Opinion
Case No. 4:03-cv-0234-DFH-WGH.
March 2, 2005
ENTRY ON PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiff Darlene Gibson Roberts was severely injured in an automobile accident on October 23, 2001. She alleges that her seat belt released in the accident, causing injuries much more severe than would have occurred otherwise. She has sued DaimlerChrysler Corporation, manufacturer of the vehicle, and Key Safety Systems, Inc., the maker of the seat belt assembly, on theories of product liability.
Invoking Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant Key Safety has moved to dismiss the claim against it for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Key Safety argues that the amended complaint adding it as a defendant shows on its face that plaintiff's claim against it is barred by Indiana's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury and product liability claims. See Ind. Code § 34-20-3-1. Plaintiff filed her original complaint on October 23, 2003, exactly two years after the accident. That complaint did not name Key Safety as a defendant. Instead, it named Honeywell International, Inc., alleging incorrectly that Honeywell was involved in the design and manufacture of the seat belt.
On February 12, 2004, plaintiff filed her motion for leave to file an amended complaint adding Key Safety as a defendant. The court granted that motion on April 26, 2004, and the amended complaint was deemed filed the same day. The court's order allowing the amended complaint noted that the court expressed no view on the issue of timeliness.
Key Safety supported its Rule 12(b)(6) motion with affidavits from its general counsel and from a reliability engineer who has been consulted as a potential expert witness in this case. The affidavit from the general counsel recounts the history of the safety restraint business originally operated by AlliedSignal, Inc. The general counsel testified that a portion of that business was sold to Breed Technologies, Inc., which in turn changed its name to Key Safety Systems, Inc. The engineer's affidavit includes photographs of the accident vehicle, as well as information about the manufacturer's labels attached to the seatbelts. Key Safety relies on the affidavits to establish that it is completely distinct from Honeywell International, Inc. and to establish that the identity of the correct manufacturer was readily available to plaintiff and her counsel by inspecting the accident vehicle.
In opposing dismissal, plaintiff contends that the two-year limitations period did not begin the day of the accident but instead began to run no earlier than March 7, 2002, which was apparently the date of a national television broadcast concerning possible defects in seat belts. Plaintiff also argues that her amended complaint should relate back to the filing of her original complaint pursuant to Rule 15(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. She bases this argument on factual assertions concerning the history of the seat belt business as it moved from AlliedSignal to Breed, which became Key Safety, and on the relationships of all of these entities to Honeywell International. She also supports her argument with copies of documents from other product liability cases in which the same lawyers represented both Honeywell International and Key Safety (and/or Breed), as was also the case here. See Pl. Br. Exhibits 1-11. (Plaintiff dismissed her claim against Honeywell International after filing the amended complaint.)
Key Safety has filed a reply brief that attaches and relies on plaintiff's interrogatory responses to show that plaintiff knew at the time of the accident that her seat belt unbuckled in the accident and that her attorney inspected the vehicle. Key Safety later supplemented its motion to dismiss with portions of plaintiff's deposition relevant to the same issues.
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part: "If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."
Key Safety's motion to dismiss clearly invites the court to consider matters outside the pleadings. Under the generous standard that applies under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff is free to hypothesize a variety of facts, both in her briefs in this court and even on appeal, that might support her argument that her claim against Key Safety is timely. See, e.g., Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 650 (7th Cir. 2001); Trevino v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 916 F.3d 1230, 1239 (7th Cir. 1990). Under that generous standard, the court cannot say that plaintiff's complaint shows, beyond dispute and as a matter of law, without taking into consideration any other possible facts, that the claim is untimely. Plaintiff's briefing regarding the relation-back issue suggests the type of facts beyond the pleadings that can affect whether the amended complaint relates back to the date of the original complaint. Accordingly, treating the Key Safety motion on the terms under which it was filed — Rule 12(b)(6) — the court must deny Key Safety's motion to dismiss. It is hereby denied.
The court and the parties do not have a "license to ignore the distinctions between motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment." Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss). Nevertheless, the parties' submissions on the motion raise serious doubts about whether the plaintiff's claim against Key Safety can survive the statute of limitations defense. In light of the command of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court intends to proceed as follows. The court will treat Key Safety's submissions in support of its Rule 12(b)(6) motion as if they were a motion for summary judgment filed today in support of the statute of limitations defense. Those submissions include the briefs and the affidavits and plaintiff's interrogatory answers. Plaintiff shall have the opportunity to respond with additional evidentiary material if she wishes to do so, but her response shall be subject to the standards of Rule 56 and this court's Local Rule 56.1. Plaintiff shall file any such response no later than April 2, 2005. Key Safety may file a reply no later than 14 days after plaintiff's response, and any further submissions shall be subject to the court's Local Rule 56.1.
Also pending is Key Safety's motion to continue the trial, which is now scheduled for June 27, 2005 in New Albany. The court finds that the continuance should be granted, and the trial set for June 27, 2005 and the final pretrial conference set for June 17, 2005 are hereby VACATED. The court will set new dates after consulting with counsel after ruling on the new motion for summary judgment. Key Safety's motion to stay discovery is hereby denied.
So ordered.