Opinion
CL-2022-1291
08-25-2023
R.N.P. v. S.W.W.
Floyd C. Enfinger, Jr., and Margaret Enfinger Pace of Law Office of Floyd C. Enfinger, Jr.,P.C., Montrose, for appellant. Stephen P. Johnson of Stephen P. Johnson & Associates, P.C., Fairhope, for appellee.
Floyd C. Enfinger, Jr., and Margaret Enfinger Pace of Law Office of Floyd C. Enfinger, Jr.,P.C., Montrose, for appellant.
Stephen P. Johnson of Stephen P. Johnson & Associates, P.C., Fairhope, for appellee.
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
On January 15, 2019, R.N.P. ("the mother") commenced an action in the Baldwin Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") seeking to establish S.W.W.’s paternity of her child and requesting an award of custody of the child, a determination of S.W.W.’s child-support obligation, and an attorney fee. The mother’s action was assigned case number CS-19-900034.
S.W.W. commenced a separate action in which he asserted claims similar to those that the mother had asserted in her action. S.W.W.’s action was assigned case number CS-19-900061. The mother filed a motion to consolidate the two actions. The juvenile court granted that motion and ordered the two actions consolidated, and it specified that all future filings were to be filed under case number CS-19-900034.
We note that the order of consolidation did not cause the two actions to lose their separate identities or merge the two actions into one action. See Rule 42, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Ex parte Autauga Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 353 So. 3d 542, 545-46 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021); H.J.T. v. State ex rel. M.S.M., 34 So. 3d 1276, 1278 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009). The record contains no indication that any further action was taken by the parties or the juvenile court in case number CS-19-900061, and this appeal pertains solely to case number CS-19-900034. For those reasons, for the purposes of this opinion, we consider the remaining filings and orders discussed in this opinion as having been filed or entered in case number CS-19-900034.
On October 12, 2019, S.W.W. filed a motion seeking an "emergency" award of visitation with the child. In that motion, he alleged that the mother had recently stopped allowing him to exercise physical custody of or visitation with the child. On November 22, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on that motion at which it received ore tenus evidence. At the conclusion of that pendente lite hearing, the juvenile court made an oral finding that S.W.W. was the child’s legal father.
On November 25, 2019, the juvenile court entered a pendente lite order awarding the parties joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child with custodial periods on an alternating-weekly basis. That November 25, 2019, pendente lite order also set forth certain restrictions and conditions, such as directing the parties to exchange the child’s medications for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD") and to dispense that medication to the child as ordered by the child’s doctor, restricting the parties to "moderate" alcohol consumption in the presence of the child, and prohibiting, when the child is present in the home, the overnight presence of a member of the opposite sex to whom the parent is not married. In its November 25, 2019, pendente lite order, the juvenile court did not formally adjudicate S.W.W.’s paternity.
The juvenile court received ore tenus evidence at a hearing on the parties’ claims over the course of two days: July 26, 2021, and August 1, 2022. The record does not explain the reason for the year-long delay between the two days of testimony.
On August 9, 2022, the juvenile court entered a judgment adjudicating S.W.W. (hereinafter "the father") as the child’s father, awarding the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of the child, and denying the parties’ respective requests for an award of child support. The father filed a postjudgment motion on August 10, 2022. On August 17, 2022, the mother filed a postjudgment motion. The father’s August 10, 2022, postjudgment motion and the mother’s August 17, 2022, postjudgment motion could each remain pending before the juvenile court for 14 days. Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P. Because of the August 17, 2022, filing date of the later of the two postjudgment motions, which was mother’s postjudgment motion, the juvenile court had until August 31, 2022, to rule on that motion or, in the absence of a written order by the juvenile court extending the time for the juvenile court to consider the motion, the motion would be denied by operation of law. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P.
After conducting a hearing on the parties’ postjudgment motions, the juvenile court entered orders on August 24, 2022, stating that each of those motions is "granted in part and denied in part." The August 24, 2022, orders did not specify the nature of the relief that the juvenile court intended to grant or deny. Instead, those orders directed the father’s attorney to prepare, a draft of a postjudgment order. Moreover, the August 24, 2022, orders did not indicate any intent to extend the time for the juvenile court to rule on the postjudgment motions pursuant to Rule 1(B), Ala. R. Juv. P.
