 26 and April 28, 2011, Defendants responded (##61, 63).
On April 5, 2011, Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss (##54, 55). Plaintiff responded (#59) on April 24, 2011. Defendants replied (##64, 65) on May 4, 2011.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (#66) on May 7, 2011. Defendant MetLife responded (#72) on June 1, 2011, and Defendants Bank of America, Countrywide, First Horizon, and John Roussel responded (#75) on June 6, 2011. Plaintiff replied (#76) on June 16, 2011.
II. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (#66)
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend is to be "freely given when justice so requires." In general, amendment should be allowed with "extreme liberality." Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Morongo Band of Missions Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990)). However, if factors such as undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue prejudice, or futility of amendment are present, leave to amend may properly be denied in the district court's discretion. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2003). The futility analysis determines whether the proposed amendment would survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988).
B. Discussion
Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint (#66 Ex. 1) alleges the following nine causes of action: (1) Debt Collection Violations; (2) Violation of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (3) Violation of Unfair Lending Practices, N.R.S. 598D.100; (4) Violation of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (5) Violation of NRS 107.080 et seq.; (6) Quiet Title Action; (7) Fraud in the Inducement and Through Omission; (8) Slander of Title; (9) Abuse of Process.
At the outset, the Court notes that many of the claims in the proposed amended complaint are already present in the original complaint. For this reason, amendment is not necessary to include Plaintiff's third through seventh causes of action. Accordingly, the Court denies leave to amend to add those claims. The Court now addresses the first, second, eighth, and ninth claims in the proposed amended complaint in turn.
1. Debt Collection Violations
Granting Plaintiff leave to plead an additional claim for unauthorized debt collection would prove futile. Liability under Chapter 649 of the Nevada Revised Statutes ("NRS") is premised on liability under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). NEV. REV. STAT. § 649.370. At the threshold of such a claim, Plaintiff must establish that Defendants are debt collectors within the meaning of the FDCPA. However, the FDCPA's definition of "debt collector" does not "include the consumer's creditors, a mortgage servicing company, or any assignee of the debt, so long as the debt was not in default at the time it was assigned." Croce v. Trinity Mortg. Assur. Corp., No. 2:08-CV-01612, 2009 WL 3172110, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 28, 2009) (citing S. Rep. No. 950382, at 3 (1977)). Furthermore, foreclosure pursuant to a deed of trust does not constitute debt collection under the FDCPA. Fitzgerald v. Clarion Mortg. Capital, No. 3:10-cv-766, 2011 WL 2633502, at *5 (D. Nev. July 5, 2011) (citing Camacho-Villa v. Great W. Home Loans, No. 3:10-cv-210, 2011 WL 1103681, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2011)); see also Izenberg v. ETS Servs., LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1204 (D. Or. 2002). For these reasons, the FDCPA and the corresponding Nevada debt collection statutes do not apply to Defendants. Plaintiff will therefore be denied the opportunity to include a claim for unauthorized debt collection due to futility.
2. Violation of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act
Plaintiff's proposed second claim for relief pursuant to NRS § 598.0923 also fails. Under the statute, a person engages in deceptive trade practices when, in the course of his or her business or occupation, he or she knowingly conducts the business or occupation without all required state, county, or city licenses. However, the statutes explicitly state that the following activities do not constitute "doing business" in the State of Nevada: (1) maintaining, defending or settling any proceeding; (2) creating or acquiring indebtedness, mortgages, and security interests in real or personal property; and (3) securing or collecting debts or enforcing mortgages and security interests in property securing the debts. NEV. REV. STAT. § 80.015(1)(a), (g)-(h). Because Defendants are explicitly exempt from acquiring licenses in this mortgage case, Plaintiff will be denied leave to amend due to futility.
3. Slander of Title
As her eighth claim for relief in the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants slandered Plaintiff's title by recording the notice of default under the first deed of trust. To succeed on a slander of title claim, the plaintiff must show "false and malicious communications, disparaging to one's title in land, and causing special damages." Exec. Mgmt., Ltd. v. Ticor Title Co., 963 P.2d 465, 478 (Nev. 1998). However, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because it is undisputed that Plaintiff is in default. See Sexton v. IndyMac Bank FSB, No. 3:11-cv-437, 2011 WL 4809640, at *5 (D. Nev. Oct. 7, 2011) ("Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim because it is undisputed that Plaintiffs are in default."); Ramos v. Mortg. Elec. Registrations Sys., Inc., No. 2:08-CV-1089, 2009 WL 5651132, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 5, 2009) (dismissing slander of title claim where Plaintiffs failed to dispute that they were in default on their loan, nor was it false that the property was to be sold at a trustee's sale). In filing the notice of default, Defendants stated that Plaintiffs were in breach of the loan agreement due to nonpayment. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss (#55) Ex. K.) Again, Plaintiff does not dispute that she is in fact in default. Because the statement is not false, Defendants cannot be liable for slander of title. Leave to amend to include a slander of title claim will therefore be denied as futile.
