The court concluded that it was "reasonable to infer that [the defendant's] tweet was intended to cause some action in Michigan or catch the eye of those most able to make contact with the Vangheluwes, i.e. , Michiganders[, so it] satisfie[d] the constitutional minimum." Id. at 861 (citing Tamburo , 601 F.3d at 706 ("In some of [the defendant's] messages, readers were encouraged to boycott Tamburo's products; in others, Tamburo's Illinois address was supplied and readers were urged to contact and harass him.")); see alsoFletcher v. Doig , 125 F. Supp. 3d 697, 709 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ("[A]lthough Doig's conduct [consisting of sending an allegedly false email to an Illinois auction house, resulting in cancellation of an auction,] originated outside of Illinois, he targeted [the plaintiff's art dealer], whose business was in Illinois, with the express goal of inflicting commercial harm there[, which] satisfied the ‘purposefully directed’ requirement.") (citing Tamburo , 601 F.3d at 707 ); Campbell v. Campbell , 262 F. Supp. 3d 701, 705-06 (N.D. Ill. 2017) ("It is ... clear that defendant's conduct was expressly aimed at Illinois. He sent the emails directly to [plaintiff's employer], which is located in Illinois.
Emails and calls directed at the forum state can be meaningful enough to create personal jurisdiction, seeWalden, 134 S.Ct. at 1122 ; however, the contacts here are not. Defendant principally communicated with Mr. Henning, whose signature block showed that he worked in Texas—not Illinois. The only connection with an Illinois employee occurred during the September 9, 2014 call which included Mr. Radcliffe. But the record does not show why Mr. Radcliffe joined the call; if Defendant knew Mr. Radcliffe would be joining the call; if Defendant knew Mr. Radcliffe was based in Illinois; or if Mr. Radcliffe participated in the call while physically in Illinois.Based on this record, the Court's decision in Fletcher v. Doig, No. 13 C 3270, 125 F.Supp.3d 697, 2014 WL 4920238 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 30, 2014), which Plaintiff cites (see [34] at 9), confirms that personal jurisdiction is lacking here. The Court in Fletcher found “ample evidence” that the defendant had directed his conduct at Illinois because the email and letter communications between the parties included Illinois addresses, such as on the email signature block.
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants falsely denied that Doig, an internationally renowned artist, had created a painting owned by Fletcher and thereby frustrated Plaintiffs' ability to sell the work. After the court dismissed the claims against Doig's associates, Docs. 74-75 (reported at 125 F.Supp.3d 697 (N.D. Ill. 2014)), and denied Doig's summary judgment motion, Doc. 198, the case proceeded to a bench trial. The court rendered a verdict for Doig, finding that he had not authored the painting.
Correspondence or other documents apprising a defendant of the plaintiff's location in the forum State can demonstrate the requisite knowledge. See Felland, 682 F.3d at 675 (holding that the defendant “knew the alleged harm would be felt in Wisconsin, ” in part because the plaintiffs' “Wisconsin residency was noted in various documents possessed and signed by [the defendant]”); Fletcher v. Doig, 125 F.Supp.3d 697, 708-09 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that the defendant “knowingly directed his conduct to Illinois” where he received and reviewed emails and letters noting the plaintiff's Chicago address). Here, LaPlante emailed Krieger “exclusively from [his] Bunzl e-mail account, and most if not all” of those emails “included a signature block” with “
In his reply brief, Griffin argues that personal jurisdiction is barred by Illinois's so-called fiduciary shield doctrine, which "denies personal jurisdiction over an individual whose presence and activity in the state in which the suit is brought were solely on behalf of his employer or other principal." See Fletcher v. Doig, 125 F.Supp.3d 697, 716 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). That argument was not made in his initial brief.
That is, the Court has the discretion to dismiss the case in favor of an adequate alternative forum if the “dismissal would serve the private interests of the parties and the public interests of the alternative forums.” Fletcher v. Doig, 125 F.Supp.3d 697, 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing Stroitelstvo Bulgaria Ltd. v. Bulgarian-Am. Enter. Fund, 589 F.3d 417, 424 (7th Cir. 2009)).
The acts of an agent may be attributed to the principal to establish personal jurisdiction over the principal. Fletcher v. Doig, 125 F. Supp. 3d 697, 706 (N.D. Ill 2014); see Walden, 571 U.S. at 285 ("physical entry into the State—either by the defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or some other means—is certainly a relevant contact"). Parties create an agency relationship when a "person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act."
"[T]he central issue under the fiduciary shield doctrine [is] 'whether a defendant's conduct in Illinois was a product of, and was motivated by, his employment situation and not his personal interests.'" Fletcher v. Doig, 125 F. Supp. 3d 697, 718 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting Fernalv. Square D Co., 903 N.E.2d 32, 38 (Ill. App. 2009)). Put another way, if the employee's "action in coming into Illinois ... was done solely on behalf of [his employer], he is under the fiduciary shield ... regardless of whether he exercised discretion rather than merely carrying out precise orders mechanically."
As Oracle's agent, Pappalardo identified AluminumSource as a potential buyer, which was represented by Gamba and Hoyt, who primarily were located in Wisconsin and Illinois, respectively. Id. at 3-4; Doc. 33 at 2 & n.1; see Fletcher v. Doig, 125 F. Supp. 3d 697, 706 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ("[T]he acts of an agent may be considered to be the acts of the principal in determining the principal's contacts with Illinois.") (internal quotation marks omitted). The record does not specify precisely when Hoyt's other company, Metallic, officially became a party to the negotiations.
The Court believes this is the proper rule even if, as Defendants contend, their intent was that Wood open the e-mail with the letter attached while he was in China attending a conference. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Doig, 125 F.Supp.3d 697, 709 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (quoting Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1075 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing the defendant's intent as " something like a bank shot in basketball" where the player shoots the ball off the backboard intending for it to hit the backboard, but, in so intending, his " express aim" is really to put the ball into the basket)). In sum, Strabala has made a prima facie case for the Court to assert personal jurisdiction over Defendants as to Count I.