Opinion
E073314
04-27-2021
In re the Marriage of ROBERT B. AND NATALIE PANOSSIAN-BASSLER. ROBERT B., Respondent, v. NATALIE PANOSSIAN-BASSLER, Appellant.
Natalie Panossian-Bassler, in pro. per., for Appellant. Westover Law Group, and Andrew L. Westover for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. SWD1700586) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Elaine M. Kiefer, Judge. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part. Natalie Panossian-Bassler, in pro. per., for Appellant. Westover Law Group, and Andrew L. Westover for Respondent.
This appeal arises from the ongoing marital dissolution proceeding of Robert B. and Natalie Panossian-Bassler (Panossian). Panossian appeals from several prejudgment orders, including the issuance of a three-year domestic violence restraining order protecting Robert from Panossian, an order regarding the sale of a residential property, and an order modifying the amount of Panossian's temporary spousal support. Robert argues that the order regarding the sale of the property is not appealable and that Panossian has forfeited all of her remaining arguments on appeal. We agree with Robert on both points, dismiss the appeal from the nonappealable order regarding the residential property, and otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
In March 2017, Robert petitioned for dissolution of his marriage to Panossian. Two years later, in March 2019, Robert petitioned for a domestic violence restraining order against Panossian. He alleged, among other things, that Panossian had sent him "a barrage of threatening and harassing text messages" and falsely reported him to the State of California Medical Board in order to get his medical license revoked. Attached to the petition were a six-page declaration from Robert and 13 exhibits. The court issued a temporary restraining order to protect Robert. In May 2019, Panossian cross-petitioned for a domestic violence restraining order against Robert.
In May 2019, the court held an evidentiary hearing on both parties' requests for restraining orders. Six witnesses, including Robert, testified on Robert's behalf. Two law enforcement officers testified on Panossian's behalf. Panossian did not testify. The court denied Panossian's request for a restraining order, finding that Robert had not been physically violent, threatened physical violence, or harassed Panossian. The court further found it "abundantly clear" that Panossian had harassed Robert and had "gone to extreme lengths to affect [Robert's] employment," such as by making "false allegations to the medical board," which Panossian had used "as a sword to terrorize [Robert] over and over." The court issued a three-year domestic violence restraining order to protect Robert from Panossian until May 31, 2022.
In July 2017, the court ordered Robert to pay Panossian $1,732 per month in temporary spousal support. In July 2019, the court ordered the amount of spousal support to be gradually reduced. The previous spousal support award was to remain in effect until September 2019, when the support would be reduced to $800 per month for two months. Starting in November 2019, Robert would no longer be obligated to pay Panossian any temporary spousal support.
In January 2019, the court ordered the parties to sell one of their residential properties, but by July 2019 they had received no offers to purchase it. After a hearing on the matter in July 2019, the court ordered the parties' real estate agent "to set the price for the house based on his assessment of the fair market price." During the hearing, Panossian agreed that the sale price could be reduced. The court ordered that the proceeds from the sale of the house be placed in the attorney-client trust account of Robert's attorney.
DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
Robert argues that the July 2019 order regarding the sale of the parties' residential property is a nonappealable interlocutory order. We agree.
"A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment." (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696 (Griset); Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1.) "A trial court's order is appealable when it is made so by statute." (Griset, supra, at p. 696.) "In civil cases there normally can only be an appeal from a final judgment. [Citation.] If there are unresolved causes of action between the parties, the judgment is not final and an appeal therefrom must be dismissed." (In re Marriage of Lafkas (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1432.)
This appeal is not from a final judgment. The register of actions reflects that no judgment had been entered as of November 2019, and the amended notice of appeal was filed on August 14, 2019.
Panossian instead appeals from numerous prejudgment orders, which she identified in her amended notice of appeal as follows: "Permanent Restraining Order, Orders by Court that Proceeds of Sale of Property go into Opposing Counsel's Trust Fund Account; Realtor has sole authority to determine fair market value of house for sale; Termination of Spousal Support." In the amended notice of appeal and in her opening brief, Panossian fails to identify any statutory authority making the interlocutory order regarding the sale of one of the parties' residential properties appealable. Nor are we aware of any. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1.) In general, Family Code section 2025 provides the only method for appealing interim rulings in marital dissolution actions (In re Marriage of Nicholson & Sparks (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 289, 291, fn. 1), and the record contains no indication that the requirements of that statute have been met.
Panossian did not file a reply brief and thus did not respond to Robert's argument concerning appealability. Because we do not have jurisdiction to entertain Panossian's appeal from the July 2019 order regarding the sale of the residential property, we dismiss the appeal from that order. B. Appellate Principles
The order modifying Panossian's temporary spousal support and the order issuing a domestic violence restraining order are appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6) [issuance of injunction appealable]; In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 [order reducing temporary spousal support is immediately appealable].)
Robert contends that Panossian has forfeited her remaining arguments on appeal by failing to cite the record and by failing to provide any meaningful legal analysis. We agree with both contentions.
We presume that appealed judgments and orders are correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) "All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [them] on matters as to which the record is silent" (ibid.), and an appellant, even one representing herself, bears the burden of demonstrating error (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247 (Nwosu)). "In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record." (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).) Any reference to the record in an appellate brief must be supported by "a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Failure to support an argument with citations to the record or to any legal authority results in forfeiture of the issue. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.)
Panossian challenges the trial court's issuance of a three-year domestic violence restraining order against her (which she mistakenly refers to as a civil harassment restraining order), arguing that her actions were not harassing and were constitutionally protected. We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's granting of a domestic violence restraining order and review for substantial evidence the trial court's factual findings. (In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.) In the present case, the restraining order was issued after the trial court heard testimony from eight witnesses, including Robert. Yet Panossian does not describe any of the testimony, let alone provide citations to the record for it. She also does not cite any of the evidence Robert submitted in support of his request for a restraining order. "An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment must cite the evidence in the record supporting the judgment and explain why such evidence is insufficient as a matter of law." (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408.) Because Panossian does not cite any evidence in support of her argument challenging the issuance of the restraining order, we conclude that Panossian has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating error. (Ibid.)
Likewise, Panossian's challenge to the order modifying her temporary spousal support also fails. In her statement of facts, Panossian includes one paragraph with information chronicling some history about the spousal support she received. She does not, however, include any citations to the record. Similarly, in the argument section of her brief challenging this order, the only citations to the record she provides are to the 2017 order awarding spousal support and the 2019 order modifying the amount of support. In addition, Panossian's only argument about why the court erred in modifying spousal support is a single sentence in which she claims that the court failed to consider a 2017 vocational examination of Robert in modifying the award two years later. Panossian does not provide any legal authority or argument supporting that assertion. A conclusory assertion of error without citation to the record or any legal authority is not sufficient to carry Panossian's burden of demonstrating that the trial court erred. (Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435 ["conclus[o]ry assertions are wholly inadequate to tender a basis for relief on appeal"].)
Because Panossian has not supported her claims on appeal with intelligible legal argument, citations to the record, or citations to relevant legal authority, she has failed to carry her burden of showing prejudicial error. We consequently must affirm both the restraining order and the order modifying temporary spousal support.
DISPOSITION
We dismiss Panossian's appeal from the July 8, 2019, order regarding the sale of residential property. We affirm the July 8, 2019, order modifying temporary spousal support and the three-year domestic violence restraining order issued on May 31, 2019. Robert shall recover his costs of appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. McKINSTER
J.