Opinion
Civil Action No. 7:02-CV-1100-R
March 21, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before this Court is Defendant, the City of Iowa Park's, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Original Complaint (filed September 10, 2002). For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The City of Iowa Park ("Iowa Park") employed Jack McGuinn ("McGuinn") as a police officer from July 1992 to August 1995. In early 1995, McGuinn was involved ma shooting incident, which led to his resignation from the Iowa. Park police force. At the time of his resignation, McGuinn entered into a Settlement Agreement with Iowa Park (the "Agreement"). The Agreement provided, inter alia, that McGuinn would release any potential claims against Iowa Park, would not seek employment with Iowa Park in the future, and that Iowa Park would not release any information other than the dates of McGuinn's employment if it were contacted by any party considering employing McGuinn in the future.Subsequently, McGuinn sought employment with the City of Electra ("Electra") police department. Chief Glen Glasscock conducted an interview and contacted Iowa Park as a reference. Iowa Park provided only the information permitted by the Agreement. After further investigation, Chief Glasscock concluded that McGuinn was an overly aggressive officer, and, therefore, refused to hire him. Chief Glasscock documented the reasons for his hiring decision in McGuinn's applicant file which was to be kept by the Electra police department. Chief Glasscock was later terminated as Police Chief. Officer Billy Walker became the acting police chief and, subsequently, made the decision to hire McGuinn when he reapplied.
Id., ¶ 22.
Id., ¶ 23. The Complaint states that the applicant file no longer exists. Id., ¶ 24.
Plaintiffs argue that while McGuinn was employed by Electra, he and other police officers and officials of Electra, violated Plaintiffs' civil rights on a continuing basis. On May 16, 2002, Plaintiffs filed suit alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserting state law negligence and negligent retention claims.
II. ANALYSIS
A. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to challenge a complaint by moving to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A district court may only dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief" Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all doubts should be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Id. A plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations. The court will not accept as true unwarranted factual deductions or mere conclusory allegations. Id. Although limited to the contents of pleadings and their attachments, the court may consider documents attached to the motion to dismiss, if those documents were referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 498-99.
B. SECTION 1983 CLAIM
In order to state a valid claim against a city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must identify three elements: "a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose `moving force' is the policy or custom." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). No heightened pleading requirement exists for complaints against municipalities; notice pleading is the correct standard. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). A city cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. "[T]he unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official imprimatur." Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578 (footnote omitted). In other words, "there must be both municipal culpability and causation." Id. at it. 17. A single incident or a few "isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability." Id. at 578 (citing Bennett v. Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). The Fifth Circuit defines "official policy" as:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of City officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority. Actions of officers or employees of a municipality do not render the municipality liable under § 1983 unless they execute official policy as above defined.Webster v. Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd in relevant part, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984).
The link between fault and causation is straightforward where the offered proof demonstrates that the municipality intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right or where the municipality's action itself violates federal law. Board of County Comm'rs of Bryer County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997). Problems of proof are much more difficult when neither of these situations is present. Id. at 406. "[A] plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff's rights must," according to the Supreme Court, "demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with `deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious consequences." Id. at 407 (citing Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). "Simple or even heightened negligence" is insufficient to meet this standard. Id. "A plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision." Id. at 411.
In Brown, the Supreme Court refused to hold the municipality liable where the Sheriff (policymaker) had allegedly failed to screen the background of an employee who later used excessive force. Id. at 415. The Supreme Court held that:
Where a claim of municipal liability rests on a single decision, not itself representing a violation of federal law and not directing such a violation . . . there can be 110 notice to the municipal decisionmaker, based on previous violations of federally protected rights, that his approach is inadequate. Nor will it be readily apparent that the municipality's action caused the injury in question, because the plaintiff can point to no other incident tending to make it more likely that the plaintiff's own injury flows from the municipality's action, rather than from some other intervening cause.Id. at 408-9.
Here, the plaintiffs allege that the City of Iowa Park "knew or should have known" that withholding information about McGuinn in accord with the Agreement would allow him to gain employment in the future. The plaintiffs allege that this constituted a policy of the City of Iowa Park and was a proximate cause of their injuries. Plaintiffs fail, however, to cite any case law in support of their position that a former employer of a police officer can be held liable for constitutional violations that allegedly occurred after the police officer resigned from that department and was hired by another law enforcement agency. At most, Plaintiffs are alleging a negligence claim against Iowa Park. Plaintiffs have not stated facts sufficient to support a claim for deliberate indifference. Moreover, McGuinn was no longer employed by Iowa Park when the Plaintiffs allege that their constitutional rights were violated; McGuinn was employed by Electra at that time.
Plaintiffs' Original Complaint, Count 3, at 16.
C. STATE LAW CLAIMS
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that "the State is not liable for the negligence of its employees absent constitutional or statutory provisions for liability." Univ. of Tex. Men Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994) (citation omitted). The Texas Tort Claims Act (the "Act") waives governmental immunity in only certain limited circumstances. Id. Specifically, the Act provides that:
[a] governmental unit in the state is liable for:
(1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if:
(A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and
(B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimaint according to Texas law; and
(2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the government unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 101.021 (Vernon 1997).
Neither the motor vehicle nor tangible property exceptions are applicable to Plaintiffs' claim for negligence against the City of Iowa Park. Plaintiffs have not alleged the injuries arose from the use of a motor-vehicle or motor-driven equipment as required for a waiver of immunity under § 101.021(1). Section 101.021(2), quoted above, is also inapplicable because information does not constitute tangible personal property under the Act. York, 871 S.W.2d at 178-9 (holding that failure to record information in patient's file does not constitute tangible personal property under the Act). In Washington v. City of Houston, a Texas Court of Appeals held that the use or nonuse of information in personnel files did not fall within the statutory language regarding the use or nonuse of tangible personal property. Washington v. City of Houston, 874 S.W.2d 791, 795-96 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1994, no writ). In that case, a patient sued the City of Houston alleging the city's failure to maintain adequate personnel records about a physician led to the physician's ability to injure the patient. Id. at 795 ("[h]ad the City not been negligent . . . its officers would have noticed something in Titus's file that would have alerted them to his questionable character and to his propensity for questionable conduct with his patients.") Id. In addition to rejecting the patient's argument as having "no logical basis and . . . contrary to current [Texas] Supreme Court pronouncements," the Court commented on the underlying policy of avoiding countless claims brought every time someone is injured by a present or former government employee:
See also State Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Tex. 2001) (holding that information contained in policy and training manuals does not constitute tangible personal property under the Act); Dallas County v. Harper, 913 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. 1995) (holding that information contained in indictment does not constitute tangible personal property under the Act).
[a]ll governmental entities maintain personnel files on their employees, and anyone injured by a governmental employee can very easily male the allegation that, had the government entity been more careful in its preparation and investigation of the employee's personnel file, it would have found something that would have alerted it to a danger in hiring and/or supervising the employee.Id. at 795-96.
As the Washington case illustrates, a city cannot be held liable under Texas law for the use or nonuse of information contained in its personnel files when the employee commits a tort while currently employed by the city. It follows that Iowa Park cannot be held liable for the use or nonuse of information contained in its personnel files when the employee no longer works for the City and is employed elsewhere when the torts were allegedly committed. The negligent retention claim must also fail because McGuinn was not employed by Iowa Park when the torts were allegedly committed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant City of Iowa Park's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Original Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims against the City of Iowa Park are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Defendant City of Iowa Park's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed March 6, 2003) is DENIED AS MOOT.