Thus, several courts have concluded that reasonable royalties and permanent injunctions can co-exist without running afoul of the one-satisfaction rule. See RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 200 F. Supp. 2d 916, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2002); TMRJ Holdings, 540 S.W.3d at 209-10; Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Johnson, 23 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Colo. App. 2001). Those courts reasoned that the royalties were permissible because they arose from some "use of the misappropriated information prior to the issuance of the injunction.

Thus, a party must present all of its evidence at trial and cannot withhold facts for post-trial motions. RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 200 F. Supp. 2d 916, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Likewise, a party cannot raise arguments for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. See Craft v. Flagg, No. 06 CV 1451, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44604 at **3-4 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2009) (the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is not to offer litigants a second bite of the apple).

Because direct evidence of misappropriation of trade secrets is typically not available, under Illinois law a plaintiff can rely on circumstantial evidence to prove misappropriation. RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 200 F. Supp.2d 916, 923 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Beyond mere admissibility, Illinois law appears remarkably unclear as to what level of circumstantial evidence qualifies as sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Prime cites Filter Dynamics Intern., Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 311 N.E.2d 386, 399 (Ill.App.Ct. 1974) to justify its position that the Court require "clear and convincing" circumstantial evidence.

Instead, a motion to reconsider is appropriate when the Court has "patently misunderstood a party, made a decision outside of the issues presented to the Court, or made an error not of reasoning, but of apprehension." RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 200 F. Supp.2d 916, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2002). In order to support a motion to reconsider on newly discovered evidence, the moving party must "show not only that this evidence was newly discovered or unknown to it until after the hearing, but also that it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced such evidence [during the pendency of the motion]."

See Motorola Sols,, Inc. v. Hytera Commc'ns Corp. Ltd., Case No. 1:17-cv-01973, 2021 WL 6690279, at *2 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 14, 2021) (citing Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., 53 F.Supp.3d 929, 932 (E.D. Tex. 2014) (adopting patent law analysis for reasonable royalty on state law trade secret misappropriation claim); RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 200 F.Supp.2d 916, 926-27 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (same)). While there are several methods to calculate reasonable royalty, at issue in this case, and the most common, is the hypothetical negotiations or the “willing licensor-willing licensee” method. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This method “attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before infringement began.

See Bowling v. Hasbro, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 192, 204-05 (D.R.I. 2008) (noting the "element of approximation and uncertainty inherent in the reasonable royalty rubric"). It assumes a fiction—that both parties would have been willing to negotiate and agree to a royalty—in order to fashion a viable remedy in a case like this, where there are no other quantifiable damages. In other cases, plaintiffs have sought a reasonable royalty for defendants' past use of trade secrets, and then a permanent injunction to prevent any future use. See, e.g., Language Line Servs., Inc. v. Language Servs. Associates, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ("Language Line clarifies in its response that it seeks a reasonable royalty for past use of trade secrets . . . and a permanent injunction to prevent future misappropriation . . . ."); RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 200 F. Supp. 2d 916, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("These cases are distinguishable from the case at hand because this Court did not award any damages for future use of the misappropriated information, but rather only awarded damages for the use and disclosure of Roll-Kraft's trade secrets for the period before the injunction issued."); cf. Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 929, 932, 938-39 (E.D. Tex. 2014) ("In patent cases in which a permanent injunction is sought, the Federal Circuit has held that a district court may impose a reasonable royalty on the defendant for future use of the patented invention in lieu of an injunction."). Here, however, the $90 million reasonable royalty requested by CardiAQ did not distinguish between past and future use of its trade secrets.

As to the third element, Illinois courts have held that "intentional and unjustified inducement" requires a showing that the defendant "acted intentionally . . . to induce the breach." Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Serv., Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17, 33, 691 N.E.2d 835, 845 (1st Dist. 1998) (internal citations omitted); RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 200 F. Supp. 2d 916, 924 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that conduct conveying to the third person defendant's desire to influence him to breach the contract constitutes inducement); Medline Industries, Inc , 2004 WL 422718, at *12 (finding that plaintiff's tortious interference with contract claim failed because plaintiff's complaint did not allege that defendant intended to induce breach of contract); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 766 ("One does not induce another to commit a breach of contract with a third person . . . when he merely enters into an agreement with the other with the knowledge that the other cannot perform both it and the contract with the third person."); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 766 cmt. h

Ultimately, however, the issue is academic in this case, as defendant's motion fails to meet any potentially applicable standard for "reconsideration" of our May 16, 2011 ruling. See, e.g., RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 200 F. Supp. 2d 916, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("Post-trial motions [under Rules 52(b) or 59(e)] serve the limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or presenting newly discovered evidence. Such motions are not vehicles to introduce new evidence that could have been presented at trial.

( Id. at 48-50.) In contending that the Plaintiffs may not obtain relief by means of a post-trial motion, the Defendants rely on RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 200 F.Supp. 2d 916, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2002). As the decision of a parallel district court, RKI is not binding precedent. More importantly, the circumstances of RKI are distinguishable.

Additionally, these two items, having not been admitted into evidence at trial, certainly should not be considered for the first time in a motion made pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after I have issued Findings and entered judgment. Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir.1997); Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum, 791 F.2d 1207, 1219-20 (5th Cir.1986); RKI Inc. v. Grimes, 200 F.Supp.2d 916, 920-21 (N.D.Ill.2002); Hollis v. Buffalo, 189 F.R.D. 260, 262-63 (W.D.N.Y.1999). " On a party's motion filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings-or make additional findings-and may amend the judgment accordingly."