Opinion
C.A. No. 00A-08-001 WCC
Submitted: August 18, 2001
Decided: November 29, 2001
Upon Claimant's Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
Denied.
Randy Roark, Pro Se Plaintiff.
Jeffrey K. Martin, Attorney for Appellee Computer Aid, Inc.
James J. Hanley, Deputy Attorney General, Attorney for Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
ORDER
On this 29th day of November, 2001, upon consideration of Randy Roark's appeal from the July 10, 2000 decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, it appears to this Court that:
1. Randy Roark, (hereinafter "the claimant") was employed by Computer Aid, Inc., (hereinafter "CAI") from June 7, 1999 until January 31, 2000 as a Help Desk Analyst. In January of 2000, CAI assigned the claimant to work at the Merck facility in Lansdale, Pennsylvania. The claimant worked in Lansdale for four days, but expressed concerns with his assignment through an e-mail he sent to his supervisor. This e-mail notified his supervisor that claimant's assignment was not working, and that he preferred to work at another assignment in Newark, Delaware.
This e-mail was disregarded by CAI, and thereafter, the claimant did not report to work.
On January 17, 2000, the claimant called CAI before he attended a scheduled computer training class, and his manager instructed him not to attend the computer training class that day (January 17, 2000) as well as the January 19, 2000 class. In anticipation that he was about to be terminated and disappointed with the corporate culture surrounding CAI, the claimant resigned from CAI. Before resigning however, the claimant voluntarily signed an amendment to a previous "Associate's Agreement," which effectively voided a promissory note signed by the claimant in favor of CAI and voided a liquidation clause whereby the claimant could have been responsible for paying CAI $5,000.
Claimant was allegedly threatened with termination earlier on October 13, 1999 if he did not sign an "Associate Improvement Form," which indicated that the claimant was not doing his job. He signed this form on October 16, 1999, only after he was permitted to place his own input into the matter.
The claimant had signed this agreement with CAI when he was hired on June 7, 1999. The agreement among other things was a three year "New — Associate — In Training Agreement."
2. The claimant first filed a petition to receive unemployment insurance on March 13, 2000. In its March 30, 2000 decision, the Claims Deputy determined that the claimant voluntarily left his employment with CAI because "he was placed at a job site, which was too far for him to travel" and that "the employer states the claimant voluntarily left to pursue other employment." The Claims Deputy then made a determination that the claimant voluntarily quit without good cause and was therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. The claimant then appealed that decision on April 11, 2000 to an Appeals Referee. In its decision the Referee stated that:
Delaware Department of Labor's Claims Deputy's Decision of March 30, 2000.
Claims Deputy Decision at 1.
[a]n employee who voluntarily terminates his employment will be disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits unless he can show that he had good cause for leaving, and that his reason or reasons for doing so were directly related to his work or to his employer. Good cause can be found where there has been a substantial reduction in hours, wages or a substantial deviation in the working conditions from the original agreement of hire to the detriment of the employee.
Appeals Referee's Dec. at 3.
After a thorough review of the facts surrounding the claimant's termination, the Appeals Referee determined that:
[q]uitting one's job in anticipation of being fired, constitutes a quit for personal reasons. It is accordingly concluded that the claimant voluntarily quit his job without good cause attributable to the same within the meaning of the above-cited section of the law.
Appeals Referee's Dec. at 4.
Thereafter, the Referee affirmed the Claims Deputy decision, noting that the claimant "quit without good cause attributable to his work." After this decision, the claimant appealed to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (hereinafter "Board"). The Board notified the claimant that his appeal was scheduled for July 5, 2000, to which the claimant responded with a letter stating he would not attend the hearing due to the fact he lives in Florida. The Board thereafter held the hearing on July 5, 2000, and the claimant failed to appear. As a result of his absence, the Board dismissed the appeal for failure of the claimant to appear and prosecute. The claimant has now filed an appeal of the Board's decision with this Court.
Appeals Referee Dec. at 4.
3. The claimant's contentions on appeal merely reiterate his previous assertions made to the Claims Deputy and the Appeals Referee and he again states he was unable to attend the Board hearing because he relocated to Florida. Because his administrative remedies were not exhausted, the Board claims that this Court is jurisdictionally barred from hearing the appeal. The only jurisdiction this Court does have, according to the Board, is to determine whether the Board abused its discretion in dismissing the claimant's appeal.
CAI adopted the Board's brief and did not file a separate brief.
4. The function of this Court on review of an Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board decision is to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make factual findings in the first instance. Rather, this Court's role is to determine whether the evidence is legally adequate to support the Board's findings.
General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960).
Boughton v. Div. of Unemployment Ins., Del. Super., 300 A.2d 2, 26-27 (1972); Ridings v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., 407 A.2d 238, 239 (1979).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994).
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 231 A.2d 64, 66-67 (196).
5. The Court finds that there was substantial evidence to support the Board's decision to dismiss the claimant's appeal, and that there was no abuse of discretion, in making that decision. Delaware law provides that "the manner in which disputed claims shall be presented and the conduct of hearings and appeals shall be in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. . . ." The Board's Rules and Regulations state that all parties must be present for their hearing at the scheduled time and "any party who is not present within 10 minutes after the scheduled time for hearing shall be deemed to waive his right to participate in said hearing."
Harvey v. Con Agra, Inc. And Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., C.A. No 94A-07-003, Graves, J. (Feb. 27, 1995) (Letter Op.) at 6.
In this case, the claimant sent a letter to the Board dated June 23, 2000 informing them that he would not appear at the July 5, 2000 hearing because he had moved to Florida, but he requested that the appeal go forward. The claimant did not attempt to reschedule the hearing date, nor did he offer the Board an excuse, which would constitute good cause. The claimant did not request a different hearing date, nor did he set forth other dates that he could travel to Delaware to attend a Board hearing.
As noted in the Board's Regulations, no continuance or rescheduling of any hearing shall be granted, unless an application is made to the Board six days before the scheduled hearing date, and in such a case, a postponement for rescheduling shall be granted only for emergency circumstances, such as death in the family or serious illness. Here, the claimant's only justification for not attending the hearing was due to the fact he now lives in Florida.
6. The Board's decision to enforce procedural rules is discretionary, and this Court will not set aside the Board's decision unless its decision was unreasonable or capricious. The claimant was notified of the hearing date, and did not proffer an excuse for his absence, which would qualify as good cause, to justify a postponement of the hearing. Here the claimant simply wanted the benefit of the Board's decision without the inconvenience of complying with the rules. Under such circumstances, the Board is free to dismiss the appeal and such conduct is not unreasonable or capricious. In essence, by his own conduct, the claimant forfeited his right to appeal to this Court. The appeal is dismissed.
In re Kennedy, Del. Supr., 472 A.2d 1317, 1331 (1984).
Harvey at 6 (citing Riley v. State, Del. Supr., 496 A.2d 997, 1018 (1985)); Patterson v. Peninsula Oil Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., C.A. No. 93A-02-002, Lee, J.(Feb. 8, 1994) (Mem.Op.)at 4.
IT IS SO ORDERED.