We note that the juvenile court’s August 24, 2022, orders did not constitute a ruling on the mother’s and father’s postjudgment motions.
"An order or a judgment need not be phrased in formal language nor bear particular words of adjudication. A written order or a judgment will be sufficient if it is signed or initialed by the judge … and indicates an intention to adjudicate, considering the whole rec
ord, and if it indicates the substance of the adjudication."
Rule 58(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).
[1] An order granting a postjudgment motion in part and denying it in part, without specifying the substance of the relief actually granted or denied, is not a ruling on the merits of that motion. Espinosa v. Espinosa Hernandez, 282 So. 3d 1, 14 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019). The August 24, 2022, orders did not mention any substantive ruling on the merits. Therefore, the parties’ postjudgment motions were denied by operation of law, at the latest, on August 31, 2022. See Rules 1(A) and (B), Ala. R. Juv. P.; Rule 59.1. Thereafter, the juvenile court lost jurisdiction to act on those postjudgment motions. Venturi v. Venturi, 233 So. 3d 982, 983 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016); see also V.B. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 356 So. 3d 199, 203 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) ("A juvenile court loses jurisdiction to take any further action on a postjudgment motion after it is denied by operation of law."); and K.G. v. M.E., 355 So. 3d 344, 348 n.3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021). Although the juvenile court entered an order on September 12, 2022, purporting to amend the August 9, 2022, judgment, that order was a nullity. Venturi v. Venturi, supra.
On September 8, 2022, the mother filed an appeal to the Baldwin Circuit Court ("the circuit court"); the appeal was timely due to the denial by operation of law of her postjudgment motion on August 31, 2022. The circuit court determined that there was an adequate record for appeal, and, as a result, it transferred the mother’s appeal to this court pursuant to Rule 28(D), Ala. R. Juv. P.
The record sets forth the following pertinent facts. The parties never married, but they were living together in June 2011, when the child was born. The father’s paternity was not disputed. According to the mother, the parties separated in 2014, and, for some period, the child lived with her and visited the father. The father testified at the November 22, 2019, pendente lite hearing that he and the mother had shared custody of the child on an alternating-weekly basis for the three-and-a-half to four years preceding that hearing date. The mother disputed a part of that statement, averring instead that the parties had shared physical custody of the child since 2017. The parties agreed that, since they separated, the father had paid the mother $350 per month in child support. In addition, the father testified that, since the time of the parties’ separation, he had paid the child’s medical expenses and all of the child’s expenses related to extracurricular activities. The father also presented evidence that he had paid for the child’s child care necessitated by the parties’ work schedules.
At the time of the pendente lite hearing, the father had been living with a woman, T.H., for approximately three years. He stated that, at the time of that hearing, he was engaged to T.H. The mother testified that she did not approve of the child staying in the father’s home with the father and a woman to whom the father was not married.
At the time of the pendente lite hearing, the father was working as a boat captain and worked "offshore" for two-to-three days at a time in the summer. The father had allowed T.H. to care for the child while he worked, and the mother had objected to that arrangement.
The father testified that in October 2019 the mother had begun refusing to allow him custodial time with the child and that she had threatened to have him arrested for kidnapping if he attempted to exercise custodial time or visitation with the child. The father stated that the mother had claimed that he had no "parental rights" to the child because his paternity had never been established pursuant to a court order. The record contains a letter from the mother’s attorney to the father’s attorney dated October 22, 2019, that states that because there was no court order allowing the father to visit the child, the mother would no longer allow the child to visit the father when T.H. was in the father’s home or if the father was working offshore. That letter also advised the father that, because there was no child-support order in place, he no longer had to contribute "the very small sum" that he had been paying the mother for the support of the child. The father testified that, after he had received that notification, he had paid the $350 per month into a savings account and used some of the amounts in that savings account to pay for items the child needed.