The Court takes judicial notice of the public records produced by Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201.
4. Abuse of Process
Amendment to include Plaintiff's proposed additional claim for abuse of process would prove futile because non-judicial foreclosure is not the type of "process" addressed by the abuse of process tort because it does not involve judicial action. Riley v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1873, 2011 WL 1979831 at *5 (D. Nev. May 20, 2011); see also Barlow v. BNC Mortg., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-0304, 2011 WL 4402955 at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 21, 2011) ("[T]he process at issue in this action is a non-judicial foreclosure which is not the characteristic legal action contemplated by an abuse of process claim . . . Therefore, the court finds that [Plaintiff] has failed to state a claim for abuse of process.") (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that amendment to add a claim for abuse of process would be futile.
Plaintiff's Motion (#66) must therefore be denied in its entirety. Amendment is not necessary to include a number of Plaintiff's claims because they appear in the original complaint. Amendment to allow the other proposed claims would prove futile for the reasons stated above. Having resolved Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (#66), the Court now turns to Defendants' motions (##54, 55) to dismiss the original complaint.
III. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (##54, 55)
A. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) will only be granted if the complaint fails to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (clarifying that Twombly applies to pleadings in "all civil actions"). On a motion to dismiss, except where a heightened pleading standard applies, "we presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)) (alteration in original); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) ("Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "[a]ll allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
Although courts generally assume the facts alleged are true, courts do not "assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations." W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, "[c]onclusory allegations and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." In re Stac Elecs., 89 F.3d at 1403 (citation omitted).
Review on a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is normally limited to the complaint itself. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). If the district court relies on materials outside the pleadings in making its ruling, it must treat the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and give the non-moving party an opportunity to respond. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); see United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). "A court may, however, consider certain materials — documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice — without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908.
If documents are physically attached to the complaint, then a court may consider them if their "authenticity is not contested" and "the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies on them." Lee, 250 F.3d at 688 (citation, internal quotations, and ellipsis omitted). A court may also treat certain documents as incorporated by reference into the plaintiff's complaint if the complaint "refers extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim." Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. Finally, if adjudicative facts or matters of public record meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may judicially notice them in deciding a motion to dismiss. Id. at 909; see FED. R. EVID. 201(b) ("A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.").
B. Discussion
The Court again notes that Plaintiff's second, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, thirteenth, and fourteenth claims for relief have been transferred to the MDL court. The Court now addresses the claims that remain within our jurisdiction, and only those parts unrelated to the formation and/or operation of MERS, per the MDL Court's order (#49).
1. Violation of Unfair Lending Practices, N.R.S. 598D.100
Plaintiff's first cause of action against Defendants MERS and First Horizon for violation of Nevada's Unfair Lending Practices Act is time-barred. The statute of limitations for "[a]n action upon a liability created by a statute" is three years. NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.190(3)(a). Plaintiff obtained the first and second loans in November 2005 and filed the complaint (#1 Ex. A) in November 2009. (Compl. ¶ 28 (#1 Ex. A).) Plaintiff's claim for unfair lending practices is therefore untimely and must be dismissed.
2. Civil Conspiracy
Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for civil conspiracy as her tenth claim for relief. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants entered into a conspiracy to eject Nevadans from their homes. (Compl. ¶ 110 (#1 Ex. A).) Plaintiff asserts in her response (#59) that she has abandoned her claim for civil conspiracy. (Pl.'s Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 10 (#59).) In accord with Plaintiff's affirmative abandonment and Local Rule 7-2(d), the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claim for civil conspiracy.
Local Rule 7-2(d) provides that "[t]he failure of an opposing party to file points and authorities in response to any motion shall constitute a consent to the granting of the motion."
In any event, the Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for civil conspiracy upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim for civil conspiracy under Nevada law, a Plaintiff must allege (1) the commission of an underlying tort; and (2) an agreement between the defendants to commit that tort." Lalatag v. Money First Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-02268, 2010 WL 2925875, at *2 (D. Nev. July 20, 2010) (citing GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11, 15 (Nev. 2001)). Furthermore, a claim for civil conspiracy must be pled with particular specificity as to "the manner in which a defendant joined in the conspiracy and how he participated in it." Arroyo v. Wheat, 591 F. Supp. 141, 144 (D. Nev. 1984). Here, Plaintiff fails to plead either element of a civil conspiracy claim, let alone with particularity as to each Defendant's alleged participation. Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed.
