Opinion
24A-JT-65
06-05-2024
In re the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.P. (Minor Child) v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
Attorney for Appellant Eric D. Grzegorski Kokomo, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Katherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Howard Circuit Court The Honorable Lynn Murray, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 34C01-2306-JT-000299
Attorney for Appellant Eric D. Grzegorski Kokomo, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Katherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FELIX, JUDGE
Statement of the Case
[¶1] J.P. (the "Child") is the biological child of R.F. ("Father") and A.P. ("Mother"). In March 2022, the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") removed the Child from Mother's care and filed a petition alleging the Child was a child in need of services ("CHINS") due to concerns about Mother's substance abuse. Father was incarcerated at that time, so he could not take the Child. The trial court adjudicated the Child a CHINS, and DCS eventually filed a petition to terminate Mother's and Father's (collectively, "Parents") parental rights. Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to the Child, and after a hearing, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights to the Child. Father now challenges that termination and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights was clearly erroneous.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On December 27, 2017, the Child was born. Father established paternity by affidavit in 2017 or 2018. Less than one month after the Child's birth, DCS removed the Child from Mother's care due to Mother's drug use and placed him with a foster family. DCS initiated a CHINS proceedings (the "2018 CHINS Case"), but that case was converted to an informal adjustment to address Mother's drug use while the Child remained in Mother's care. In January 2019, the 2018 CHINS Case was closed.
[¶4] On March 19, 2022, Hamilton County DCS received a report alleging the Child was a victim of abuse or neglect due to Mother possessing and using illegal substances. Specifically, law enforcement officers stopped Mother while she was driving with the Child in her car and discovered Mother and her passenger were under the influence of illicit substances and that there were several fluid-filled syringes in the car. After officers took Mother into custody, she ingested a bag of heroin, overdosed, and was taken to a local hospital. DCS took custody of the Child that night and placed him with his prior foster family. On March 21, 2022, DCS filed a verified petition alleging the Child was a CHINS. At that time, Father was on work release and was "able to have a few visits" with the Child, Tr. Vol. II at 13, but on August 7, 2022, Father escaped from the facility, was re-arrested, and incarcerated. Prior to 2022, Father had never met or visited the Child.
[¶5] On January 3, 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the CHINS petition. On January 13, 2023, the trial court adjudicated the Child a CHINS. On February 3, 2023, the trial court entered a dispositional order requiring Mother and Father to participate in certain services, maintain their sobriety, and "[o]bey the law." Tr. Vol. IV at 77-81. On March 13, 2023, the trial court approved the Child's permanency plan of reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. On June 21, 2023, DCS filed a verified petition to involuntarily terminate Parents' rights to the Child. The trial court subsequently appointed a Guardian ad Litem.
[¶6] On November 20, 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on DCS's termination petition. Shortly before that hearing began, Mother decided to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to the Child, and the trial court terminated her rights accordingly. The trial court then proceeded to hear evidence concerning DCS's request to involuntarily terminate Father's parental rights to the Child.
[¶7] On December 11, 2023, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights to the Child. In its order, the trial court made the following relevant findings and conclusions:
37. At the TPR Fact Finding Hearing, Father testified to his extensive criminal history . . ., his relationship with the Child prior to the Department's involvement, and his history with illegal substances....
38. Father self-described his criminal history as "extensive," admitting it dates back at least 20 years. He described being incarcerated consistently since around January 2020.
42. According to Father, he did not have much contact, including visitation, with Child prior to the Department's removal and detention in March 2022. Father blamed Mother for his lack of contact and could not recall if he ever petitioned
for court-ordered visitation. Father failed to describe any substantial or definitive measures he took to be part of the Child's life prior to the Child's removal by DCS in March 2022.
44.... The Child needs a stable, loving, and permanent home, free of illegal substance use and criminal activity, which has been and would be delayed by waiting for Father to be released from the [Indiana Department of Correction]. Based upon Father's history of non-involvement with the Child and his criminal behaviors, it is unlikely that once released, Father would successfully participate in offered family services or be in a position to provide appropriate long-term care and custody for the Child.
53. The Child was removed due to allegations of illegal substance use by Mother.... Father's earliest possible release date is May 2027. Father claims an earlier release if he complies with certain programs while incarcerated; however, Father's history of non-compliance with probation and similar programs, coupled with his lengthy criminal history, raises doubt about his ability to comply. There is no indication that those circumstances have significantly changed in any positive way.
56. This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is reasonably probable that the conditions that led to the removal and to the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied to the degree that Father will be able to provide the
Child with the nurturing, stability, and care that they require on a long-term basis. * * *
58. The Court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the parent-child relationship between the child and Father poses a threat to the well-being of the child. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the Child because . . . he needs permanency with caregivers who can provide him with a nurturing environment that is secure and free from substance use and neglect and meets . . . his needs until . . . he reaches the age of majority. Father has failed to demonstrate an ability to parent the Child safely or to provide him with the nurturing, stable, and appropriate care and environment that he requires on a long-term basis. Since the Department became involved, Father has clearly demonstrated that he cannot or will not cease criminal activity and work towards creating a stable, loving home for the Child....
59. The Court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship between Father and Child is in Child's best interest in that further efforts to reunite Father and Child are unlikely to succeed.... Failure to terminate the parent-child relationship at this time would simply deny the Child the stability and permanency to which they are entitled, and which has already too long been denied. It is in the Child's best interests to have permanency, not perpetual wardship and uncertainty.
60. The Court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Child, which plan is to place the Child for adoption.... [I]n this case, current placement has voiced their intent to adopt.Appellant's App. Vol. II at 121-27. Father now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶8] Father challenges the trial court's termination of his parental rights over the Child. "Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children-but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated." In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45-46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.
[¶9] To terminate Father's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that, among other things,
(B) one of the following is true:
(i) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied,
(ii) there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of Father's relationship with the Child poses a threat to the well-being of the Child, or
(iii) the Child has, on two separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) termination is in the best interests of the Child; and
(D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Child.See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023); id. § 31-37-14-2.
[¶10] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous if the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Father does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.
[¶11] On appeal, Father challenges only the trial court's conclusions that he has not remedied the reasons for the Child's removal from his care and that the continuation of his relationship with the Child is a threat to the Child's wellbeing. Father does not challenge the trial court's conclusions that terminating the parent-child relationship is in the Child's best interests and that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Child. Father also does not expressly challenge any of the trial court's findings, including those underpinning the challenged conclusions. See Appellant's Br. at 10-13. To the extent Father's arguments can be read to challenge particular findings, those arguments are merely invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). Therefore, considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Father has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for the Child's removal and that the continuation of Father's relationship with the Child is a threat to the Child's well-being. We affirm the trial court's termination decision.
[¶12] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.