The mother admitted that she had restricted the father’s access to the child and that she had made the threat of having the father arrested if he attempted to exercise visitation or a custodial period with the child; she also conceded that those actions were not in the child’s best interests. The mother stated that, in addition to her concerns about the father’s living with T.H. and leaving the child with T.H. when he worked offshore during his custodial periods, she was concerned about the amount of alcohol the father consumed. The mother also believed that, during the times that the child was with the father, the father had not been dispensing the child’s medication to treat the child’s ADHD in accordance with the instructions of the child’s doctor.
As indicated above, in its November 25, 2019, pendente lite order, the juvenile court awarded the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of the child on an alternating-weekly basis. In that pendente lite order, the juvenile court also ordered, among other things, that the father dispense the child’s ADHD medications as directed by the child’s doctor, that neither party have an unrelated person of the opposite sex stay overnight in the home if the child was present, and that each parent allow the child to stay with the other parent at any time he or she might be out of town during his or her custodial period with the child.
The father and T.H. married shortly after the November 22, 2019, pendente lite hearing. The mother stated that the father’s house was a large, brick house. The father testified that that house had been purchased for $320,000, but, he claimed, T.H.’s father had either purchased the house or contributed significant funds to its purchase.
At the July 26, 2022, portion of the final hearing, the mother testified that she shares a home with her sister ("the aunt") and the child. The mother testified that the aunt is disabled and does not contribute financially to the household. The parties live approximately two-and-a-half blocks from one another.
At the final hearing, the parties presented evidence that, after the entry of the pendente lite custody order, they had worked well together in coparenting the child. The mother testified that there had been some disagreement or difficulty concerning the child’s medication for ADHD but that the issue had resolved itself before the final hearing in this matter.
Neither party submitted to the juvenile court the child-support forms required by Rule 32(E), Ala. R. Jud. Admin., either at the final hearing or at any other time during the pendency of this matter. The mother owns and operates three small businesses, and she submitted into evidence her income-tax returns from 2016 through 2019. See Rule 32(B)(3), Ala. R. Jud. Admin. (defining the term "self-employment" income in context of reaching a child-support determination). The mother testified to figures from the income-tax forms that represented what she had claimed for income-tax purposes to be her businesses profits or losses and/or her total gross income for income-tax purposes. In presenting that evidence, the mother indicated that she had claimed a total of $20,884 in income in 2016, $11,412 in income in 2017, $21,774 in 2018, and $27,382 in 2019. The mother testified at the July 26, 2022, portion of the final hearing that she had not yet compiled her records or filed her income-tax returns for the 2020 or 2021 tax years. However, she stated that she believed that her income would be the same, or only slightly higher, than her income in 2019.
Similarly, the father submitted into evidence his income-tax returns and testified that, based on his employment income, he had earned $59,358 is 2016, $62,396 in 2017, $93,485 in 2018, $107,011 in 2019, and $108,779 in 2020. See Rule 32(B)(2) (defining the term "gross income" as including, among other things, salaries and wages). The father testified candidly that he had not yet filed his 2021 income-tax returns because he was "[r]eally just wanting to see the turnout of this" matter. When the mother’s attorney attempted to cross-examine the father about that statement, the juvenile court stated that it appeared that the mother, who had not filed her incometax returns for two years, was employing the same strategy.
The father testified that in 2020 or early 2021, he resigned from his employment as a boat captain and opened his own property-management business. The father testified that he did not know his 2021 income, but that he believed it was significantly lower than the income he had earned while employed as a boat captain. The father stated, however, that he was attempting to "grow" his property-management business.
The mother contended that, because the father resigned from his employment at which he was making more money than he did in his new property-management business, the father was voluntarily underemployed. See Rule 32(B)(5), Ala. R. Jud. Admin. (providing that income may be imputed to a parent who the court finds to be voluntarily underemployed). The father, however, testified that his job as a boat captain had required him to spend several days each week away from home and that he had wanted to be in a position to stay home consistently with the child. According to the father, he wanted to be a "bigger part" of the child’s life, especially given the child’s age; the child was 11 years old at the time of the August 1, 2022, part of the final hearing. For that reason, the father said, he resigned from his employment as a boat captain. The father stated that, as of 2021, he was home every night and able to spend time with the child during his custodial periods.
