See id. at 8 ¶ 34, 11 ¶ 43 (citing Robbins v. McCormick, 853 P.2d 1205 (Mont. 1993)).Robbins quoted the 1985 version of Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-401 (1)(b).

The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted Mont.Code Ann. § 46–18–401(1) as requiring merged sentences to run concurrently, but has not held the statute requires the sentences to become one sentence. See State v. Tracy, 2005 MT 128, ¶ 28, 327 Mont. 220, 113 P.3d 297 (defendant was entitled to credit for time served on sentences ordered to run concurrently because they merged and ran at the same time); Robbins v. McCormick, 258 Mont. 429, 853 P.2d 1205 (1993) (suspended sentence in prior charge merged with new sentences, and therefore State had no authority to require petitioner to serve the suspended portion of the prior sentence consecutively with the end of his new sentences); State v. Thiel, 242 Mont. 77, 788 P.2d 337, 339 (1990) (prior deferred sentence and suspended sentence merged with new sentence and the sentences imposed in the prior cases should be served concurrently with the sentence in the new case); In re Petition of Arledge, 232 Mont. 450, 756 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1988) (sentences in unrelated cases “shall be merged” and the consecutive sentences imposed in one case shall run concurrently with the sentences in the other cases). [¶ 16] Other courts have also interpreted the term “merge” in sentencing statutes as the equivalent of concurrent. See, e.g., Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, 271 Conn. 808, 860 A.2d 715, 724 (2004) (“The merger concept embodied in [Conn.