Opinion
No. 10-04-00357-CR
Opinion delivered and filed February 8, 2006.
Appeal from the 85th District Court, Brazos County, Texas, Trial Court No. 04-02929-Crf-85.
Affirmed.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Robbins appeals her conviction for intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(3), (f) (Vernon 2003). We affirm.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
In Robbins's first and second issues, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that she injured C.T.S. "by hitting him on his back or legs," as alleged in the indictment and as the trial court charged the jury. Besides lacerations, bruises, and other marks to his back and legs, the evidence was that C.T.S. suffered numerous bruises, abrasions and other marks to his head, face, neck, shoulder, arms, abdomen, buttocks, and groin. Robbins argues, "Although a rational trier of fact could conclude that appellant might have struck the child in some manner, there was absolutely no evidence in the record to support the State's particular allegations of where she inflicted the injuries" (emphasis in orig.).
Robbins also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that she was guilty as a party. "A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a) (Vernon 2003). The trial court instructed the jury that it could find Robbins guilty as a party if it found that her live-in boyfriend
Aaron Black did intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to C[.] T[.] S[.] . . . by hitting him on his back or legs, and you further find that Deanna Robbins had a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, and that Deanna Robbins was acting with the intent to promote or assist in its commission, and you find that Deanna Robbins failed to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense . . .
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(3) (Vernon 2003). Robbins argues, "There was no evidence presented by the State that appellant was acting with intent to assist Aaron Black when he committed the acts alleged," (emphasis in orig.) and "no evidence that appellant acted in concert with Black in causing the injuries or that she failed to make reasonable effort to prevent the injuries committed at Black's hands."
Robbins put on no evidence in the guilt-or-innocence stage of trial, and points to no evidence contrary to the verdict. The State points primarily to the following evidence. Robbins admitted:
• Robbins was frustrated with C.T.S.'s poor behavior, and she discussed "alternate measures" of discipline with Black.
• On one occasion when C.T.S. was behaving badly, Robbins went outside and left C.T.S. with Black. When she returned, C.T.S.'s face was "swollen and puffy," and Black said that C.T.S.'s discipline "had been taken care of."
• On another occasion, Robbins lost her temper and "left her head in the other room" in physically disciplining C.T.S., and "her intentions were to kill [C.T.S.] that night when she was hitting him."
• She and Black had both "put bruises on" C.T.S.
Black admitted that both Robbins and he had hit C.T.S.
Legal Sufficiency.
In Robbins's first issue, she contends that the evidence was legally insufficient. "In deciding whether evidence is legally sufficient, `the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (quoting Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981)); accord Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We hold that the jury, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found Robbins guilty as a principal or as a party. We overrule Robbins's first issue.
Factual Sufficiency.
In Robbins's second issue, she contends that the evidence was factually insufficient. "In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, both for and against the finding, and set aside the verdict if `proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof.'" Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)); see Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133-36 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Viewing this evidence in a neutral light, we hold that the proof of Robbins's guilt as a principal or as a party is not so weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination and not outweighed by contrary proof. We overrule Robbins's second issue.
PARTIES CHARGE.
In Robbins's third issue, she contends that the trial court erred in charging the jury on the law of parties. We assume without deciding that Robbins's issue is adequately briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a), 38.1(h); Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 673 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); McCarthy v. State, 65 S.W.3d 47, 49 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2906 (2005).
Robbins's argument on error is as follows, in its entirety (emphasis in orig.):
A jury charge should instruct the jury as to every theory within the scope of an indictment which the evidence tends to establish. Christian v. State , 71 Tex.Crim. 566, 161 S.W. 101 (1913); Imo v. State , 816 S.W.2d 474, 480-81 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1991, pet.ref'd); TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 36.14. In the case at bar, there is absolutely no evidence to support the submission of the parties charge to the jury.
"In general, an instruction on the law of parties may be given to the jury whenever there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict that the defendant is criminally responsible under the law of parties." Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 564 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). "Evidence is sufficient to convict under the law of parties where the defendant is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages its commission by words or other agreement." Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 739 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (quoting Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994)). For the reasons stated above, the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict that Robbins was responsible as a party. We overrule Robbins's third issue.
Having overruled Robbins's issues, we affirm.