[2] The mother argues on appeal that the juvenile court erred in denying her claim seeking an award of sole physical custody of the child and instead awarding the parties joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child. See § 30-3-151, Ala. Code 1975 (defining terms "sole physical custody," "joint legal custody," and "joint physical custody"). There had been no previous court order concerning the custody of the child. Therefore, the August 9, 2022, judgment constituted an initial custody determination.
Section 30-3-152, Ala. Code 1975, sets forth factors to consider when making a custody determination, providing, in pertinent part:
"(a) The court shall in every case consider joint custody but may award any form of custody which is determined to be in the best interest of the child. In determining whether joint custody is in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider the same factors considered in awarding sole legal and physical custody and all of the following factors:
"(1) The agreement or lack of agreement of the parents on joint custody.
"(2) The past and present ability of the parents to cooperate with each other and make decisions jointly.
"(3) The ability of the parents to encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact between the child and the other parent.
"(4) Any history of or potential for child abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnapping.
"(5) The geographic proximity of the parents to each other as this relates to the practical considerations of joint physical custody.
"(b) The court may order a form of joint custody without the consent of both parents, when it is in the best interest of the child."
Further, our legislature has stated:
"It is the policy of this state to assure that minor children have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of their children and to encourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of rearing their children after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage. Joint custody does not necessarily mean equal physical custody."
In discussing the review of an initial custody determination, this court has explained:
"When the trial court makes an initial custody determination, neither party is entitled to a presumption in his or her favor, and the ‘best interest of the child’ standard will generally apply. Nye v. Nye, 785 So. 2d 1147 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000); see also Ex parte Byars, 794 So. 2d 345 (Ala. 2001). In making an initial award of custody based on the best interests of the children, a trial court may consider factors such as the ‘ "characteristics of those seeking custody, including age, character, stability, mental and physical health … [and] the interpersonal relationship between each child and each parent." ’ Graham v. Graham, 640 So. 2d 963, 964 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (quoting Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Ala. 1981)). … Other factors the trial court may consider in making a custody determination include ‘the sex and age of the [children], as well as each parent’s ability to provide for the [children’s] educational, emotional, material, moral, and social needs.’ Tims v. Tims, 519 So. 2d 558, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). The overall focus of the trial court’s decision is the best interests and welfare of the children."
Steed v. Steed, 877 So. 2d 602, 604 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).
The record establishes that for at least two years before the initiation of this matter, the parties had shared physical custody of the child. With certain exceptions, that arrangement had gone well and had been beneficial to the child. Although the parents had minor disagreements about some aspects of raising the child, such as whether he needed medication for ADHD and whether he should be exposed to a person of the opposite sex living with the father, those issues were resolved by the provisions of the November 25, 2019, pendente lite custody order and the August 9, 2022, final judgment. It is clear from the record that each parent loves the child and, for the most part, each has encour- aged the child’s relationship with the other parent. The parties agreed at the August 1, 2022, portion of the final hearing that the joint physical custody award set forth in the November 25, 2019, pendente lite custody order had been workable. The father testified that the child’s behavior had stabilized and improved when the parties began to work well together to coparent the child. Further, the mother and the father live within two-and-a-half blocks of each other, so the child has easy access to each parent.
In this case, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that the best interests of the child are served by the award of joint legal custody and joint physical custody to the parties. Given the facts of this case and the presumption in favor of the juvenile court’s judgment, we cannot conclude that the mother has demonstrated that the juvenile court erred in awarding the parties joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the child. Burkett v. Burkett, 367 So. 3d 409, — (Ala. Civ. App. 2022); Hyche v. Hyche, 226 So. 3d 673, 679 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016).
[3–5] The mother next argues that the juvenile court erred in reaching its determination that child support would not be awarded to either party in this matter and that, in doing, so, the juvenile court deviated from the application of the Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., child-support guidelines. The mother correctly notes that compliance with the Rule 32 child-support guidelines is mandatory. See § 30-3-155, Ala. Code 1975 ("In making a determination of child support, the court shall apply Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration."); Morrow v. Dillard, 257 So. 3d 316, 325-26 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).