3. Racketeering (NRS 207.470)
Like her claim for civil conspiracy, Plaintiff asserts in her opposition that she has abandoned her eleventh cause of action for racketeering. (Pl.'s Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 10 (#59).) In accord with Plaintiff's affirmative abandonment and Local Rule 7-2(d), the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claim for racketeering. In any event, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for racketeering because a plaintiff must plead such a claim with specificity. Eastwood v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, No. 3:09-cv-00656, 2010 WL 2696479, at *2 (D. Nev. July 2, 2010) (citing Asphalt Prods. Corp. v. All Star Ready Mix, 898 P.2d 699, 700 (Nev. 1995). "That is, the complaint must allege at least two predicate crimes related to racketeering in order to sufficiently plead a racketeering claim upon which relief can be granted." Eastwood, 2010 WL 2696479, at *2 (citing Asphalt Prods, 898 P.2d at 700). Here, Plaintiff merely alleges that "Defendants engaged in racketeering . . . via the predatory and abusive lending practices described herein, and the repeated failure to disclose such - both relative to Plaintiff and others." (Compl. ¶ 114 (#1 Ex. A).) Plaintiff's one conclusory allegation falls far short of what is required to state a claim for racketeering pursuant to Nevada law.
4. Unjust Enrichment
In her twelfth claim for relief, Plaintiff asserts that "Defendants have been unjustly enriched by receiving payments on the risky, volatile mortgage loan which was designed to reap inordinate profits for Defendants and to ultimately fail." (Compl. ¶ 119 (#1 Ex. A).) However, Plaintiff has also affirmatively abandoned her claim for unjust enrichment. (Pl.'s Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 10 (#59).) In accord with Plaintiff's affirmative abandonment and Local Rule 7-2(d), the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment. In any event, Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment fails anyway because under Nevada law, there can be no action for unjust enrichment where there is an express, written contract. Leasepartners Corp. v. Robert L. Brooks Trust, 942 P.2d 182, 187 (Nev. 1997); see also Lipshie v. Tracy Inv. Co., 566 P.2d 819, 824 (Nev. 1977) ("To permit recovery by quasi-contract where a written agreement exists would constitute a subversion of contractual principles."). Plaintiff bases her claim for unjust enrichment on "the terms of the Note and Deed of Trust executed by Plaintiff" and "mortgage loan documents." (Compl. ¶¶ 117-18 (#1 Ex. A).) In other words, Plaintiff bases her claim for unjust enrichment on express, written contracts. Plaintiff's claim therefore fails as a matter of law.
5. Permanent Injunction and Declaratory Relief
Plaintiff asserts claims for a permanent injunction and declaratory relief as her third and fourth claims for relief, respectively. However, injunctive and declaratory relief are remedies, not independent causes of action. In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1130 (D. Nev. 2007). Both of these claims are derivative of Plaintiff's other substantive claims, which all fail. Accordingly, Plaintiff's third and fourth claims for relief must also be dismissed.
IV. Plaintiff's Motion to Certify State Law Question to the Nevada
Supreme Court (#53)
Plaintiff has filed a motion (#53) pursuant to Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) to certify the following question of state law to the Nevada Supreme Court:
Under the Nevada nonjudicial foreclosure statute, when a Notice of Default is recorded by a Trustee or other purported agent of the beneficiary prior to the recording of a document appointing that Trustee or purported agent, is the resulting foreclosure invalid so as to require at least one additional document to be recorded to correct the foreclosure process?(Pl.'s Mot. Certify at 2 (#53) (emphasis and footnote in original).) Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) provides that the Nevada Supreme Court may answer questions of law certified to it by a United States District Court if there are "questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending . . . and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent."
NRS 107.080, et seq.
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The Court finds that Plaintiff's question of state law is not determinative of any part of this case. Plaintiff's question is not at all relevant to the claims that remain within the jurisdiction of this court. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege a violation of NRS § 107.080 anywhere in the Complaint (#1 Ex. A), not even in her claim for wrongful foreclosure, which remains with the MDL court. Accordingly, certification of Plaintiff's question will have no impact on this litigation. Certification is therefore inappropriate in this case and Plaintiff's Motion to Certify (#53) must be denied.
V. Conclusion
The Court has analyzed each of Plaintiff's claims that remain in our jurisdiction and found that they all must be dismissed. Furthermore, because the Court also denies Plaintiff's motion (#66) to amend the complaint for reasons of futility, Plaintiff will not be granted leave to amend, and Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice. Finally, the Court finds that certification of Plaintiff's question to the Nevada Supreme Court would be inappropriate as the question is not determinative of any part of this case.
IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion (#66) for leave to file amended complaint is DENIED .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant MetLife's motion (#54) to dismiss and Defendants' Bank of America, Countrywide, First Horizon, and John Roussel's motion (#55) to dismiss are GRANTED. All of Plaintiff's claims remaining within our jurisdiction are DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Certify State Law Question to the Nevada Supreme Court (#53) is DENIED.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE