Roberts v. Cives Corporation

Full title: ROUDON ROBERTS, ET. AL., Plaintiffs, v. CIVES CORPORATION, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Thomasville Division

Date published: Jun 27, 2005

6:03-CV-24 (WLS) (M.D. Ga. Jun. 27, 2005)

Opinion

6:03-CV-24 (WLS).

June 27, 2005

ORDER

W. SANDS, Chief Judge

Presently pending is Defendant's motion to dismiss the claims filed by Nathaniel Johnson, Dante Johnson, Marty Allen, Dennis R. White, Danny Jones, James R. Parnell, Clarence H. Wilson, and Robert Tony Bennett ("Amended Plaintiffs"). (Tab 45). For the following reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss the claims of the Amended Plaintiffs (Tab 45) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This is an employment discrimination case in which the Plaintiff alleges age and disability discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Defendant moves to dismiss the Amended Plaintiffs' claims for failure to satisfy the administrative requirements necessary for filing an ADA or ADEA claim. (Tab 45).

Since this case was filed on May 8, 2003, Defendant has proceeded in a fashion that can be described as repetitive. This results in the proceedings becoming unnecessarily piece-meal. First, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on August 8, 2003. (Tab 9). The motion was denied on March 9, 2004. (Tab 32). No sooner than the motion was denied, than Defendant filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on July 12, 2004, which not only relied on a clearly distinguishable case, but was essentially a motion for reconsideration. (Tab 37). Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to add Plaintiff Johnson on September 18, 2003, and an amended motion to amend the complaint to add the remaining Amended Parties and claims on June 9, 2004. (Tabs 16, 33). Defendant opposed the amendments. (Tab 25, 38).

In its 12 page memorandum in support of its opposition to amend the complaint, and 18 page memorandum in support of its opposition to the second amended complaint, Defendant raised numerous grounds. (Tabs 25, 38). Specifically, Defendant argued that (1) the amendment was futile in that Amended Parties failed to satisfy the administrative prerequisites for filing an ADA or ADEA lawsuit; (2) Robert's EEOC was untimely and therefore, Plaintiff Johnson's claim could not "piggyback" on Roberts' claim; (3) Johnson's claims are not sufficiently similar to Roberts' claims; (4) the single filing rule or piggyback rule does not apply to ADA claims; (5) Johnson's ADA claims are not similar to Roberts'; (6) Johnson's hostile work environment claims are not similar to Roberts'; (7) Johnson's claims were not filed within the statute of limitations; (8) Johnson's claims had to have been filed within 90 days of Roberts' receipt of his right to sue letter; (9) Johnson's claims did not relate back pursuant to Rule 15(c); and (10) Plaintiff's amendment is unduly delayed and prejudicial to Defendant. (Tab 25). In its orders granting the amendments, the Court rejected all of Defendant's contentions. (Tab 32, 43). Specifically, the Court stated:

Plaintiff asserts justiciable federal claims against the Defendant. Whether the claims will ultimately be successful is not the question before the Court.

(Tab 43).

The Court notes that in the present motion to dismiss, directed at all Amended Plaintiffs, that Defendant argues in its 17 page brief that the amended complaints should be dismissed because (1) the Amended Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the administrative prerequisites for filing an ADA or ADEA lawsuit; (2) the single filing rule or piggyback rule does not apply to ADA claims; (3) Robert's EEOC charge does not provide Defendant with sufficient notice of Amended Plaintiffs' claims and are not sufficiently similar; (4) Amended Plaintiffs' claims were not filed within the statute of limitations; (5) Amended Plaintiffs' claims had to have been filed within 90 days of Roberts' receipt of his right to sue letter; and (6) Amended Plaintiff's claims did not relate back pursuant to Rule 15(c). (Tab 45).

A comparison of the motions opposing the amended complaints and the present motion to dismiss shows that they are virtually identical. Likewise, Defendant implies that the Court asked for this motion because it was not appropriate to consider Defendant's objections at the time of the amendment. The Court made no such statement nor intended such. Defendant's previous objections were dealt with on the merits and with the amount of explanation they required. Further, as with the renewed motion for summary judgment, Defendant's present motion to dismiss and the objections to the amendment contain grounds for relief that are not supported by the law. Defendant argued in its objections, and the present motion, that the Amended Parties had to file their complaints or be added to the suit within 90 days of receipt by Plaintiff Roudon Roberts of his right to sue letter. (Tab 25, p. 8; Tab 38, p. 5; Tab 46, pp. 3, 4, 10). Defendant relies on Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086 (11^th Cir. 1996) and other cases for this assertion. In discussing the statute of limitations, however, the Grayson court states:

Accordingly, we conclude that a putative plaintiff must file his written consent to opt into the class action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on his ADEA claim. [FN39] A contrary ruling would mean that the piggybacking rule could be applied to virtually eliminate the statute of limitations for opt-in plaintiffs in ADEA actions.

FN39. This would of course, apply only to plaintiffs who were subject to the allegedly discriminatory act prior to November 21, 1991, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Civil Rights Act replaced the two-year and three-year statutes of limitations with a ninety-day period in which to begin a civil action after the plaintiff has received the EEOC's notice that his charge was filed. For plaintiffs who allege being subject to wrongful conduct occurring after November 21, 1991, an analogous rule would be to allow potential plaintiffs ninety days from the date they receive the notice of the opt-in class, to file their written consent to opt into the class. But see Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 308-09 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that nonfiling piggybacking plaintiffs who were demoted post-Civil Rights Act may opt into a class so long as the claimant upon whose EEOC charge they are piggybacking files suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 299, 133 L.Ed.2d 205 (1995). Compare O'Connell v. Champion Int'l Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 394 (8th Cir. 1987).

Grayson v. K Mart Corp. 79 F.3d 1086, 1107 (11^th Cir. 1996). To the extent that Grayson could be interpreted to mean that the opt-in plaintiffs' must file their notices within 90 days of the representative plaintiff receiving his right-to-sue letter, the Eleventh Circuit stated in Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554 (11^th Cir. 1997), that only plaintiffs who have filed an EEOC charge of discrimination are required to file suit within 90 days of the receipt of a right-to-sue letter. Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 2002 WL 32058462, *50 (N.D.Ga. 2002) (only person seeking to represent the class must file suit within 90 days of receipt of right-to-sue letter).

The only grounds which Defendant brings in the present motion which was not brought before is the question whether one can "piggyback" one ADA claim onto another. As this ground for objection could have been raised in Defendant's two previous objections to the amended complaints, it is DENIED without prejudice and can be raised in Defendant's motion for summary judgment if Defendant so desires. Otherwise, Defendants' motion to dismiss (Tab 45) is DENIED. Further, the parties are put on notice that further motions unsupported by fact, that are repetitive, dilatory, or unsupported by the law will be dealt with in accordance with the Court's broad discretion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

As noted previously, this case has been pending for more than two years, and except for limited discovery related to the first motion for summary judgment, no discovery has taken place. Therefore, the parties shall confer and file a joint proposed scheduling/discovery order, no later than Wednesday, July 20, 2005, so that the case may move to appropriate disposition without undue delay.

SO ORDERED.