"[T]his court has consistently held that the application of Rule 32 is mandatory …. A trial court may deviate from the child-support guidelines in determining a child-support amount; however, any deviation is improper if it is not justified in writing. In Martin v. Martin, 637 So. 2d 901, 902 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994), this court issued the following directive:
" ‘ "We hold, therefore, that the word "shall" in Rule 32(E), Ala. R. Jud. Admin., mandates the filing of a standardized Child Support Guidelines Form and a Child Support Obligation Income Statement/Affidavit Form."
" ‘Compliance with Rule 32(E) is mandatory, even though the trial court may find that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inequitable. When the court determines that application of the guidelines would be manifestly unjust or inequitable, and then deviates from the guidelines in setting a support obligation, the court must make the findings required by Rule 32(A)(ii), Ala. R. Jud. Admin. When Rule 32(E) has not been complied with and child support is made an issue on appeal, this court may reverse the judgment of the tidal court and remand the case for further proceedings in compliance with Rule 32.’ "
J.M. v. D.V., 877 So. 2d 623, 630 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (quoting Thomas v. Norman, 766 So. 2d 857, 859 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (emphasis omitted).
The mother argues in her brief submitted to this court that the juvenile court’s failure to calculate a child-support amount utilizing the forms required by the Rule 32 child-support guidelines is reversible error. See J.M. v. D.V., 877 So. 2d 623, 630 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003); Holley v. Holley, 829 So. 2d 759 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), However, this court has excused the lack of the required child-support guideline forms when it has been able to discern the method by which child support was determined. Devine v. Devine, 812 So. 2d 1278, 1282-83 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); Dismukes v. Dorsey, 686 So. 2d 298, 301 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
As indicated above, as a part of complying with Rule 32, each parent was required to submit to the juvenile court the child-support forms required under Rule 32(E). Neither party did so. Moreover, although the mother asserted a claim seeking child support, she had not filed income-tax returns for two years and claimed not to know the amount of her income. The father also failed to file income-tax returns indicating his income from his new business for the 2021 tax year, and he testified only that he believed his annual income would be much lower than it had been in years past. Thus, neither parent provided the juvenile court with a documented, accurate amount of his or her income at the time of the final hearing to assist the juvenile court in the difficult determination regarding an appropriate child-support award.
In a case in which the trial court declined to award child support, this court stated:
"[W]e have not, in every instance, reversed a trial court’s child-support judgment simply because the requisite forms were not contained in the record. … If this court has been able to determine how a trial court computed the child-support obligation based on testimony or other evidence, we have affirmed. In the present case, the trial court did not award any child support. The failure of the trial court to complete a CS-42 form, which is the form upon which child support is calculated, is certainly understandable; the trial court made no computations. In addition, the parties’ respective incomes are clearly established in the record, so the lack of a CS-42 form will not impact future attempts at modification. Therefore, we will not reverse the trial court’s judgment on the basis of the absence of a CS-42 form."
Dunn v. Dunn, 891 So. 2d 891, 896 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).
The mother contends, however, that the juvenile court did not make a determination of the parties’ incomes, and, in her reply brief, she contends that a future modification action would be made more difficult because of the juvenile court’s failure to secure and complete the required child-support determination forms. Although the juvenile court did not set forth a calculation of child support on Form 42 in compliance with the requirements of the Rule 32 child-support guidelines, it found that the mother and the father "make roughly equal sums of income." The juvenile court’s finding that the parties’ incomes were approximately the same, together with its award of what it found was "true joint legal and physical custody of the minor child," constituted a basis for a deviation from the Rule 32 child-support guidelines. See Rule 32(A)(1)(a), Ala. R. Jud. Admin. (providing that one reason a court may deviate from the Rule 32 guidelines is "[s]hared physical custody or visitation rights providing for periods of physical custody or care of children by the obligor parent substantially in excess of those customarily approved or ordered by the court"); Zarr v. Zarr, 201 So. 3d 559, 564 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (noting that an award of joint physical custody is a basis for deviating from the Rule 32 child-support guidelines, but stating the court making such a deviation must state its reason for that deviation); see also Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 386 So. 3d 42, — (Ala. Civ. App. 2023) (providing that the reason for deviating from the Rule 32 child-support guidelines must be made in writing). [6] Under Rule 32(A)(1)(a), the payment of child support by one parent to another is not mandatory if the parents share joint physical custody. Bonner v. Bonner, 170 So. 3d 697, 705-06 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). The mother insists, however, that the purported disparity in the parties’ respective incomes in this case warrants an award of child support to her. The mother contends that, in resigning from his previous employment and opening his own business, the father is voluntarily underemployed and that, in determining that the parties’ incomes were approximately equal, the juvenile court erred in denying her request that it impute income to the father. The Rule 32 child-support guidelines provide that "[i]f the court finds that either parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, it shall estimate the income that parent would otherwise have and shall impute to that parent that income; the court shall calculate child support based on that parent’s imputed income." Rule 32(B)(5).
Given the parties’ failure to submit the required child-support forms and the juvenile court’s failure to calculate child-support pursuant to those forms, we are unable to conclude whether the juvenile court imputed income to the father or the extent, if any, to which it might have deviated from the calculation of child support pursuant to the Rule 32 child-support guidelines. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the juvenile court’s judgment pertaining to child support, and we remand the cause to the juvenile court to consider the issue of child support in accordance with the Rule 32 guidelines and this opinion. The new determination will require, among other things, that the juvenile court ascertain the parties’ incomes, whether to impute income to one or both of the parties, and whether it wants to deviate from the child-support guidelines. In fashioning that child-support award, the determination of the credibility of the parties’ testimony and their evidence concerning their respective incomes is, as always, a factual issue that is within the juvenile court’s discretion to resolve. See Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 655 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (providing that the issue of child support is within the discretion of the trier of fact).
The mother also argues on appeal that the juvenile court erred in failing to award her retroactive child support under § 30-3-114, Ala. Code 1975, for periods after the parties separated in 2014. That section provides:
"The order of retroactive support shall be a sum certain judgment and may cover all periods in which the non-supporting parent failed to provide support. For all time periods in which support is requested, the court shall consider the needs of the child or children and the ability of the parents to respond to these needs, and shall determine the amount of support due for each period by application of the child support guidelines found in Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration based upon the circumstances during the time period for which support is sought. If the judgment for retroactive support includes support due for a period of time in which aid was paid by the Department of Human Resources and an assignment of support rights thereby exists under Section 38-10-4[, Ala. Code 1975,] and Section 38-10-5[, Ala. Code 1975], the department shall be entitled to recover any support due the department under Section 38-10-6[, Ala. Code 1975]."
In this case, the mother’s petition did not include a request for an award of retroactive child support pursuant to § 30-3-114. The mother did assert a claim for retroactive child support during the final hearing, but she did not mention § 30-3-114. Regardless, the father did not object to the juvenile court’s consideration of the mother’s claim for retroactive child support. Therefore, the issue was tried by the implied consent of the parties pursuant to Rule 15(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.
[7] The mother contends in her brief submitted to this court that the juvenile court was required to award her retroactive child support back to 2014, when the parties separated. However, during her arguments before the juvenile court, the mother did not assert a claim for an award of child support retroactive to 2014. Instead, the mother requested that the juvenile court award her child support retroactive to the time that she filed her petition in this matter, i.e., January 15, 2019. Thus, any possible error on the part of the juvenile court in not awarding the mother child support retroactive to periods between 2014 and January 15, 2019, was invited error. See Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So. 2d 801, 808 (Ala. 2003) (discussing the doctrine of invited error); Ross v. Ross, 51 So. 3d 1037, 1044 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) ("Because the wife testified that she only wanted child support until the child began college, if the trial court committed any error in terminating the husband’s child-support obligation at that time, it was in the nature of invited error and it cannot serve as the basis to win a reversal on appeal.").
[8, 9] We reverse the judgment on the child-support issue for the failure to comply with Rule 32(E), Ala. R. Jud. Admin. " ‘The determination whether an award of retroactive child support is appropriate is dependent on the specific facts of the case.’ " Freeman v. Freeman, 84 So. 3d 989, 947 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (quoting Willis v. Willis, 45 So. 3d 347, 349 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)). On remand, in connection with its determination of the appropriate child-support award, if any, the juvenile court is free to reconsider whether it wishes to award child-support retroactive to the date of the filing of the mother’s petition.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
Edwards, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.